2017 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases and Public Laws of Note by unknown
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 3 Article 8
Summer 2018
2017 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases and
Public Laws of Note
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Contracts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal
Procedure Commons, Family Law Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Labor and Employment
Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Property Law and Real
Estate Commons, Torts Commons, and the Workers' Compensation Law Commons
This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
(2018) "2017 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases and Public Laws of Note," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 23 : Iss. 3 ,
Article 8.
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol23/iss3/8
  
 
 
 
 
 
2017 Survey of Rhode Island Law 
 
 
CASES 
 
Civil Procedure 
Limoges v. Nalco Co., 
157 A.3d 567 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 606 
Pullar v. Cappelli, 
148 A.3d 551 (R.I. 2016)........................................................ 612 
Contract Law 
Cote v. Aiello, 
148 A.3d 537 (R.I. 2016)........................................................ 617 
Nappa Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 
152 A.3d 1128 (R.I. 2017) ..................................................... 624 
Criminal Law 
Duvere v. State, 
151 A.3d 314 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 631 
State v. Adams, 
161 A.3d 1182 (R.I. 2017) ..................................................... 636 
State v. Fuentes, 
162 A.3d 638 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 646 
State v. Pacheco, 
161 A.3d 1166 (R.I. 2017) ..................................................... 652 
State v. Parrillo, 
158 A.3d 283 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 660 
State v. Terzian, 
162 A.3d 1230 (R.I. 2017) ..................................................... 669 
603 
 604 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:603 
 
Employment Law 
Mancini v. City of Providence, 
155 A.3d 159 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 677 
 
Injunctive Relief 
Paolino v. Ferreira, 
153 A.3d 505 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 683 
 
Insurance Law 
Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc., 
161 A.3d 1150 (R.I. 2017)...................................................... 693 
Jackson v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
159 A.3d 610 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 701 
 
Labor and Employment Law 
Beagan v. R.I. Dept. of Labor & Training, Bd. of Review, 
162 A.3d 619 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 707 
 
Legal Malpractice 
DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell, Ltd., 
152 A.3d 413 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 714 
 
Property Law 
Kilmartin v. Barbuto, 
158 A.3d 735 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 720 
 
Tort Law 
Bates-Bridgmon v. Heong’s Mkt., Inc., 
152 A.3d 1137 (R.I. 2017)...................................................... 729 
O’Connell v. Walmsley, 
156 A.3d 422 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 739 
Roach v. State, 
157 A.3d 1042 (R.I. 2017)...................................................... 745 
 
Workers’ Compensation 
Ajax Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 
154 A.3d 913 (R.I. 2017)........................................................ 755 
 2018] SURVEY SECTION 605 
Zoning Law 
Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Ass’n v. Pres. Soc’y of 
Newport Cty., 
151 A.3d 1223 (R.I. 2017) ..................................................... 763 
LEGISLATION 
2017 Public Laws of Note ........................................................... 769 
  
 
 
 
 
Civil Procedure. Limoges v. Nalco Co., 157 A.3d 567 (R.I. 2017). 
A Rhode Island Supreme Court justice has the authority to vacate 
a trial justice’s grant of summary judgment if the hearing justice 
made an improper credibility assessment, a function that should 
be reserved for the factfinder at trial. The function of the trial 
justice in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is to 
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The Plaintiff,1 Mr. Limoges, was employed by the State of 
Rhode Island as an Assistant Administrator to Facilities and 
Operations.2 He oversaw the heating, ventilation, and air 
condition (HVAC) systems in the state’s courthouses.3 On August 
8, 2008, a pipe at the Garrahy Judicial Complex in Providence 
ruptured, causing the chemical bromine to leak.4 While cleaning 
up the scene, Mr. Limoges inhaled the chemical, which later 
caused him to suffer pulmonary injuries.5 
The Plaintiffs brought suit against three different companies: 
Nalco Company; Arden Engineering Constructors, LLC (Arden); 
and JMB Mechanical, Incorporated (JMB), for negligence, strict 
liability, and breach of warranty claims.6 After discovery 
proceedings had begun, both JMB and Arden moved for summary 
judgment.7 JMB was granted summary judgment on all three 
counts; Arden was granted summary judgment on the counts of 
strict liability and breach of warranty.8 At the time of the initial 
hearing, the Plaintiffs were unprepared to argue against the 
 
 
1. Plaintiff in the singular refers to Mr. Limoges. Ms. Limoges’ sole 
claim is for loss of consortium. 
2. Limoges v. Nalco Co., 157 A.3d 567, 568 (R.I. 2017). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 568–69. 
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summary judgment motion on the negligence count; therefore, the 
hearing justice granted the Plaintiffs an additional two weeks to 
secure expert testimony that would assist in establishing a prima 
facie negligence case.9 
After the two weeks, the Plaintiffs filed a supplemental 
memorandum and an expert affidavit.10 In response, Arden was 
granted an additional two weeks to respond to the Plaintiffs’ 
expert affidavit.11 When it was time for the hearing justice to 
consider Arden’s motion for summary judgment, Arden asserted 
that it should be granted summary judgment because the 
Plaintiffs’ expert’s conclusions were not supported by any facts.12 
The Plaintiffs contended that their expert’s affidavit was sufficient 
to establish duty and breach.13 Unconvinced by the expert’s 
affidavit, the hearing justice granted Arden’s motion for summary 
judgment.14 The Plaintiffs timely appealed to Rhode Island 
 
 
9. Id. at 569. The hearing justice treated Plaintiffs’ argument as a 
request under Rule 56(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 
10. Id. The affidavit said, in relevant part: 
(a) Arden, by and through its agents, employees, and assigns, had a 
duty to carefully and professionally remove, replace, and/or re-align 
the piping connecting the chemical feed system to the chillers when 
it replaced the chillers in 2006; and (b) Arden, by and through its 
agents, employees, and assigns, had a duty to carefully and 
professionally inspect the piping connecting the chemical feed 
system to the chillers when it replaced the chillers in 2006; and (c) 
Arden either caused the crack in the piping when it replaced the 
chillers in 2006, at which time it removed, replaced, and/or re- 
aligned the piping connecting the chemical feed system to the 
chillers; or (d) Arden failed to inspect and discover a crack in the 
piping connecting the chemical feed system to the chillers when 
removed, replaced, and/or re-aligned the piping connecting the 
chemical feed system to the chillers in 2006. 
Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that “there [was] no paper record 
here that [showed that the pipe] was cracked in 2006.” Id. 
13. Id. at 570. “Of the four elements of negligence, only duty is a 
question of law.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Alston, 154 A.3d 456, 459 (R.I. 
2017)). The remaining three elements of a negligence claim are fact-based, 
and the hearing justice may treat the issue of negligence as a matter of law 
only if the facts suggest only one reasonable inference. Id. at 570–71 (first 
quoting Hall v. City of Newport, 138 A.3d 814, 820 (R.I. 2016); and then 
quoting Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1218 (R.I. 2013)). 
14. Limoges, 157 A.3d at 570. 
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Supreme Court.15 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon conducting a de novo review of the hearing justice’s 
grant of summary judgment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
sought to determine whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
[a] matter of law.”16 Here, it was uncontested that Arden replaced 
the chiller units in 2006.17 According to Plaintiffs, genuine issues 
of material fact remained in dispute about the standard of care 
Arden was required to use while replacing the chiller units.18 
The Court held that the Plaintiff’s’ expert affidavit, combined 
with the other documents available to the hearing justice, raised a 
material question of fact as to whether Arden was responsible for 
the Plaintiff’s injury.19 In drawing all inferences in favor of the 
Plaintiffs, Arden, while replacing the chiller units, should have 
noticed that the piping was incorrect, and should have warned the 
Plaintiff or whoever oversaw the HVAC system at the courthouse 
in 2006.20 
Additionally, the Court addressed Arden’s concern that the 
expert affidavit was “insufficient because it is unsupported by the 
record, wholly conclusory, and does not set forth any specific facts 
as the basis for [its] opinion that Arden was somehow  
negligent.”21 The Court reiterated  that hearing justices should  
not make credibility assessments during summary judgment 
motions.22 The function of a summary judgment motion is issue 
 
 
15. Id. 
16. Id. (first quoting Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I. 2005); 
and then quoting Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 497 (R.I. 2003)). 
17. Limoges, 157 A.3d at 571. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. Plaintiff swore in an interrogatory answer that Arden did install 
the pipe in question. Additionally, Plaintiff testified during a deposition that 
one of Arden’s employees told him that the pipe that burst was the wrong 
kind of pipe. Id. 
20. Id. at 572. 
21. Id. at 571. 
22. Id. (first quoting DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125, 131 (R.I. 2013); 
and then quoting Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43, 48 (R.I. 1999)). 
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finding, not issue determination.23 At trial, the Plaintiffs’ expert 
would be subject to cross-examination, and it would ultimately be 
left up to a factfinder to determine his credibility.24 For the 
foregoing reasons, the Court vacated the Superior Court’s 
judgment and remanded the record to that tribunal.25 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that 
the primary role of the Court when ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment is issue finding determinative, not issue 
determination. The Court recently addressed a similar issue in 
which they also vacated the Superior Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in a negligence action.26 These rulings reiterate the 
distinct functions of the Court and the factfinder regarding 
summary judgment motions. It is the role of the courts to 
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Only 
when a review of the admissible evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party reveals no genuine issues of 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, will the Supreme Court uphold the hearing justice’s 
grant of summary judgment.27 
Issue determination (in this case, credibility assessment), is a 
function that is left to the factfinder at trial. During trial, 
witnesses will be subject to three truth telling tools: the oath, 
demeanor evidence, and cross-examination. It is with these tools 
that a factfinder will be able to determine the credibility of a 
witness. Here, Arden would have the ability during cross- 
examination to point out the deficiencies in the Plaintiffs’ expert 
affidavit.28 Under oath, the Plaintiffs’ expert would have to 
explain his findings and state the facts that supported his 
conclusory statements. The jury would have the opportunity to 
 
23. Limoges, 157 A.3d at 571–72 (first quoting Goodkin v. DeMaio, 664 
A.2d 1119, 1120 (R.I. 1995) (mem.); and then citing Hodge v. Osteopathic 
Gen. Hospital of R.I., 265 A.2d 733 (1970)). 
24. Limoges, 157 A.3d at 572. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. (citing Williams v. Alston, 154 A.3d 456 (R.I. 2017)). 
27. Limoges, 157 A.3d at 570 (first quoting Nat’l Refrigeration, Inc. v. 
Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 971 (R.I. 2008); and then quoting 
Carlson v. Town of Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1129, 1131 (R.I. 1999)). 
28. Limoges, 157 A.3d at 572. 
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study the expert’s responses, both voluntary and involuntary, and 
decide whether they deemed his testimony reliable. By vacating 
the Superior Court’s judgment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the distinct functions of the courts and the factfinder 
regarding summary judgment motions. 
This decision emphasized the high bar the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court requires moving parties to meet to be granted 
summary judgment. A summary judgment is an  “extreme 
remedy” that is only to be granted when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact.29 Here, even though the expert affidavit lacked a 
factual basis, the Court still decided that it was enough to deny 
summary judgment. The Court determined that the conclusory 
statements from the expert affidavit, paired with other documents 
that were available to the hearing justice at the time, was enough 
to create a genuine issue of fact. This issue of fact is all that is 
needed for a summary judgement motion to be denied. The 
credibility of the expert’s statements is not of concern at this point 
in the proceedings. The Plaintiffs will be left to their proof at 
trial.30 
Here, the Court properly reversed the Superior Court’s grant 
of summary judgment because: (1) plaintiffs should get their day 
in court; (2) credibility determinations are made at trial; and (3) a 
trial provides the forum for revealing flaws in the affidavit, not a 
summary judgment hearing. Plaintiffs seek litigation with the 
assumption that they will have an opportunity to be heard, to 
voice one’s complaints and explain one’s actions. A grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the moving party eliminates this 
opportunity. Courts should continue to set high bars to shield 
plaintiffs from losing their day in court. Additionally, credibility 
determinations should always be made at trial. As mentioned 
above, credibility determinations should be left to the trier of 
facts. This responsibility requires the jury to determine what the 
truth is and who is telling the truth. By allowing credibility 
determinations to be made at summary judgment proceedings, 
courts are robbing jurors of their primary role. By requiring a  
high bar for moving parties to be granted summary judgment, the 
courts are preserving the ultimate function of the jury. Lastly, 
 
 
29. Id. at 570. 
30. Id. at 572. 
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trial provides a forum for each legal counsel to reveal flaws and 
errors in the other sides arguments. It is important that these 
faults are recognized at trial and not during a summary judgment 
hearing because these faults are brought to the attention of the 
jury, which impacts their decisions making abilities. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a genuine issue of 
material fact existed as to whether Arden was responsible for the 
Plaintiffs’ injuries. Here, the Court reiterated that a hearing 
justice should not make credibility assessments, a function that 
should be reserved for the factfinder at trial. 
 
Michaela Bland 
  
 
 
 
 
Civil Procedure. Pullar v. Cappelli, 148 A.3d 551 (R.I. 2016). A 
defendant forfeits the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction when 
the defendant, through delay or conduct, gives a plaintiff a 
reasonable expectation that it will defend the suit on the merits or 
causes the court to go to some effort that would be wasted if 
personal jurisdiction is later found lacking. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 2006, Plaintiff, Anthony Pullar, a Rhode Island resident, 
entered into a three-year employment contract with Defendant, 
Louis Cappelli, a resident of New York, to serve as the captain of 
defendant’s sailboat, the S/Y Atlanta.1 Defendant retained the 
right to terminate the agreement at any time for good cause.2 If 
Plaintiff served the entire three-year term, he would be entitled to 
a bonus of $150,000, equivalent to one year’s salary.3 Plaintiff 
began performance in September of 2006.4 
On August 1, 2009, one month before the contract expired, 
Defendant terminated Plaintiff without cause and failed to deliver 
the bonus payment.5 As a result, Plaintiff filed suit on April 22, 
2011, in the Superior Court of Rhode Island, alleging breach of 
contract and seeking compensatory damages for the money owed.6 
Defendant, in his answer, asserted that Rhode Island did not have 
personal jurisdiction over him.7 Notwithstanding Defendant’s 
jurisdictional challenge, the case proceeded in the Superior Court 
for more than three and a half years, during which the parties 
participated in pretrial proceedings and engaged in extensive 
discovery.8 
 
1. Pullar v. Cappelli, 148 A.3d 551, 553 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
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On December 4, 2013, the case advanced to court-annexed 
arbitration. Defendant, after fully participating in the arbitration, 
received an adverse result and rejected the arbitration award.9 
Plaintiff then moved to assign the case to trial.10 On November  
14, 2014, Defendant filed a motion requesting for the case to be 
assigned to the continuous jury trial calendar.11 After a hearing  
on the motion, the case was set for trial.12 
On December 9, 2014, three and a half years after filing his 
initial answer and faced with an impending trial, Defendant 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that he lacked sufficient 
contacts with Rhode Island to be within the forum’s jurisdictional 
reach.13 In response, Plaintiff argued that Defendant forfeited the 
defense by failing to assert it for three and a half years while 
actively participating in the litigation process.14 Despite  
Plaintiff’s contentions, the Superior Court granted the motion, 
concluding that Defendant had not waived the defense because it 
was properly asserted in his answer.15 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg wrote for the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court.16 The Court, as a matter of first 
impression, was tasked with determining “whether a defendant in 
a diversity action may waive or, more befittingly, forfeit the 
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction through delay or other 
conduct that demonstrates an intent to litigate.”17 In other words, 
whether Defendant forfeited the defense by actively participating 
in the litigation for more than three and a half years without 
asserting it.18 The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s review of a 
lower court’s dismissal of an action for lack of personal jurisdiction 
is de novo.19 
 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 554. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 553. 
17. Id. at 554. 
18. See id. 
19. Id. (citing Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836 
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To challenge a forum’s jurisdictional reach, a defendant must 
assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in the answer.20 
However, a defense is not preserved indefinitely simply because it 
was raised in the answer.21 More specifically, a defendant, 
through delay or conduct, forfeits the defense of lack of personal 
jurisdiction by indicating an intent to litigate on the merits or 
causing the court to go through some effort that would be wasted 
if jurisdiction is later found lacking.22 Thus, the Court held that 
Defendant forfeited the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by 
participating in pretrial proceedings, discovery, and arbitration, 
for more than three and a half years without asserting the defense 
despite having numerous opportunities to do so.23 
In so holding, the Court first looked to Rule 12 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance.24 Rule 12 requires 
defendants to seasonably assert affirmative defenses at the 
pleading stage to eliminate unnecessary delay, avoid unfair 
hardship on plaintiffs, and conserve judicial time and resources.25 
Nevertheless, federal courts invoke the doctrine of forfeiture when 
a defendant fails to seasonably assert a properly raised 
jurisdictional defense or submits to the jurisdiction of the court 
through his or her conduct.26 
The Court––persuaded by the established precedent of the 
federal courts––adopted the doctrine of forfeiture.27 To determine 
whether a defendant forfeited jurisdictional defense, the Court 
looks to: (1) the amount of time that passed between the answer 
and the assertion of the defense; (2) whether the defendant 
actively participated in the litigation before raising the defense; 
and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity to raise the 
defense throughout the litigation process.28 
 
A.2d 1113, 1117 (R.I. 2003)). 
20. Id. at 555. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 558. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 556. See Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476–77 (R.I. 2004) 
(“Rhode Island Rule 12(b) is nearly identical to Rule 12(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. See Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 62 (2nd Cir. 
1999). 
27. Id. at 557. 
28. See id. 
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Turning to the facts of this case, three and a half years passed 
between Defendant’s answer and motion for summary judgment 
for lack of personal jurisdiction.29 Prior to Defendant’s motion on 
the eve of trial, Defendant participated in extensive discovery, 
appeared at pretrial hearings, submitted motions, participated in 
arbitration, and even consented to a jury trial.30 Defendant had 
numerous opportunities to raise the defense throughout the 
litigation process and failed to do so.31 Notably, the Court opined 
that it would be contradictory for a defendant to consent to the 
terms of a court proceeding and at the same time remain outside 
the court’s jurisdictional reach.32 
Ultimately, Defendant slept on his right to challenge 
jurisdiction in Rhode Island.33 Due to Defendant’s unjustified 
delay and considerable pretrial activity, the notions of fair play 
and justice were not offended by requiring him to accede to 
jurisdiction in Rhode Island.34 Accordingly, the Court vacated the 
judgment of the Superior Court, and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.35 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of 
forfeiture and held that a defendant forfeits the defense of lack of 
personal jurisdiction when the defendant demonstrates an intent 
to litigate and causes the court to waste valuable time and 
resources prior to finding that jurisdiction is improper.36 The 
forfeiture doctrine is essential to effectuating the purpose of 
requiring affirmative defenses to be promptly asserted.37 Absent 
the possibility of forfeiture, litigants’ ability to raise an affirmative 
defense and subsequently assert that defense later in the 
litigation process creates unnecessary delay and is unfair to the 
opposing party.38 
 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 558. 
32. Id. at 557–58. 
33. Id. at 558. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. See id. 
38. Id. at 557. 
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After adopting the doctrine of forfeiture, the Court analyzed 
the two ways in which a defendant may forfeit an affirmative 
defense.39 Although the language employed by the Court seems to 
suggest that forfeiture occurs either by indicating an intent to 
litigate or causing the court to go through some effort that is 
wasted if jurisdiction is later found lacking, it is evident that 
defendant’s actions in this case exceeded the requirements of both 
prongs.40 After three and a half years of litigation and 
considerable pretrial activities, it was evident that the assertion of 
the defense was nothing more than an eleventh-hour attempt to 
avoid an inevitable trial.41 Thus, the “defendant’s silence in the 
face of a known right” constituted forfeiture of the affirmative 
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.42 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, as a matter of first 
impression, adopted the doctrine of forfeiture and held that a 
defendant may forfeit the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, 
through unjustified delay or conduct, that either indicates an 
intent to litigate or causes the court to waste valuable time and 
resources if jurisdiction is later found lacking.43 The Court 
determined that the adoption of the doctrine was necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the rule, requiring defendants to raise 
affirmative defenses in responsive pleadings to avoid unnecessary 
delay. 
 
Stephen D. Lapatin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. Id. 
40. See id. at 558. 
41. See id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
  
 
 
 
 
Contract Law. Cote v. Aiello, 148 A.3d 537 (R.I. 2016). An 
implied contract or claim for promissory estoppel cannot be found 
when essential elements of the contract were never agreed upon 
by the parties. Additionally, even where a plaintiff succeeds on an 
unjust enrichment claim, he must present the proper evidence to 
determine the amount of damages he is entitled to in order for the 
court to render an award. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Plaintiff Mathew M. Cote began working for Defendants, John 
Aiello and his wife, Anna-Maria Aiello, in 1986 at their 
construction company, Aiello Construction.1 Aiello Construction 
closed in 1991 and Plaintiff was transferred to a sister company, 
Richmond Sand and Gravel.2 However, Plaintiff disagreed with 
how the company was being managed by Jeffrey Nero (Nero), 
Defendants’ son-in-law, and Plaintiff left the company later that 
year.3  In May 1996, Defendants offered Plaintiff an opportunity  
to return to their business at a sister company, RRM, and told 
Plaintiff that he could purchase RRM in the future.4 No further 
terms were discussed and Plaintiff accepted the employment 
opportunity.5 Plaintiff was then named President and Vice 
President of RRM and acted as its Chief Executive Officer in 
1997.6 Several times over the years, Defendants indicated that 
Plaintiff could purchase RRM in the future, including in 1999, 
when Mr. Aiello told Plaintiff that “when he was ready to retire he 
would sell RRM to [Plaintiff] at fair market value and would 
structure a payment plan for him.”7 However, again, no further 
 
 
1. Cote v. Aiello, 148 A.3d 537, 540 (R.I. 2016). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 541. 
7. Id. 
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details were ever discussed.8  Plaintiff loaned RRM approximately 
$400,000 interest-free over the years, all of which was paid back to 
him, in order to promote the success of the company.9 In June 
2005, Defendants sold RRM to Peter Calcagni (Calcagni).10 
Defendants informed Plaintiff of the sale within a few days, and 
Plaintiff became “visibly distraught”; however, Plaintiff continued 
to work for Calcagni.11 
On August 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Mr. 
Aiello, alleging: “(1) promissory estoppel; (2) breach of an oral 
contract; (3) breach of an implied contract; (4) breach of a quasi- 
contract; and (5) constructive trust.”12 On May 15, 2007, Plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint bringing the same claims against 
Defendant Mrs. Aiello and alleging fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation.13 
A bench trial commenced in Rhode Island Superior Court in 
November 2011.14 In June 2013, the trial justice issued a 
comprehensive bench decision that summarized the testimony of 
Plaintiff, Nero, Calcagni, and Calcagni’s successor, Michael 
D’Ambra.15 However, she did not include the testimony of 
Defendants whom she found to be dishonest and untrustworthy.16 
Although she believed that Defendants had acted “despicabl[y]” 
she rejected all of Plaintiff’s claims other than that of unjust 
enrichment.17 The trial justice specifically stated that the 
conversations between the parties in 1996 and 1999 did not offer 
sufficient evidence that all material terms of a contract were 
agreed upon.18 Plaintiff’s damages were limited to reasonable 
interest on the loans he had given to RRM; however, Plaintiff had 
not presented evidence at trial to show what the interest rate of 
this loan should have been, and thus he was not awarded any 
 
 
 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 542. 
10. Id. at 541. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 542–43. 
16. Id. at 543. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
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damages.19 Judgment was entered on July 29, 2013, and Plaintiff 
filed a timely notice of appeal.20 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to analyze the 
various claims Plaintiff brought, recognizing that the factual 
findings in a nonjury case “are granted an extremely deferential 
standard of review”; however, questions of law are reviewed de 
novo.21 
In his appeal, Plaintiff argued the conversations between the 
parties in 1996 and 1999, in conjunction with their subsequent 
conduct, was sufficient evidence of an implied contract, and the 
trial justice acted erroneously in focusing only on the two 
conversations when analyzing the claim.22 However, the Court 
stated that although the trial justice began by summarizing 
testimony and noted these instances as the only concrete 
occurrences, she also referenced the “frequent conversations” 
between the parties, which is proof that she did not overlook this 
material evidence.23 Further, the Court agreed with the trial 
justice’s analysis that there was no implied-in-fact contract, 
reasoning that the 1996 conversation merely showed a “possibility 
of a future ownership opportunity,” and the 1999 conversation 
only added to the uncertainty.24 For example, the parties did not 
discuss what the term “retirement” meant and what would  
happen if Defendants died before retiring. Additionally, there 
were no terms established regarding payment and financing.25 
Therefore, the Court did not find that there was mutual assent 
between the parties.26 For these reasons, the Court  concluded 
that it “fail[ed] to glean any evidence indicating that the parties 
agreed on essential terms of a purchase agreement as to establish 
 
 
19. Id. at 544. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. (first quoting State v. Gianquitti, 22 A.3d 1161, 1165 (R.I. 2011); 
and then citing Lamarque v. Centreville Savings Bank, 22 A.3d 1136, 1139– 
40 (R.I. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 545. 
24. Id. at 545–46. 
25. Id. at 546. 
26. Id. 
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an implied contract for the purchase of RRM.”27 
Plaintiff similarly argued that the trial justice overlooked 
material evidence in regard to his promissory estoppel claim by 
focusing solely on the 1996 and 1999 conversations, and that she 
erred in concluding that Plaintiff did not reasonably rely on 
Defendants’ promises.28 Again, the Court determined that  the 
trial justice did not overlook material evidence, and the Court 
agreed that Defendants’ statements only discussed possibilities 
and future opportunities and “lacked any certainty and 
specificity.”29 The Court refused to expand the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel and find an uncertain promise constituted 
promissory estoppel merely because the statements were 
repeatedly reiterated.30 Further, even if the promise was 
sufficiently certain, Plaintiff needed to prove reasonable reliance 
on the statements, which he failed to do.31 The Court determined 
that a reasonable businessman would not rely on such vague 
statements, and in the nine years since the statements were 
initially made, a reasonable person would have discussed the 
promise further and reduced it to writing.32 Lastly, even if there 
was reliance it was beneficial to Plaintiff because he gained 
“considerable experience” while also “earning an acceptable 
salary.”33 Therefore, Plaintiff failed on each element of his 
promissory estoppel claim.34 
Plaintiff also argued that the trial court erred in dismissing 
his fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims because the trial 
justice found Defendants’ testimonies to be dishonest but then 
concluded that Defendants had “simply changed their minds” 
about the sale.35 However, the Court found that the trial justice 
correctly relied on the general principle that “mere unfulfilled 
promises to do a particular thing in the future do not constitute 
fraud in and of themselves.”36 This principle applied equally to 
 
27. Id. at 546–47. 
28. Id. at 547. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 548. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. (quoting 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 87 at 122 (2013)). 
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Plaintiff’s claim for negligent misrepresentation because the 
misrepresentation must be based on fact and not some potential 
future event.37 
Plaintiff’s final contention on appeal was that the trial justice 
erred in limiting damages to reasonable interest on the loans.38 
The Court recognized that there is no prior case law that provides 
a rule for the amount of damages that can be recovered in a claim 
for unjust enrichment, and thus, generally a plaintiff’s damages 
should not necessarily be confined to a reasonable rate of 
interest.39 However, the Court held that the trial justice did not 
err in limiting Plaintiff’s damages to a reasonable rate of interest 
because Defendants did not “engage[] in any deceit or legal 
wrongdoing,” and Plaintiff was repaid the loans in full.40 The 
Court compared Plaintiff to a moneylender who “generally is not 
compensated for the positive benefits derived by the loan, such as 
increased profitability, unless the agreement provides for some 
sort of royalty.”41 Further, the record shows only a “vague and 
attenuated” connection between the loans RRM received from 
Plaintiff and the success of RRM.42 Therefore, the  Court 
concluded that the trial court acted appropriately in confining the 
damages to the reasonable rate of interest on the loan, for which 
there was no evidence of at trial.43 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, as well as the trial court, 
clearly acknowledged that Defendants acted reprehensively and 
that this type of behavior should be discouraged; however, 
Plaintiff simply did not satisfy the elements of his claims under 
established case law.44 Although the Court may have been 
sympathetic to Plaintiff’s situation, it relied heavily on the 
established principles of law to provide reasoning for Plaintiff’s 
inability to succeed on his claims. 
 
 
37. Id. at 549. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 550. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 551. 
44. See id. at 543, 545, 547, 548–49, 550. 
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However, in evaluating Plaintiff’s claim regarding an implied- 
in-fact contract, the Court stated that there were “gaps in basic 
contract terms, including the payment structure, financing, and 
purchase price.”45 Yet, the Court had previously acknowledged 
that during the parties’ conversation in 1999, Defendants told 
Plaintiff that “he would sell RRM to [Plaintiff] at fair market 
value and would structure a payment plan for him as  well.”46  
This appears to provide some evidence of payment structure, a 
payment plan, and a purchase price at fair market value. 
Ultimately, even if this was sufficient evidence of an agreement 
about the financial aspects, other elements of the contract were 
absent, making it obvious that there was a lack of mutual 
assent.47 
Although it was clear that the Court disagreed with 
Defendants’ treatment of Plaintiff,48 ruling in favor of Plaintiff on 
Plaintiff’s implied-contract and promissory estoppel claims would 
have set a dangerous precedent. As discussed above,  certain 
terms were clearly absent from the agreement between the 
parties.49 If the Court had enforced this agreement as an implied- 
contract or promissory estoppel, the Court would have created 
uncertaintly surrounding the requirements for an enforceable 
contract and as such, far more loosely agreed upon statements 
could be considered a contract. For these reasons, the Court 
correctly concluded that Plaintiff could not succeed on either of 
these claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that material terms of 
an oral agreement were missing and thus could not support claims 
for promissory estoppel or an implied-in-fact contract. Although 
the Court then found that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy 
a claim for unjust enrichment, without evidence as to the 
 
45. Id. at 546. 
46. Id. at 541. 
47. For example, Defendant had stated that this would occur when he 
retired; however, the term “retirement” was never defined, and the parties 
never discussed what would happen if Defendant died before retirement. 
Further, Plaintiff “did not consider himself bound to an agreement to 
purchase.” Id. at 546. 
48. Id. at 543. 
49. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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appropriate amount of damages, the Court refused to award 
monetary damages. 
Brenna P. Riley 
  
 
 
 
 
Contract Law. Nappa Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 152 A.3d 
1128 (R.I. 2017). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that an 
arbitrator exceeded his authority by failing to interpret a contract 
provision in a manner consistent with the essence of the parties’ 
agreement, and by directly contravening the contract language in 
determining payments due to the contractor. Here, the arbitrator 
chose to identify a wrongful termination made by the contractor as 
a termination of convenience, a power specifically reserved by the 
property owner in the contractual agreement, and therefore, 
reached beyond the terms of the contract. There are limited 
circumstances in which an arbitral award can be reviewed, but 
when an arbitrator exceeds the terms and contradicts the essence 
of the parties’ contract, the court cannot permit the award to 
stand. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In September 2012, Caroline and Vincent Flynn (the Flynns) 
entered into a contract1 with Nappa Construction Management, 
LLC (Nappa) to construct an automobile repair facility in 
Narragansett for $360,000 (the project).2 The  contract  allowed 
the Flynns to terminate the contract for cause and they could 
order Nappa to suspend, delay or interrupt construction for any 
amount of time without cause, so long as the Flynns notified 
Nappa in writing.3 Additionally, the contract provided the Flynns 
with the ability to terminate the contract for convenience and 
without cause provided that the Flynns give Nappa written 
notice.4 Work began in December 2012, but the construction was 
 
 
1. Nappa Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 152 A.3d 1128, 1129 (R.I. 
2017). The parties used an American Institute of Architects form contract, 
specifically A101-2007 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and 
Contractor. Id. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 1130. 
4. Id. 
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erratic and Flynns complained about the pace of the project.5 
On June 24, 2013, the Flynns notified Nappa, via letter, to 
cease all work on the project because the construction no longer 
followed the building plans and did not satisfy industry 
standards.6 Specifically, the cement floor for the project was 
noncompliant.7 In return, Nappa submitted a  request  for 
payment which was then denied by the Flynns.8 Subsequently, on 
July 29, 2013, Nappa informed the Flynns that they had breached 
their contractual duty and sought mediation.9 Nappa then 
proceeded to terminate the contract on September 4, 2013 due to 
nonpayment.10 In response, the Flynns filed an action in the 
Rhode Island Superior Court alleging that Nappa wrongfully 
terminated the contract.11 
In accordance with the terms of the contract, Nappa 
demanded arbitration to resolve the issue.12 Nappa accused the 
Flynns of breaching the contract, improperly stopping the work, 
and failing to make a payment.13 Subsequently, the Flynns  
denied all the allegations and filed a counterclaim, alleging Nappa 
had breached the contract and was negligent in the performance  
of its contractual duties.14 
On March 13, 2015, the arbitrator issued his award after 
determining there was fault on the part of both the Flynns and 
Nappa.15 The arbitrator determined that problems existed with 
the cement floor that Nappa constructed, but the Flynns’ order to 
cease all work on the project was not a satisfactory way to resolve 
the issue and had only worsened the matter between the two 
parties.16 Additionally, the arbitrator found that Nappa’s request 
for payment, which included the cost of the deficient cement floor, 
 
 
 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1131. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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was a poor decision.17 Consequently, Nappa’s determination that 
the Flynns had breached the contract, and their subsequent 
termination of the contract for the Flynns’ failure to pay, were not 
justified.18 Although the arbitrator determined that Nappa was 
not justified in its termination of the contract, the arbitrator 
resolved to invoke the termination for convenience clause of the 
contract.19 Essentially, the arbitrator decided that neither party 
was in breach of the contract and that the easiest way to resolve 
the tense relationship was to terminate the agreement.20 The 
arbitrator then awarded Nappa $37,979.97, which represented 
Nappa’s expenses, expected profit, and additional back charges, 
and offset by the cost to remedy the defective cement floor.21 
Nappa filed a petition in Superior Court seeking to confirm 
the arbitrator’s award.22 The Flynns subsequently filed a motion 
to vacate the award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded 
the scope of his powers and disregarded a provision of the contract 
by terminating the contract for convenience.23 Nappa defended  
the award by arguing the arbitrator acted within his powers and 
did not disregard provisions of the contract because the contract 
featured a broad arbitration provision.24 Additionally, Nappa 
argued that the arbitrator can transform a termination for cause 
into a termination for convenience because a court can do so when 
both clauses are featured in a contract.25 On May 8, 2015, the 
hearing justice denied the Flynn’s motion and granted Nappa’s 
petition to confirm the award because the arbitrator had 
attempted to utilize the terms of the contract in his decision, 
which indicated his regard for the contract itself.26 Furthermore, 
the hearing justice determined the arbitrator was within his 
power to declare the termination for convenience instead of the 
termination for cause.27 The hearing justice also explained that 
 
 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1131–32. 
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as a matter of policy, courts traditionally favor the finality of an 
arbitrator’s award.28 On May 29, 2015, final judgment was 
entered, and the Flynns filed a timely notice of appeal.29 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Writing for the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Suttell stated that although the Court must review an arbitrator’s 
decision with deference, the Court is compelled by statute to 
vacate an award “[w]here the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, 
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made.”30 Additionally, the Court stated that although parties 
can contract to use arbitration in order to avoid litigation,31 a 
party may not circumvent an arbitral award by arguing to the 
courts that an arbitrator made a mistake.32 The Court also held 
that “[a]n arbitrator may exceed his or her authority by giving an 
interpretation that fails to draw its essence from the parties’ 
agreement, is not passably plausible, reaches an irrational result, 
or manifestly disregards a provision of the agreement.”33 
The Court noted the arbitrator’s determination that Nappa 
was not justified in declaring that the Flynns had breached the 
contract, nor in terminating the contract for failure to pay.34 
However, despite of the revelation that Nappa improperly 
terminated the contract, the arbitrator concluded that the toxic 
relationship shared by the parties must end.35 Subsequently, the 
arbitrator employed the “fiction” that the Flynns had terminated 
the contract for convenience and determined that neither party 
was at fault.36 Although the contract provided the Flynns with  
the ability to terminate the contract for convenience without 
 
28. Id. at 1132. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9-18 (2017)). 
31. Id. at 1133 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 
88, 92 (R.I. 1991)). 
32. Id. (quoting Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 687 A.2d 440, 
441 (R.I. 1996)). 
33. Id. (quoting Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC v. Bilray Demolition 
Co., 91 A.3d 830, 835 (R.I. 2014)). 
34. Id. at 1134. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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cause, so long as they provided Nappa with written notice, the 
Court found no evidence that the Flynns notified Nappa that they 
were terminating the contract.37 In fact, the only  letters  sent 
from the Flynns to Nappa were those that exercised the Flynns’ 
contractual right to suspend construction.38 Therefore, there was 
no indication that the Flynns wanted to terminate the contract, 
but rather only evidence that Nappa needed to address the 
deficiency of the cement floor.39 
Here, the Court held that by utilizing the termination for 
convenience, a provision only to be exercised by the Flynns at 
their discretion, the arbitrator disregarded the language of the 
contract and ignored an explicit contract provision.40 The Court 
noted that when “an arbitrator’s decision conflicts with the 
express terms of the agreement, it fails to draw from the essence 
of the agreement.”41 Additionally, the Court ruled that the 
arbitrator’s findings were in direct contradiction to his 
conclusions.42 The arbitrator did not find the “stop-work order” 
issued by the Flynns to be a satisfactory way to address the 
cement floor issues, but determined they did not breach the 
contract.43 Similarly, the arbitrator found that Nappa was not 
justified in terminating the contract, but then proceeded to award 
Nappa as though they were not in breach of the contract.44 
Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior 
Court, which had confirmed the award, and remanded the record 
with directions to grant the Flynns’ motion to vacate with further 
proceedings to be consistent with the opinion.45 Justice Indeglia, 
with whom Justice Flaherty joined, dissented from the majority’s 
opinion. 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court successfully navigated the 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. (citing Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227, UFCW Union, 205 F.3d 922 
(6th Cir. 2000)). 
42. Id. at 1134–35. 
43. Id. at 1135. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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narrow margin between the policy of giving arbitrator awards 
deference in the name of finality and ensuring that the bargained- 
for benefits established in a contract between two parties are 
sufficiently represented.46 The fact of the matter is the parties 
voluntarily entered into an agreement, and their decision to bind 
themselves to the terms of the contract, even if that agreement is 
a form contract,47 should be thoroughly protected when an 
arbitrator misinterprets or ignores a provision.48 To uphold an 
arbitrator’s award for finality’s sake when that award fails to 
respect the agreement that the parties’ made would be plainly 
unjust. 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Indeglia agreed with much of 
the majority’s analysis, but disagreed with the conclusion that the 
arbitrator disregarded the law while interpreting the contract.49 
While the dissenting justices acknowledged the Court must vacate 
a decision in which the arbitrator exceeds their power, they 
reminded the majority that the court has continuously afforded 
great deference to arbitrators’ decisions.50 Here, the dissent 
accepted the arbitrator’s conclusion that fault lay on both parties 
and that the relationship had to be concluded.51 Accordingly, the 
dissent found that the arbitrator, in an attempt to be fair and 
reasonable, determined the contract was terminated through the 
provision that afforded the Flynns the ability to terminate the 
contract for convenience.52 In doing so, the dissent found the 
arbitrator was acting within the contract and that “under no 
circumstances can the arbitrator’s award be considered in excess 
of the terms of the parties’ contract, a manifest disregard of the 
law in its interpretation, or an irrational result.”53 Indeed, the 
dissent believes that “although the arbitrator could not find a 
termination for cause, a termination for convenience effectively” 
occurred, and therefore the arbitrator simply resolved the dispute 
on a provision that was in the contract.54 
 
46. Id. at 1133. 
47. Id. at 1129. 
48. Id. at 1133. 
49. Id. at 1135. 
50. Id. at 1135–36. 
51. Id. at 1136. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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The dissent desired to uphold the longstanding policy of 
paying deference to the decisions of arbitrators; however, a 
contractual provision providing one party the option to terminate 
a contract for convenience should not permit an arbitrator to 
exercise that option on behalf of, and indeed without the consent 
of, the party to whom that provision empowers. The majority’s 
opinion that the order to cease work on the project issued by the 
Flynns represented a part of the continuing relationship is more 
persuasive than the idea that a termination for convenience was 
exercised by the Flynns at that moment. In spite of the 
longstanding policy of the Court to pay deference to the decisions 
of arbitrators, the Court should not be afraid to vacate awards 
when an arbitrator has exceeded their power in the name of 
protecting the essence of a contract between two parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that an arbitrator’s 
decision should be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his 
authority by failing to interpret a contract provision in a manner 
consistent with the essence of the parties’ agreement. Here, the 
arbitrator ended the relationship between the two parties by 
exercising a termination for convenience, which was a power 
specifically reserved by one of the parties. In finding that a 
termination for convenience had occurred without the consent of 
the party to whom that power had been vested, the Court properly 
determined the arbitrator exceeded his power. 
 
Andrew Plocica 
  
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. Duvere v. State, 151 A.3d 314 (R.I. 2017). The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court does not require a translator for 
defendants who speak English as a second language when the 
defendant’s statements and demeanor during the hearing indicate 
that the defendant understands proceedings. A court may use the 
defendant’s knowledge of the consequences of the plea and ability 
to answer the court’s questions to infer that the defendant does 
not need an interpreter. Further, a court can utilize the 
defendant’s long-time employment in the United States as further 
evidence of understanding English. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On June 13, 1997, Rhode Island State Police stopped Jean O. 
Duvere (the Defendant) for speeding.1  The Defendant worked as  
a cab driver at the time and was driving back to New York after 
delivering a passenger to Boston.2 The Defendant consented to a 
search of the cab, and police officers found two “bricks” of 
marijuana in his trunk.3 The police charged the Defendant with 
possession of between one to five kilograms of marijuana with 
intent to sell, and bail was set at $25,000 with surety, which the 
Defendant posted.4 The Defendant attended his arraignment at 
Kent County Superior Court in October, and the justice allowed 
the Defendant to maintain his residence in New York.5 The 
Defendant did not attend any of the following court proceedings, 
and the Superior Court issued a warrant for his arrest.6 
In 2009, the Defendant travelled to Haiti and was arrested 
upon his return to New York.7 The police brought him to Rhode 
Island, and he pled nolo contendere to possession of between one 
 
1. Duvere v. State, 151 A.3d 314, 315 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.01.1 (2017); Duvere, 151 A.3d at 315. 
5. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 315–16. 
6. Id. at 316. 
7. Id. 
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and five kilograms of marijuana.8 The Superior Court sentenced 
the Defendant to ten years, with eighteen months to serve in 
person, and eight and a half years suspended with probation.9 
Though the Defendant spoke English as a second language, 
neither he nor his attorney requested an interpreter, and the 
Defendant also stated that he could understand and speak 
English.10 The Defendant’s attorney verbally explained the plea 
form, and the Defendant stated that he understood that he was 
forfeiting some rights by agreeing to the plea.11 After his plea, the 
Defendant later appeared before the same justice several times 
without his attorney, and at no point did he claim that he did not 
understand the court or request an interpreter.12 
On June 11, 2013, the Defendant filed an application to 
vacate his nolo contendere plea, claiming that he did not know or 
understand the charges against him.13 Based on the Defendant’s 
thirty-year residence in the United States and the Defendant’s 
ability representing himself at prior hearings, the hearing justice 
denied the application.14 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the 
Defendant’s plea was “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,” and 
therefore the nolo contendere plea was not a violation of Rule 11 of 
the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.15 The Defendant 
argued that the hearing justice “should have insisted that a 
Haitian-Creole interpreter be available. . . .”16 The hearing justice 
has discretion to appoint interpreters if necessary, and when a 
defendant would have “significant language difficulty” the court 
“should make such a determination of need.”17 Further, the Court 
is deferential to the hearing justice and does not change the 
hearing justice’s determination “[a]bsent ‘clear evidence of 
 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 316. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.01.1 (2017); Duvere, 151 A.3d at 316. 
14. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 316–17. 
15. Id. at 317–18. 
16. Id. at 318. 
17. Id. (quoting State v. Ibraham, 862 A.2d 787, 798 (R.I. 2004)). 
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prejudice.’”18 
In determining if there was “clear evidence of prejudice,” the 
Court examined the two reasons the hearing justice concluded 
that the Defendant had not needed a translator.19  First,  the 
Court examined the hearing record and found there was no 
evidence that the Defendant did not understand the  
proceedings.20 When asked if he understood English, the 
Defendant responded “Yes, I speak English. Yeah, I 
understand.”21 Further, the Defendant answered all questions 
asked of him without any signs of difficulty.22 Beyond the mere 
ability to speak English, the Defendant gave the hearing justice 
evidence that he understood the plea. When asked to explain why 
he was taking a plea, the Defendant explained “[Counsel] told me, 
but I suppose for 18—I got eight years probation. I say that’s 
okay.”23 The Court reasoned that this statement showed that the 
Defendant understood that he received a lesser sentence for the 
nolo contendere plea.24 
Second, the hearing justice relied on the fact that the 
Defendant had lived and worked in the United States for thirty 
years.25 In State v. Ibraham, the Court held that eight years of 
employment was enough time to infer an understanding of 
English.26 Applying that reasoning to this case, the Court held 
that the hearing justice did not err in determining that the 
Defendant did not need an interpreter based in part on the 
Defendant’s thirty years of employment in the United States.27 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court examined two types of 
evidence to determine the necessity for the hearing justice to use a 
 
18. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 318 (quoting State v. Reyes, 141 A.3d 647, 653 
(R.I. 2016)). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 318–19; State v. Ibraham, 862 A.2d 787, 798 
(R.I. 2004). 
27. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 318. 
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translator in hearings. The first type looked at the Defendant’s 
statements and mannerisms during the hearings.28 This direct 
evidence showed that the Defendant claimed to be proficient in 
understanding and speaking English and demonstrated this 
ability when questioned by the justice.29 The  Defendant  could 
also summarize the result of the plea and even voiced approval for 
the outcome.30 From this, the Court reasonably concluded that  
the Defendant was able to agree to the plea in a “knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary” manner.31 
However, the Court also upheld the hearing justice’s 
determination that the Defendant’s length of employment in the 
United States showed he understood English without considering 
any other factors.32 While a defendant’s employment can be 
relevant to knowledge and understanding of English, the length of 
time alone is far from the only factor that should be considered 
when inferring a defendant’s English proficiency from their work. 
In Ibrahim, the defendant’s employment was better suited to show 
his ability to speak and understand English.33 In that case, the 
defendant worked for seven years as a project manager at a 
technology company, which would require extensive interaction 
with, comprehension of, and direction of English speaking 
workers.34 The defendant in Ibrahim is easily distinguished from 
the Defendant in Duvere, where it is conceivable that the 
Defendant would only need to know the names of locations and 
simple directions to work as a taxi driver.35 It is also conceivable 
that the population the Defendant served as a cab driver may 
have primarily been a Haitian-Creole speaking neighborhood of 
New York. 
The Court was correct to determine that the Defendant could 
speak English well enough to understand the court proceedings 
based on his statements during the hearings.36 However, the 
Court oversimplified the analysis from Ibrahim, where the Court 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. “I say that’s okay.” Id. 
31. Id. at 317. 
32. See id. at 318. 
33. See State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787, 798 (R.I. 2004). 
34. Id. 
35. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 315. 
36. Id. at 318. 
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inferred English proficiency from the length of the defendant’s 
employment, as well as the defendant’s field of work and 
managerial position.37 The Court simplified the nuanced analysis 
and inference from Ibrahim, and instead inferred English 
proficiency from the Defendant’s length of employment alone.38 
CONCLUSION 
When a defendant’s statements and demeanor indicate that 
the defendant understands English, the court does not need to 
insist that an interpreter be present during a court proceeding. 
Evidence that the defendant understands English include the 
responses the defendant gives to direct questioning, as well as the 
defendant’s ability to explain the consequences of his or her plea. 
Further, the court can infer an understanding of English from the 
length of the defendant’s employment in the United States. 
 
Ryan M. Cummins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d at 798. 
38. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 318–19. 
  
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Adams, 161 A.3d 1182 (R.I. 2017). An 
FBI agent’s cell phone testimony is admissible when he is 
qualified as an expert, the State shows he reached his conclusion 
in a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable manner, 
and his inability to pinpoint cell phones at a certain time went to 
the weight of the evidence. Cell phone records are admissible 
through employee of a cell phone provider, which merged with a 
Defendant’s provider, because the employee had knowledge of the 
record-keeping and used her employer’s processes. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In June and July of 2012, James Adams (Adams or 
Defendant) accessed Backpage.com for escort services and had 
female escorts meet him at his designated location, a first-floor 
garage that he was staying in.1 On July 20, 2012,  Patrolman 
Jared Hardy of the Cranston Police Department responded to the 
address of 391 Framington Avenue in Cranston, Rhode Island 
after reports of an “oozing liquid . . . coming out of the garage”  
that was described as having a “bad smell.”2 Upon entering the 
garage, he found a badly decayed body that he believed to be an 
African-American female.3 Detective William John Palmer from 
the Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) unit of the Cranston 
Police Department was called to the scene and discovered a cell 
phone, a Massachusetts identification card, and multiple debit 
cards belonging to one Mary Grier (Grier).4 On July 22, Detective 
Gates from the Cranston Police Department met with Jesse 
Adams, brother of the Defendant, who confirmed that James 
Adams had been living in the garage.5 Following this meeting, 
 
1. State v. Adams, 161 A.3d 1182, 1187 (R.I. 2017). Backpage is a 
classified advertising website where individuals can list a variety of products 
and services, including escorts and strippers. Id. at n.1 
2. Id. at 1187–89. 
3. Id. at 1188. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
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Detective Gates began to prepare a photo array containing the 
Defendant’s image and contacted the Defendant’s parole officer to 
ascertain the Defendant’s location.6 It was at this time that 
detectives confirmed that the decedent found in the garage was 
Grier.7 Detective Gates was able to obtain Grier’s cell phone 
number and obtain search warrants for certain cell phone records 
and simultaneously secured an arrest warrant for James Adams.8 
On July 23, 2012, Detective Gates interviewed Jessica Dyer 
(Dyer) after receiving information that there may have been a 
second female present the night Grier was murdered.9 Dyer 
claimed she had been assaulted by a man in the same garage on 
June 30, 2012.10 Detective Gates then conducted a photo array 
containing six males with similar characteristics, and Dyer 
identified the Defendant as her assailant.11 On July 24, 2012, the 
detectives learned that the Defendant was at the Charlesgate 
Manor apartment complex in Providence.12 Detective Jaime  
Cahill of the Cranston Police Department was inside the building 
when he observed the Defendant “running through the parking 
lot.”13 After the police apprehended the Defendant, Detective 
Souza collected a “red and black backpack, a couple of bottles of 
beer, a bottle of water, and an Airsoft pistol.”14 Detective Souza 
test-fired the Airsoft pistol from the backpack to confirm that this 
“pistol [was] an operable firearm.”15 On July 26, 2012, Evonna 
Malave, who previously reported to the police that, on June 24, 
2012, she had been robbed and sexually assaulted by a man on 
School Street in Johnston, went to the Johnston Police 
Department, where she gave a statement and identified the 
Defendant as her assailant.16 
On December 6, 2013, Defendant was charged by criminal 
indictment with the murder of Grier, two counts of felony assault 
 
6. Id. at 1189. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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upon Dyer, two counts of committing a crime of violence while in 
possession of a firearm, two counts of first-degree sexual assault 
upon Malave, first-degree robbery of Malave, and unlawful 
possession of a firearm.17  These charges resulted in a ten-day  
jury trial, which had a total of twenty-eight witnesses.18 Doctor 
Carolyn Revercomb (Revercomb), a former assistant medical 
examiner at the Office of State Medical Examiners for Rhode 
Island, testified that her conclusion was that Grier’s cause of 
death was homicidal violence.19 Doctor Revercomb reached this 
conclusion based on several factors including “the positioning of 
the body in a concealed location where it was found, the presence 
of the ligature around the neck in an irregular knot,” the body 
being found nude, and the bruising on decedent’s right leg and on 
her right-hand index finger which was “potentially” a defensive 
wound.”20 She also testified that the time of death was difficult to 
pinpoint because of decomposition, but estimated that based on 
maggot activity she observed on July 24, 2012, the death of Grier 
could have occurred “a week or more” prior to that  date.21  
Tamara Wong (Wong), a forensic scientist for the Rhode Island 
Department of Health Laboratories, testified that she analyzed a 
pair of Joe Boxer underwear found in the garage and that the 
DNA on the underwear was a match to the Defendant.22 Wong 
stated that there was a “1 in 82 trillion chance that” the DNA 
profile indicated someone other than the Defendant.23 Kevin 
Horan, a Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Cellular Analysis Certificate Survey Team, testified regarding his 
conclusions after analyzing certain cell phone data from the 
Defendant’s and Grier’s cell phones.24 Agent Horan  concluded 
that the Defendant’s and Grier’s cell phones were in the same 
approximate vicinity on the morning of July 15, 2012.25 
Vanyik Proeun (Proeun) testified that, in July 2012, he was 
living on second-floor apartment on the property and that he 
 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 1189–90. 
19. Id. at 1190. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1190–91. 
23. Id. at 1191. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
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became friends with the Defendant.26 Proeun testified that he 
would give the Defendant rides and on one occasion, the 
Defendant informed him that he was attracted to strippers.27 
Sarivutha Pich, who also lived in the second-floor apartment, 
testified that, on July 15, 2012, after returning home between 3:30 
and 4:30 a.m., she noticed the garage light was on and saw the 
Defendant in the garage alone.28 Dayo Oduntan (Oduntan), a 
friend of the Defendant for over fifteen years, testified that the 
two were “close friends.”29 Oduntan testified that in 2002 or 2003, 
the two shared an apartment on Federal Hill in Providence, and, 
at that time, he observed the Defendant use the Backpage website 
to “look[] for girls.”30 Oduntan testified that he was incarcerated 
at the Adult Correctional Institutions during July of 2012 when he 
saw the Defendant in prison.31 Oduntan testified that he wrote a 
letter to the Special Investigations Unit “looking for a deal” to help 
reduce his own sentence in exchange for information he could 
obtain from the Defendant, which led to him eventually being 
assigned to same cellblock as the Defendant.32 Oduntan testified 
that, while he and the Defendant were in the recreational yard, he 
asked the Defendant about Grier and the Defendant “let it be 
known, yes, he did it.”33 Oduntan testified that the Defendant 
made other references to the murder including a reference to a 
television show where a female was murdered and rolled up in a 
carpet and stated that was what he had done.34 
On July 13, 2015, the jury found the Defendant guilty of the 
second-degree murder of Grier (count 1), felony assault on Dyer 
with a dangerous weapon (firearm) (count 2), felony assault on 
Dyer with a dangerous weapon (metal object) (count 3), first- 
degree robbery of Malave (count 10), and unlawful possession of a 
firearm (count 12).35 The Defendant moved for a new trial, which 
 
 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1191–92. 
28. Id. at 1192. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 1193. 
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was heard and denied on September 2, 2015.36 On appeal, the 
Defendant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the 
weight of the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and the 
trial justice erred in deciding otherwise.37 The Defendant also 
appealed the admission of certain evidence relating to cell phone 
data and analysis that was introduced at trial, which he argued 
should have been excluded by the trial justice.38 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the Defendant’s arguments, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court initially sought to determine whether the trial 
justice abused his discretion, in violation of Rule 72 of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence,39 when he allowed in the testimony of 
Agent Horan.40 The Court focused on the statutory language 
which provides that, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of fact or opinion.”41 The Court then identified 
four nonexclusive factors that trial courts look to when  
considering expert testimony involving novel or technical 
theories.42 These factors include: “(1) whether the proffered 
knowledge can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or 
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) 
the known or potential rate of error; (4) whether the theory or 
technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
field.”43 The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his 
 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. R.I. R. Evid. 702. 
40. Adams, 161 A.3d at 1194. 
41. Id. at 1195 (citing R.I. R. Evid. 702). 
42. Id. at 1196. 
43. Id. (quoting DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729, A.2d 677, 689 (R.I. 
1999)). The Court provided that “when the proffered knowledge is neither 
novel nor highly technical, satisfaction of one or more of these factors is not a 
necessary condition precedent to allowing the expert to testify” and “[t]he 
proponent of the evidence need only show that the expert arrived at his or her 
conclusion in what appears to be a scientifically sound and methodologically 
reliable manner.” Id. (quoting Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881,  892  (R.I. 
2003)). 
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discretion by allowing Agent Horan to testify about the cell phone 
technology, as this was a field in which he was an expert and his 
knowledge was not novel.44 The Court then addressed the 
Defendant’s claim that the trial justice abused his discretion when 
he did “not fashion an effective remedy” after the State disclosed 
Agent Horan’s expert testimony one month before trial and 
therefore, the one-month time period was insufficient to prepare 
for trial.45 The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his 
discretion because, at the evidentiary hearing on May 28, 2015, 
the trial justice informed defense counsel that if he needed 
additional time to prepare, he would receive an extension.46 
Because the Defendant’s counsel failed to request a continuance, 
this claim failed on appeal.47 
The Court then turned to the Defendant’s contention that the 
trial justice abused his discretion in admitting his MetroPCS cell 
phone records (MetroPCS records) through Susan Johnson 
(Johnson), an employee of T-Mobile.48 The Defendant’s claim 
rested on the fact that that evidence did not satisfy the business- 
records exception49 to the hearsay rule because the relevant 
“records were kept in the ordinary business of MetroPCS, not T- 
Mobile.”50 At trial, Johnson testified that, in 2013, after T-Mobile 
and MetroPCS merged, Johnson became responsible for 
maintaining MetroPCS records.51 The trial justice held that the 
cell phone records met the business-record rule exception and 
satisfied Rule 803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 
because Johnson was “entirely familiar with how Metro[PCS] kept 
its records” and T-Mobile and MetroPCS records “were kept in 
precisely the same way.”52 Additionally, the Court held that the 
records were properly authenticated in accordance with Rule 
90153 because it was “reasonably probable that the evidence is 
 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 1197. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1198. 
49. R.I. R. Evid. 803(6). 
50. Adams, 161 A.3d at 1198. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. R.I. R. Evid. 901. 
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what [Johnson] [pro]claim[ed] it to be.”54 
Finally, the Court addressed the Defendant’s claim that the 
trial justice erroneously denied his motion for new trial given that 
the weight of the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions.55 The Defendant specifically contended  that  Dyer 
and Malave were not credible witnesses and that his second- 
degree murder charge should be vacated because there was “no 
evidence of any type of malice necessary to sustain a second[- 
]degree murder conviction.”56 The trial justice found that Dyer 
was a credible witness and her failure to disclose a head injury at 
the hospital did not mean “that Defendant didn’t hit her in the 
head.”57 For Malave, the trial justice found her to be a credible 
witness and noted that a handgun found in the Defendant’s 
backpack when he was arrested provided further proof that her 
allegations were true.58 When assessing the malice necessary for  
a second-degree murder conviction, the trial justice highlighted 
Oduntan’s ability to recount details “that could have only come 
from [the Defendant],” specifically the style of clothes Grier was 
wearing when she was killed.59 Additionally,  Oduntan’s  
testimony provided that the Defendant made statements that 
Grier was just a prostitute and that he had left her body behind a 
sofa, which further supported a finding of malice.60 After  a  
careful review of the trial transcript in its entirety, the Court was 
satisfied that the trial justice “articulated adequate grounds for 
denying the motion.”61 The Court declined to disturb the trial 
justice’s decision as the trial justice specifically noted the 
shortcomings of certain witnesses, but ultimately concluded that 
the weight of the evidence supported convictions on counts one, 
two, three, and ten of the indictment.62 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly found that using the 
 
54. Adams, 161 A.3d at 1199. 
55. Id. at 1200. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1202. 
58. Id. at 1203. 
59. Id. at 1204. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
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four nonexclusive factors to assist in expert testimony was 
unnecessary to this case as Agent Horan’s expert testimony 
involving cell phone towers was not novel.63 Considering how 
widely accepted cell phone evidence has been in courts for some 
time now, the Court was correct to conclude that this type of 
expert testimony was certainly not novel. The Court articulated 
that the responsibility to question the shortcomings of cell phone 
tower science fell on the Defendant through cross-examination of 
Agent Horan.64 Also, the Court determined there was  no 
discovery violation because the trial justice specifically told the 
Defendant he would be given additional time if he needed it.65 
This seems to be a fair assessment because if the Defendant is 
truly claiming he did not receive adequate time, the trial justice 
allowed him the opportunity to be granted more. 
Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of whether the 
business records exception to hearsay applies when an employee  
of one company is testifying about another company’s records that 
her employer also owns.66 The Court allowed this to fit into the 
business records exception because Johnson had knowledge of the 
record-keeping of MetroPCS, she spoke to the record keeper of 
data for MetroPCS, and MetroPCS followed the same processes for 
storing data as T-Mobile.67 However, it is fair to ask just how far 
this should extend when it comes to employees of one company 
testifying about the records of another company. The Court 
concluded that this met the burden to fit the business records 
exception to hearsay, but it could be argued that the testimony 
would have been more adequate if it came from the record keeper 
of the MetroPCS data, rather than just a T-Mobile representative. 
While the records were kept in the same way at both companies, 
Johnson was not an employee of MetroPCS; therefore, she can 
only assume that it followed the same processes without firm 
knowledge of the day-to-day activities at MetroPCS. 
Additionally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court outlined the 
high standard required before it will disturb a trial justice’s ruling 
on denial of a new trial. On the counts of felony assault, the trial 
 
63. Id. at 1196. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1197. 
66. Id. at 1198. 
67. Id. 
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justice found that Dyer was a credible witness.68 It is interesting 
to note that Dyer testified to a head injury, but did not report this 
to the doctor when she was treated.69 However, this discrepancy 
alone should not be enough to make someone not a credible 
witness, and the Court seemed to reach the right conclusion in 
allowing that verdict to stand. On the count of robbery, the 
witness Malave initially gave a written statement that her 
assailant had blonde hair and tattoos on both arms, which the 
Defendant does not have.70 However, the trial justice noted that 
the jury simply ignored this discrepancy to which he did not fault 
them because it was clear this was not a mistaken identification.71 
While the discrepancies in the description are noteworthy, the 
Court drew the proper conclusion, as Malave was able to describe 
the gun and backpack which the Defendant himself had in his 
possession when police apprehended him.72 Finally, on the count 
of second-degree murder, the Court gave enhanced consideration 
to Oduntan’s testimony to reach its finding of malice.73 The trial 
justice noted that Oduntan’s description of the events “could only 
have come from [the Defendant].”74 The Court made the proper 
judgment here as it was clear that Oduntan’s knowledge of the 
events came from listening to the Defendant essentially bragging 
about the crime he committed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68. Id. at 1201. 
69. Id. at 1202. 
70. Id. at 1203. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 1204. 
74. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an agent’s cell 
phone testimony is admissible when he is qualified as an expert, 
the State shows he reached his conclusion in a scientifically sound 
and methodologically reliable manner, and his inability to 
pinpoint cell phones at a certain time went to the weight of the 
evidence. The Court determined cell phone records are admissible 
through employee of a cell phone provider, which merged with a 
Defendant’s provider, because the employee had knowledge of the 
record-keeping and used her employer’s processes. 
Sean Rock 
  
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Fuentes, 162 A.3d 638 (R.I. 2017). The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that comprehensive jury 
instructions on eyewitness identification are preferred, but not 
required, so long as the trial justice gives a reasonable jury 
instruction. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Early on November 6, 2009, Henry Vargas (Vargas) was shot 
and killed outside of a nightclub on Broad Street in Providence.1 
At around 1:00 a.m., Vargas left the nightclub, Club Platinum, 
with his girlfriend, Carmelina Bueno (Bueno).2 Upon leaving, 
Bueno and Vargas crossed Aldrich Street which intersects Broad 
Street.3 Two people followed them, one man (the Defendant) and 
one woman.4 When Bueno and Vargas arrived at their car, the 
man following them shouted and asked Vargas if he wanted to 
fight.5 Vargas ran at the man.6 The man then pulled a gun from 
his jacket and shot Vargas repeatedly.7 Bueno testified at trial 
that she saw the shooter’s face and more specifically, his smile, 
during this encounter.8 After Vargas, mortally wounded, fell to  
the ground, Bueno saw the man get into the passenger side of a 
dark-colored SUV parked on Aldrich Street.9 Bueno described the 
shooter as five foot, nine or ten inches tall, about thirty-six or 
thirty-seven years old, about one hundred seventy pounds, having 
short black hair and a clean face, and wearing jeans and a black 
jacket.10 On December 1, 2009, Detective Emilio Matos presented 
 
1. State v. Fuentes, 162 A.3d 638, 640 (R.I. 2007). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. The Defendant allegedly shouted, “Your fat one, didn’t you want 
to fight me? Come now.” Id. at 641. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 642. 
10. Id. 
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Bueno with a photo array to identify the shooter.11 After a  
minute, Bueno identified the Defendant as the shooter because of 
his face.12 
Bueno testified at trial as the sole testifying eyewitness to the 
shooting of Vargas.13 On cross-examination, Bueno testified that 
the shooter “looked and sounded Dominican”; but in front of the 
grand jury, Bueno testified that the shooter had “light skin, like 
an Indian.”14 Bueno explained that “[f]or us, an Indian  is  a 
person [who is] not dark nor white,” and that she was referring to 
a “Hispanic.”15 Bueno also testified that she met with Detective 
Kenny Court where she saw a photograph of DJ Nelson who had 
been in the club the night of the shooting.16 Bueno stated that DJ 
Nelson looked like the shooter, but that DJ Nelson was darker 
than the shooter.17 On cross examination, Bueno testified  that 
she had told an investigator, Robert Gemma, and his paralegal 
that she “believed [DJ Nelson] was involved in the shooting.”18 
Bueno also testified that one week after the shooting, at a housing 
complex referred to as “Chad Brown,” that she had seen DJ 
Nelson coming out of a SUV.19 She further testified that she was 
afraid of DJ Nelson because of a prior occasion at Club 
Platinum.20 This prior occasion was when Vargas told Bueno that 
“somebody had [told him] that they wanted to kill him.”21 When 
Bueno tried to ask Vargas about who had told him that someone 
wanted to kill him, Vargas stated that DJ Nelson had taken this 
man away.22 
Bueno also testified that three security guards worked  at 
Club Platinum at the night in question: one of whom argued with 
 
 
11. Id. at 643. 
12. Id. Bueno also identified the defendant at trial as the man she saw 
shoot Vargas. Id. 
13. Id. at 640. Twenty-two other witnesses testified at trial, however, 
none of them witnessed the murder. Id. 
14. Id. at 642. 
15. Id. (alteration in original). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 642–43. 
19. Id. at 643. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. (alteration in original). 
22. Id. 
 648 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:646 
 
Vargas and who Bueno testified shot Vargas.23 When the other 
two security guards ran to Bueno after Vargas had been shot, 
Bueno told the security guard who asked what happened that “he 
knew who had done it.”24 
In January 2010, a grand jury indicted the Defendant on two 
counts: first-degree murder of Vargas and discharging a firearm 
while committing a crime of violence, resulting in the death of 
Vargas.25 At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found the 
Defendant guilty on both counts and the trial  justice sentenced 
the Defendant to two consecutive life sentences.26 The Defendant 
filed a timely appeal and argued that the trial justice failed to 
provide the State v. Werner jury instruction that cautioned jurors 
about the fallibility of eyewitness  identifications.27  The 
Defendant argued that the trial justice’s refusal to provide this 
jury instruction was a reversible error that “gravely prejudiced the 
defense.”28 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court sought to address the issue of whether the trial 
justice properly instructed the jury on witness  identification.29 
The Defendant argued that the trial justice should have used the 
eyewitness jury instruction approved by the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court in Werner.30 The State argued that the  trial 
justice did not err because in State v. Davis,31 the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s failure to give a specific 
jury instruction about eyewitness identification was not a 
reversible error.32 
The Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the 
 
23. Id. The Court did not indicate whether the defendant was a security 
guard at Club Platinum. Id. at 641. 
24. Id. at 642. 
25. Id. at 640. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. (citing State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093, 1102 (R.I. 2004)). 
28. Id. at 645. 
29. Id. at 640. 
30. Id. at 645; see also Werner, 851 A.2d at 1102. 
31. 131 A.3d 679, 697 (R.I. 2016). The court held that “[t]he better 
practice would be for courts to provide the jury with more comprehensive 
instructions when eyewitness testimony is an issue.” Id. 
32. Fuentes, 162 A.3d at 645. 
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Defendant’s request for a jury instruction on eyewitness 
identification.33 The trial justice instructed the jury to consider 
the following factors about witness credibility: age, intelligence, 
candor, prejudice, motive, appearance, conduct, and demeanor of 
each testifying witness.34 The trial justice instructed the jurors to 
bring their own experiences from their everyday lives to evaluate 
witness credibility.35 Further, the trial justice instructed the jury 
to consider any consistencies or inconsistencies between what a 
witness testified at trial and what the witness may have said 
earlier.36 Both of these instructions were proper, especially with 
respect to the undulating nature of Bueno’s eyewitness 
testimony.37 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reaffirmed their holding in 
State v. Davis.38 The Court prefers more comprehensive jury 
instructions with respect to eyewitness testimony, but the Court 
does not require comprehensive jury instructions.39 The trial 
justice did consider the undulating nature of Bueno’s eyewitness 
testimony and acted accordingly.40 Bueno’s total testimony shows 
potential inconsistencies between her trial and prior testimony.41 
However, the trial justice’s instructions took into account these 
inconsistencies by instructing the jury to take into account such 
inconsistencies.42 Therefore, the court found no reversible error in 
the trial justice’s refusal to instruct the jury with more 
comprehensive jury instructions.43 
The problem with this opinion is that the Court was very 
unhelpful on the issue of proper jury instructions on eyewitness 
identifications. Should trial judges give the more comprehensive 
jury instructions found in Werner or try to consider specific issues 
 
33. Id. at 646. 
34. Id. at 645. 
35. Id. at 645–46. 
36. Id. at 646. 
37. Id. at 645–46. 
38. See id. at 646. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. See id. at 642–43. 
42. Id. at 646. 
43. Id. 
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with the eyewitness’s testimony? The former ensures that the  
jury is properly instructed on the issue of the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification and on the weight such testimony should 
be given. The latter can fail to clearly instruct the jury on the 
unreliability and proper weight that should be given to this kind 
of testimony. Further this method lacks uniformity. The risk of 
wrongful conviction of innocent people based upon mistaken 
eyewitness identification is real. In this case, the Court should 
have given clearer guidance on this issue. Instead, the Court 
simply agreed that the trial judge gave proper jury instructions. 
No rules were given on why these instructions were proper. 
Begging the question, has the Court endorsed the lower court’s 
jury instructions and, therefore, told lower courts to use these jury 
instructions? Or does the court want more comprehensive jury 
instructions, but in this case found no errors that merited 
reversal? The answer to either question remains unclear. 
The solution to this problem is to either formally require the 
Werner jury instructions, or to adopt a rule or test to evaluate jury 
instructions on eyewitness identification? Either scenario will 
provide helpful guidance on this issue. The Werner instructions 
will provide uniformity. This bright line rule will ensure that all 
juries will be instructed about the weight and reliability of such 
evidence. However, this approach may not fit every case. The 
other approach will require a test or rule to require that jury 
instructions appropriately instruct juries on reliability issues and 
weight of eyewitness identifications. This rule or test will allow  
for both a minimum level of uniformity and proper discretion at 
the trial court level to respond to circumstances. 
The adoption of a rule or test to evaluate jury instructions 
about eyewitness identifications is the better solution to this 
problem. This solution provides first and foremost uniformity in 
jury instructions on this issue that ensure that juries are properly 
instructed on the risks of eyewitness identifications. Second, this 
solution will provide meaningful guidance for trial judges when 
deciding how to instruct the jury.  This guidance will ensure that  
a trial judge can be confident that his or her jury instructions are 
proper and will be upheld as such. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that comprehensive 
 2018] SURVEY SECTION 651 
jury instructions on eyewitness testimony is preferred, but not 
required.44 In this case, the trial justice did not abuse his or her 
discretion by not giving such comprehensive instructions because 
the trial justice provided other jury instructions that were 
sufficient to guard against a jury placing too much weight on the 
conflicting eyewitness testimony.45 
Tyler Pare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44. See id. at 645. 
45. Id. 
  
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Pacheco, 161 A.3d 1166 (R.I. 2017). 
Dismissal of a preliminary breath test refusal in the Traffic 
Tribunal does not collaterally estop the State from bringing a 
chemical breath test refusal charge against the same defendant at 
a criminal trial. Preliminary breath test refusals and chemical 
breath test refusals are two distinct issues; the preliminary breath 
test refusal was actually litigated in the Traffic Tribunal so that 
the State is not estopped from raising the chemical breath test 
refusal charge in a criminal trial. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
At approximately two o’clock in the morning in December 
2011, Francisco Pacheco (Pacheco) ran a stop sign, nearly hitting 
Warren Patrolman Patrick Sarasin’s (Officer Sarasin) police 
cruiser.1 Officer Sarasin, accompanied by Patrolman Christopher 
Perreault (Officer Perreault), began following Pacheco in his 
vehicle as he turned onto Child Street in Warren.2  Pacheco 
quickly turned into a parking lot and sped away in the opposite 
direction, where he again failed to stop at another stop sign.3 
Pacheco eventually pulled off into a parking lot and got out of his 
car, at which point the officers began chasing him on foot.4 While 
apprehending Pacheco, who struggled, Officer Sarasin smelled “a 
strong odor of alcohol” and noticed that Pacheco was slurring his 
speech.5 Pacheco refused to take a field sobriety test and a 
preliminary breath test.6 At the Warren Police Department, 
Pacheco was placed in a breathalyzer room and advised of his 
rights to undergo a chemical breath test.7 He remained 
uncooperative and refused to take a chemical breath test and to 
 
1. State v. Pacheco, 161 A.3d 1166, 1168 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
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sign any related paperwork.8 Among other charges, Pacheco was 
charged with a second offense of refusing a chemical breath test.9 
He was also cited for several infractions, including refusal to 
submit to a preliminary breath test.10 
On July 15, 2013, Pacheco appeared pro se before the Rhode 
Island Traffic Tribunal where Officer Sarasin reported that he 
chased Pacheco on foot and apprehended him after a struggle.11 
The magistrate dismissed the preliminary refusal infraction for 
lack of evidentiary foundation.12 
Before trial, Pacheco sought to dismiss the chemical refusal 
charge on the basis of collateral estoppel.13 The trial  justice 
denied the motion.14 At the end of trial, Pacheco renewed his 
motion to dismiss, which was denied again.15 The jury convicted 
Pacheco of unlawful possession of marijuana and a chemical 
refusal and, in May 2014, he was sentenced to five months to 
serve on the chemical refusal count.16 
In November 2015, by order of the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island, the case was remanded to the Superior Court with 
directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
Pacheco’s motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel was 
timely.17 The Superior Court found the motion was untimely 
 
8. Id. at 1168–69. 
9. Id. at 1169. Pacheco was also charged with possession of marijuana, 
second offense; driving under the influence of alcohol; simple assault; and 
resisting arrest; see also 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1(b)(2) (2012). 
10. Pacheco, 161 A.3d at 1169. Pacheco was also cited for failure to stop 
at a stop sign and operating a motor vehicle without evidence of insurance; 
see also 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.3 (2012). 
11. Pacheco, 161 A.3d at 1169. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. Pacheco argued that “because the government failed in its first 
attempt to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant refused to 
submit to a chemical test at the time of the alleged incident, it is collaterally 
estopped from trying [Pacheco] again on same issue.” Id.  He also argued  
that “the state failed to establish the requisite reasonable belief necessary to 
prove the preliminary refusal by failing to present evidence that Officer 
Sarasin detected alcohol odor on defendant, observed blood shot or watery 
eyes, or exhibited a staggered walk.” Id. 
14. Id. The trial justice found that the motion was untimely filed and 
lacked merit. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1169–70. 
17. Id. at 1170; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2); SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 
12(b)(3). 
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filed, but there was good cause for delay.18 
Before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Pacheco argued 
that the State was collaterally estopped from prosecuting the 
chemical refusal in Superior Court because those facts were 
already decided in the Traffic Tribunal, and although the charges 
arose under different statutes, the State must still prove Officer 
Sarasin reasonably believed Pacheco was operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence for both the chemical refusal  
and preliminary refusal.19 The State contended that the issue of 
Officer Sarasin’s reasonable belief was not “actually litigated and 
determined” in the Traffic Tribunal because the charge was 
dismissed and that observations relevant to the second charge 
made after the first preliminary refusal were unrelated to the first 
charge.20 Further, the State argued that there are procedural 
differences between the Traffic Tribunal and the Superior Court 
that made collateral estoppel an improper avenue to travel.21 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Conducting a de novo review, the Court rejected Pacheco’s 
assertion that the State was collaterally estopped from 
prosecuting him for the chemical refusal after the Traffic Tribunal 
magistrate dismissed the preliminary refusal infraction.22 
Addressing in depth two of the three identified elements of 
collateral estoppel, the Court determined that there was no 
identity of the issues and no final judgment on the merits so as to 
invoke collateral estoppel.23 
The Court identified the issue before it as having two  
separate statutes governing two different offenses so that there is 
 
 
18. Pacheco,  161  A.3d  at  1170. Pacheco’s first attorney suffered a 
medical emergency and a new attorney had been assigned. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1171–72. 
23. Id. at 1172. The Court identified three elements that must be 
present for collateral estoppel to apply: “(1) an identity of issues, (2) the 
previous proceeding must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits, 
and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be the 
same or in privity with a party in the previous proceeding.” Id. (quoting  
State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 358 (R.I. 2005)). The Court did not address 
the third element in the present case because it was clearly met. Id. 
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no identity of issues:24 chemical refusals governed by Rhode  
Island General Laws section 31-27-2.1(a) and preliminary refusals 
governed by section 31-27-2.3(a).25 While both statutes “require 
that the officer have a reasonable belief or reasonable grounds to 
believe that the operator was operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence” before requesting the driver submit to a test, 
this only provides “the grounds upon which the officer based a 
request that operator submit to each test.”26 The issue at stake in 
the present case was unrelated to whether there was a lawful stop 
or probable cause to arrest so as to invoke the reasonable belief 
standard.27 Instead, the Court reasoned that  the  reasonable 
belief for a preliminary breath test may be established up until 
the officer requests the breath test, whereas reasonable belief for a 
chemical breath test may continue beyond the time of the arrest.28 
Thus, the operator’s behavior following an arrest is irrelevant for 
preliminary refusal infractions, but highly relevant to chemical 
refusal charges.29 In the present case, the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the arrest provided Officer Sarasin 
with reasonable grounds to request the chemical breath test.30 
Further, after the preliminary refusal, Officer Sarasin found 
two unopened beer bottles in Pacheco’s vehicle, and Pacheco was 
“belligerent and uncooperative” at the police station, thus 
continuing to establish reasonable grounds for the chemical  
breath test request that were no longer relevant for the 
preliminary breath test.31 The Court also reasoned that because 
 
 
24. Id. at 1173. “An identity of issues requires ‘first, [that] the issue 
sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue decided in the prior 
proceeding’ second, the issue must actually [have been] litigated; and third, 
the issue must necessarily have been decided.’” Id. (quoting State v Godette, 
751 A.2d 742, 746 (R.I. 2000)). 
25. Id. at 1170–71. 
26. Id. at 1174. 
27. Id. at 1175. 
28. Id. at 1174; see also 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-27-2.1(b)(2), -2.3 (2012). 
29. Pacheco, 161 A.3d at 1174. 
30. Id. The Court considered that this was a “chaotic, 2 a.m. near- 
collision with a police cruiser, a motorist driving through two stop signs, 
followed by a foot chase, a pepper spray takedown, preliminary refusal, 
struggle, and uncooperative behavior at the police department.” Id. 
31. Id. at 1174–75. The Court determined that evidence relevant to 
second offense was irrelevant to first refusal, bolstering the conclusion that 
identity of issues is lacking. Id. 
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the results of a preliminary breath test are not admissible at trial 
to prove a chemical refusal charge, it seems counterintuitive to 
decide that a determination on the preliminary refusal infraction 
could collaterally estop the State from pursuing the more serious 
charge at trial where the preliminary breath test analysis would 
not be admissible.32 
The Court next examined whether the issue was actually 
litigated using the Chase standard, which in part states that “only 
a specific finding on a material matter of fact fully litigated at [a] 
hearing will collaterally estop the state from attempting to prove 
the same fact at trial. A general finding will not suffice.”33 The 
Court determined that the magistrate in the Traffic Tribunal did 
not make “a specific finding on a material matter of fact” because 
he only found that the evidentiary requirements necessary to 
prove a preliminary refusal had not been met.34 
The Court declined to address the State’s contention that 
procedural differences between the Traffic Tribunal and criminal 
trials bar the use of collateral estoppel because this analysis was 
unnecessary as all the other elements of collateral estoppel were 
addressed.35 However, the Court did note that there are 
differences between the two forums and other jurisdictions have 
held “that traffic infractions may not serve as a basis for collateral 
estoppel in a subsequent criminal proceeding.”36 
COMMENTARY 
In this case, the majority and dissent characterized the 
identity of issues and final judgment requirements of collateral 
estoppel differently, thus resulting in contradicting conclusions. 
The majority opinion took the more restrictive approach of 
concluding that the issues of a preliminary breath test and 
chemical breath test must be exactly identical and that both 
issues must have been actually litigated in at least a similar 
forum in order for collateral estoppel to apply.37 On the other 
hand, the dissent approached these requirements in a more liberal 
 
32. Id. at 1174. 
33. Id. at 1175 (alterations in original). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 1176. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 1175. 
 2018] SURVEY SECTION 657 
 
manner, concluding that the issues are identical when looking at 
the statutes and were actually litigated in the Tribunal.38 
The majority views the application of collateral estoppel, in 
most instances, as threatening to equitable decisions.39 In looking 
at Rhode Island case law, the Court referenced a history of cases 
that consistently limited the use of collateral estoppel to very 
specific, narrow instances. For example, the Chase doctrine 
established that only a “specific finding” on a matter “fully 
litigated” would collaterally estop the State from pursuing the 
same fact at trial and a “general finding” would not suffice.40 
While this doctrine was eventually replaced in Gautier, that Court 
still maintained a restrictive collateral estoppel view in finding 
that an issue heard in a probation-revocation hearing is not 
collaterally estopped in a criminal trial because the two forums 
are so distinct.41 The Court emphasized that probation-revocation 
hearings, similar to the Traffic Tribunal hearing in the present 
case, were considerably less formal than criminal trials so to apply 
collateral estoppel here would “undesirably alter the criminal trial 
process.”42 
In applying this same restrictive rationale to the current case, 
the Court emphasized that the issues were not exactly identical.43 
The majority followed State v. Godette in determining that the 
issues had to be “identical.”44 Thus, even though the issues here 
were extremely similar with nearly identical evidentiary 
foundations, because the two separate statutory mandates were 
not facially identical, the majority concluded that collateral 
estoppel did not apply to this case.45 The majority continues in its 
opinion to discourage cross-forum collateral estoppel. The 
Tribunal initially dismissed the case because the charge was 
lacking an evidentiary basis, but the majority stated that, because 
this evidence was not a statutory mandate for preliminary 
refusals nor was it the exclusive way to show reasonable belief, 
 
38. Id. at 1178–82. 
39. See id. at 1172 (quoting State v. Werner, 871 A.2d 347, 1055 (R.I. 
2005)). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1173. 
42. Id. 
43. See id. at 1175. 
44. Id. at 1173 (citing State v. Godette, 751 A.2d 742, 746 (R.I. 2000)). 
45. Id. at 1174; see 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-27-2.1(b)(2), -2.3 (2012). 
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the Tribunal misconstrued the statute and, in fact, separate 
evidence was needed to prove each issue in the two forums.46 
The Court supports its final conclusion with the rationale that 
the “doctrine of collateral estoppel ‘is capable of producing 
extraordinarily harsh and unfair results,’” so much so that the 
Court will “not apply the doctrine ‘mechanically’ in situations 
which would lead to inequitable results.”47 In essence, the Court 
here was admittedly following the United States Supreme Court’s 
suggestion that collateral estoppel in criminal cases is to be 
applied with “realism and rationality.”48 Through its prior views 
and applications of collateral estoppel, the Court entered this case 
with the understanding that to apply collateral estoppel with 
“realism and rationality” meant to apply it sparingly, as its 
application threatens to undermine the equitable system of justice 
established today.49 
In contrast, the dissenting opinion does not feel as though 
applying collateral estoppel would threaten or undermine the 
justice system. Rather, the dissenting opinion points  out  that 
both statutes require the officer to meet the same level of 
suspicion before requesting the breath test and it was this 
threshold issue that the State failed to prove at the Tribunal, 
causing it to dismiss the preliminary refusal.50 While the dissent 
admits that if post-arrest evidence were introduced at the criminal 
trial it would agree with the majority that the issues to be decided 
were different, the State failed to provide any post-arrest evidence 
at trial supporting its reasonable grounds.51 Therefore, because 
the same evidence was admitted to support the reasonable 
suspicion standard required in both statutes and that evidence 
was heard by the Tribunal, the same issue was actually litigated 
and decided when the Tribunal dismissed the preliminary refusal 
for lack of an evidentiary basis.52 
Here, the dissent makes the most compelling argument in 
finding that the issues are identical and were actually litigated in 
 
46. Id. at 1174. 
47. Id. at 1176 (quoting Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee, 
854 A.2d 1008, 1017 (R.I. 2004)). 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 1172, 1176. 
50. Id. at 1178. 
51. Id. at 1178–79. 
52. Id. at 1169, 1182. 
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the Tribunal in stating that, because the statutes require the 
officer to meet the same level of suspicion before requesting the 
breath test and only evidence of what occurred prior to both tests 
was introduced, the same issues were tried.53 Even though post- 
arrest evidence can be admitted for chemical refusals and not 
preliminary refusals, because the State did not rely on post-arrest 
evidence and therefore did not utilize this difference, the issues 
that were actually heard in the Tribunal and criminal trial were 
the same, despite this technical, statutory difference.54 The 
evidentiary difference was the only distinguishing factor in the 
statutes relied on by the majority to reach its conclusion that the 
issues were not identical, yet this difference was not utilized 
here.55 Further, to support its conclusion in finding that the issue 
was actually litigated, the majority opinion relied on Chase even 
though Gautier replaced the Chase doctrine and the majority 
recognized that the doctrine was no longer applicable.56 This 
contradiction seems to show that the majority was working 
towards the overarching view that collateral estoppel threatens to 
undermine the justice system rather than looking at how the 
elements of collateral estoppel actually applied to the facts of this 
case.57 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the Traffic 
Tribunal’s dismissal of a refusal to submit to a preliminary breath 
test infraction does not collaterally estop the State from pursuing 
the charge of refusing a chemical breath test in a criminal trial. 
The Court determined that the two issues, governed by two 
separate statutes with distinct requirements, does not satisfy the 
identity of issues requirement of collateral estoppel, and a 
dismissal for lack of evidentiary support is not a final judgment on 
the merits so as to make the issue actually litigated. 
 
Kaelyn Phelps 
 
 
53. Id. at 1178. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 1174. 
56. Id. at 1173. 
57. See id. at 1176. 
  
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Parrillo, 158 A.3d 283 (R.I. 2017). Rhode 
Island General Laws section 12-19-2, reducing a punishment of 
imprisonment for time already served, and section 42-56-24, 
reducing punishment of imprisonment for good behavior, apply 
only to the incarceration period, not the overall sentence imposed. 
As such, although the Defendant had been notified by the 
Department of Corrections that his probation had ended, the 
Defendant was still on probation, and the State could charge him 
as a probation violator. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On January 21, 1986, Anthony Parrillo (Parrillo) pled guilty 
to two counts of second-degree murder.1 Parrillo received a 
sentence of thirty years, twenty years to serve with ten years 
suspended.2 Ten years of probation were to follow upon release 
from the Adult Correctional Institution (ACI).3 While serving his 
sentence, Parrillo received credit for both time served, pursuant to 
Rhode Island General Laws section 12-19-2,4 and for good 
behavior pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 42-56- 
24.5 As a result, Parrillo was given an early release on December 
22, 1993, and started parole.6 Parrillo stated in an affidavit that 
on or about October 25, 1999, his parole officer notified him that 
his parole was terminated and his ten-year probation term had 
 
1. State v. Parrillo, 158 A.3d 283, 285 (R.I. 2017). Parrillo was charged 
with one count of murder in the first degree and one count of murder in the 
second degree in March of 1982. Id. Parrillo was found guilty on both counts 
by a Rhode Island Superior Court jury; however, he appealed to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court in 1984, and the conviction was vacated. Id. The case 
was remanded to the Superior Court where Parrillo pled guilty. Id. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 285 & n.3 (citing relevant part of 12 R.I. GEN LAWS § 12-19-2 
(2017) that credits a term of imprisonment for time already served). 
5. Id. at 285–86 & n.4 (citing relevant part of 42 R.I. GEN LAWS § 42-56- 
24 (2017) which credits a term of imprisonment for good behavior). 
6. Id. at 285–86. 
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begun.7 After ten years without an incident, Parrillo received 
written notice from the Department of Corrections (DOC) Adult 
Probation and Parole Unit, stating “that his ‘file ha[d] expired on 
[October 24, 2009,]’ and that ‘[a]ccording to available records as of 
[that] date, [his] probation ha[d] been terminated.’”8 After 
receiving the letter, Parrillo had no further contact from the 
probation department.9 
On December 17, 2011, Parrillo was involved in a physical 
altercation at a nightclub in Providence and was charged with two 
counts of felony assault, conspiracy to commit felony assault, and 
simple assault.10 The following month, on January 9, 2012, the 
state of Rhode Island (the State) filed a probation violation report 
pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.11 The State claimed Parrillo “had failed to ‘keep the 
peace and be of good behavior’” and charged him as a probation 
violator.12 Parrillo claimed he was no longer on probation at the 
time of the incident, and had not been on probation at any time 
after October 24, 2009, hence, he sought a dismissal of the 
violation report.13 Parrillo also asserted that the State should be 
barred from charging him as a probation violator “because to hold 
otherwise would constitute a violation of his due-process rights.”14 
On November 2, 2012, a violation hearing was held where 
Parrillo argued that he was not a violator because his probation 
had    terminated  in   2009.15 Further, he claimed it was 
“inconceivable” for the State to inform him his probation had 
 
 
 
7. Id. at 286. 
8. Id. (alterations in original). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. Parrillo was convicted at a bench trial in the Superior Court of 
aiding and abetting one felony assault and of misdemeanor assault; the other 
counts were dismissed. Id. at 286 n.5. 
11. Id. at 286 & n.6 (citing relevant part of Rule 32(f) of the Superior 
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning probation violation). 
12. Id. at 287. 
13. Id. Parrillo claimed his probation ended on December 20, 2003, 
relying on the sentencing justice’s language that stated his probation term 
would “commence upon his release from the ACI.” Id. He further claimed  
that at the very latest his probation ended on October 24, 2009, relying on the 
DOC letter. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
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terminated and “years later” charge him as a probation violator.16 
As such, Parrillo argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
barred the state from charging him as a probation violator.17 The 
State maintained Parrillo was on probation in 2011, claiming that 
a thirty-year sentence in 1986 “meant that he would ‘finish 
serving the full term of his sentence on January 22, 2016.’”18 
Disagreeing with the State, the hearing justice quashed the 
32(f) violation report.19 The hearing justice rejected Parrillo’s 
equitable estoppel argument because there was no detrimental 
reliance in the circumstances of this case.20 Further, he found  
that section 12-19-8 of the Rhode Island General Laws clearly 
granted the sentencing justice authority to set the period of 
probation, and that the sentencing justice specified that it would 
commence when Parrillo was released from the ACI.21 The State 
filed a motion to reconsider that was heard on April 5, 2013.22   
The hearing justice explained that he denied the violation report 
because the “clear language of the judgment of conviction that 
articulated that the probationary term would ‘commence upon 
[Parrillo’s] release from the ACI.’”23 The hearing justice denied  
the motion to reconsider and the State filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, which was granted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
on May 27, 2014.24 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The first question for the Rhode Island Supreme Court was 
whether Parrillo was on probation at the time of the 2011 
altercation.25 If so, then the Court would determine whether the 
 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. The hearing justice found that regardless of whether the 
probationary period commenced on the date Parrillo was released from the 
ACI or the date he completed parole, he was not on probation at the time of 
the 2011 altercation. Id. at 287 n.7. 
22. Id. at 287–88. The Supreme Court noted that “no avenue for such a 
motion” exists in the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the 
hearing justice heard the motion regardless. Id. at 288 n.8. 
23. Id. at 288 (alteration in original). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
 2018] SURVEY SECTION 663 
hearing justice erred in rejecting Parrillo’s equitable estoppel 
defense.26 The Court noted it would affirm unless one or more 
errors of law had “so infected the validity of the proceedings as to 
warrant reversal.”27 To determine whether Parrillo was on 
probation the Court looked at the “interplay and application of 
several statutory provisions”—the first being section 12-19-8 of  
the Rhode Island General Laws, which governs sentencing.28 The 
Court interpreted that section as granting a wide range of 
discretion to the sentencing justice with the only limitation being 
that it does not conflict with another statute.29 
Next, the Court determined the application between Rhode 
Island General Laws sections 42-56-24,30 governing good behavior 
credits, and section 12-19-2(a),31 governing time already served 
credits.32 The Court relied on the holding in Rose v. State, which 
dealt with the interplay of these two statutory provisions with the 
existence of a mandatory minimum sentence.33 In Rose, the Court 
found that the language of section 42-56-24 was clear, and the 
only reduction contemplated by the provision was for the amount 
of time spent incarcerated, not the overall sentence imposed.34 
Also in Rose, the Court, relying on State v. Bergevine,35 held 
section 12-19-2 also did not apply to the overall sentence.36 As 
such, the Court held in Rose that neither the good-behavior credits 
nor the time-served credits entitled the defendant to “an 
acceleration of the end date of his probationary term” as they only 
 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 288. (“Section 12-19-8(a) provides, in relevant part, that the 
sentencing court may impose a sentence and suspend the execution of the 
sentence, in whole or in part, or place the defendant on probation without the 
imposition of a suspended sentence[,] and that such suspension shall place 
the defendant on probation for the time and on any terms and conditions that 
the court may fix.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 289. The Court found that section 42-56-24 authorized the 
DOC to credit a prisoner for good behavior and “industriousness.” Id. 
31. Id. The Court found that section 12-19-2(a) requires that a sentence 
of imprisonment be reduced for the amount of time confined while awaiting 
trial or awaiting sentencing. Id. 
32. Id. at 288–89. 
33. Id. (citing Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 907–13 (R.I. 2014)). 
34. Id. 
35. See 883 A.2d 1158, 1158–59 (R.I. 2005). 
36. Parrillo, 158 A.3d at 290 (citing Rose, 92 A.3d at 912). 
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applied to the time spent incarcerated.37 
The State argued that despite Rose dealing with a mandatory 
minimum, the holding in Rose still applied to Parrillo, and the 
Court should reverse the hearing justice’s finding that Parrillo 
was not on probation in 2011.38 Conversely, Parrillo argued that 
Rose did not apply because Rose relied heavily on two cases that 
were decided after Parrillo was sentenced in 1986.39 Further, 
Parrillo argued Rose was distinguishable because it dealt with 
good-time and time-served credits lowering a sentence to less than 
a mandatory minimum, and in his case there was no mandatory 
minimum.40 Finally, Parrillo argued “principles of estoppel 
appl[ied] as a matter of due process, barring the state from 
seeking to adjudge him a probation violator.”41 
The Court found Rose central to their analysis of the State’s 
petition and to the three statutory provisions at issue because 
Parrillo made the same claim as the defendant in Rose—that the 
“clock on his probationary term should have started ticking when 
he either was released on parole or had successfully completed 
parole.”42 Moreover, regarding Parrillo’s first argument that Rose 
relied on two cases decided after Parrillo was sentenced, the Court 
stated “[i]t is well established that a judicial interpretation of a 
statute ‘relates back’ to the date the statute was enacted and, 
unlike legislative action, does not implicate ex post facto 
considerations.”43 Furthermore, the Court noted Parrillo’s 
argument that there was no mandatory minimum in issue, but 
found that the distinction did not require the Court to “stray away 
from [its] clearly articulated interpretation of the good-time and 
 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. The two cases relied on in Rose were State v. Jacques, 
announcing that a “probationary period began at imposition of a sentence, 
even if that meant at the commencement of incarceration” and State v. 
Dantzler, holding that a “trial court could revoke a probationary term on the 
basis of criminal acts committed after imposition of sentence but before the 
actual probationary portion of sentence commenced.” Id. at 290 & n.11–12 
(quoting State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338 (R.I. 1997) and State v. Jacques, 554 
A.2d 193, 196 (R.I. 1989)). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 291 (citing State v. Barber, 767 A.2d 78, 78–80 (R.I. 2001)). 
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time-served credit statutes enunciated in Rose . . . .”44  As such, 
the Court found Parrillo’s credits did not entitle him to “an 
acceleration of the end of his probationary term,” especially 
because the sentencing justice specified that the sentence was 
thirty years.45 The Court held that Parrillo was on probation at 
the time of the 2011 altercation because Parrillo was sentenced to 
a thirty-year term on January 21, 1986, and his good-time and 
time-served credits only reduced his incarceration period, but not 
the overall sentence.46 Therefore, the thirty-year sentence did not 
end until January 21, 2016.47 
Next, the Court addressed whether the hearing justice 
committed an error of law when he held that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel did not bar the state from charging Parrillo as a 
probation violator.48 Parrillo claimed that the 2009 letter sent by 
the DOC informing him his probation was completed caused him 
to “conduct [himself] at all times as though [he] was not on 
probation.”49 As such, Parrillo argued that as a result he 
detrimentally relied on the letter, while the State argued that 
Parrillo could not meet the elements of equitable estoppel.50 
The Court stated that in order to invoke the equitable 
estoppel doctrine there are two necessary elements: “[f]irst, an 
affirmative representation . . . directed to another for the purpose 
of inducing the other to act or fail to act in reliance thereon; and 
secondly, that such representation or conduct in fact did induce 
the other to act or fail to act to his injury.”51 The Court held that 
this was not the proper instance for equitable estoppel and that 
the hearing justice had not committed an error of law.52  The 
Court reasoned that the DOC employee that sent the letter did not 
have the “authority to decrease a judicially imposed sentence,”  
and that any statement about Parrillo’s probation term ending in 
2009 directly contradicted the “judicially-imposed” sentence as 
well as “[sections] 42-56-24 and 12-19-2(a), including the effect 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 291–92. 
49. Id. at 292 (alterations in original). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. (quoting Faella v. Chiodo, 111 A.3d 351, 357 (R.I. 2015)). 
52. Id. 
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these credits had on the length of Parrillo’s  sentence.”53  
Moreover, the Court found that Parrillo provided no evidence that 
the DOC employee “intended to induce any specific behavior” or 
that his conduct in the 2011 incident was “induced by the 2009 
DOC letter.”54 Finally, the Court emphatically stated it was 
“preposterous” for Parrillo to claim the 2009 letter induced him to 
commit an alleged crime.55 
Finally, Parrillo argued the State violated due process given 
he had no “fair warning” that his conduct subjected him to the 
penalty of a probation violator.56 However, because the  lower 
court had decided Parrillo’s case on other grounds, the Court 
remanded for the hearing justice to consider the due process 
argument.57 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied heavily on Rose when 
holding that sections 42-56-24 and 12-19-2(a), dealing with good- 
time and time-served credits, only reduce the time spent 
incarcerated, and not the overall sentence, regardless of whether 
or not there is a mandatory minimum sentence.58 It seems as 
though the majority of the Court found that the distinction in 
Rose, the mandatory minimum, was not enough to require the 
Court to revisit the relationship between these statutes when it 
addressed the interplay of the same two statutes in Parrillo.59 
Conversely, the dissent used the definitions of the words 
“sentence” and “imprisonment” while interpreting the two statutes 
in question, sections 42-56-24 and 12-19-2, and would have 
affirmed the Superior Court’s decision that Parrillo was not on 
probation at the time of the 2011 altercation.60 The dissent noted 
that Rose had a key distinction, the mandatory minimum, and 
Rose did not decide the interpretation of the two statutes when 
there was no mandatory minimum.61 The dissent focused on the 
 
53. Id. at 292–93. 
54. Id. at 293 (citing Faella, 111 A.3d at 357). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 294. 
58. Id. at 291. 
59. Id. 
60. See id. at 294 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. (citing Rose, 92 A.3d at 913). 
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word “sentence,” and faulted the majority with equating “sentence 
with imprisonment” when interpreting section 42-56-24.62 
Moreover, the dissent claimed the majority interpretation of 
section 12-19-2 was faulty on the same grounds, especially  
because section 12-19-2 mandates that a “sentence or sentences 
imposed shall be reduced by the number of days spent in 
confinement while awaiting trial and while awaiting 
sentencing.”63 The plain language of the statutes  clearly 
mandates that good-time and time-served credits reduce the 
sentence imposed.64 Additionally, the dissent noted that sentence 
and imprisonment have a clear distinction as sentence is defined 
as “[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding  
a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a 
criminal wrongdoer.”65 Therefore, the dissent found that the 
General Assembly used the word “sentence” to “refer[] to the 
entirety of the judgment imposed against the defendant.”66 
The dissent, by citing to the actual definitions of the terms in 
question, took the clearer approach and deferred to what the 
General Assembly likely intended by using those terms.67 As the 
dissent pointed out, if the General Assembly wanted the credits 
applied only to the period of incarceration, then it could have 
chosen that word when drafting the statutes.68 The Court’s 
reasoning behind the Rose holding is logical; if there is a 
mandatory minimum sentence then it should not be reduced below 
that minimum. However, when no mandatory minimum is at 
issue, the plain language of the terms used by the General 
Assembly should be used to interpret the statutes enacted. This 
seemingly led to the dissent’s conclusion—a sentence means just 
“the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.”69 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly held that sections 
 
 
62. Id. (citing Rose, 92 A.3d at 914). 
63. Id. at 294–95. 
64. Id. at 295. 
65. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1569 (10th ed. 2014)). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 295. 
68. Id. 
69. See id. 
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42-56-24 and 12-19-2(a), dealing with good-time and time-served 
credits, only reduce the time spent incarcerated and not the 
overall sentence regardless of whether or not there is a mandatory 
minimum sentence. The Court extended the Rose holding because 
it found the distinction between Rose and the case at bar, that no 
mandatory minimum existed, was not sufficient for the Court to 
stray from the interpretation they gave to the two statutes in 
Rose. 
 
David R. Fitzpatrick 
  
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law. State v. Terzian, 162 A.3d 1230 (R.I. 2017). To 
comply with the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entries and 
searches must conform to particular and narrow exceptions, such 
as exigent circumstances that supersede the warrant requirement. 
Police must also base their belief that a person has the authority 
to consent to a search of a home on demonstrable factors, not on 
assumption. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On the night of July 31, 2007, Providence police received a 9-
1-1 call of gunshots fired in the area of Pumgansett Street.1  Soon 
after, officers responded to a nearby location.2 There, a man 
approached police and told them that the “Defendant, who ‘lived 
on Pumgansett Street,’ had ‘shot his back window out and beat up 
his girlfriend.’”3 Officers responded to the Defendant’s home on 
Pumgansett Street, where, according to police, gunpowder could 
be smelled in the air and broken glass laid in the street.4 After 
police knocked on the front door, the Defendant, Boghos Terzian, 
emerged from the house, appearing “to the officers to be ‘highly 
intoxicated.’”5 Police did not ask the Defendant if he lived in the 
home.6 The Defendant began to converse with police, but soon 
“became ‘uncooperative’ and ‘belligerent,’” causing officers to place 
him in a police cruiser.7  After removing him from the cruiser to  
be identified,8 police handcuffed the Defendant and placed him 
back in the cruiser, where he remained for the duration of the 
 
 
1. State v. Terzian, 162 A.3d 1230, 1234 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at n.2. The man who spoke with police was Vito A. Cocci. Id. 
4. Id. at 1234–35. 
5. Id. at 1235. 
6. Id. at 1240. “The officers failed to ask who, if anyone, lived in the 
house, and they did not ask anyone for identification.” Id. 
7. Id. at 1235. 
8. Id. The defendant “was identified by Vito as the person with the 
firearm.” Id. 
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events.9 
Police then spoke with the Defendant’s fiancée, Stephanie 
Kruwell, and her daughter, Samantha Kruwell, both of whom 
were at the Pumgansett Street home.10 The two women were 
caring for “a young child who was ‘running around the house.’”11 
Police did not ask Stephanie or Samantha who lived in the house 
and assumed the two women did.12 Police asked Stephanie if the 
house contained any guns.13 Stephanie told officers it did, and, 
though police did not request her permission, she voluntarily 
consented to a search of the home.14 Police entered the house and 
Stephanie directed them to the location of the gun.15 Police 
discovered a holstered handgun “beneath clothing stacked on top 
of a bureau,” along with ammunition adjacent to the gun.16 After 
detectives from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation arrived and 
photographed the gun, police seized it.17 
The Defendant moved to suppress the seized gun, which the 
Rhode Island Superior Court justice denied.18 At the conclusion of 
a trial, a jury convicted the Defendant of three counts of assault 
with a dangerous weapon and one count of carrying a pistol 
without a license.19 The Defendant appealed to the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court, arguing that “the Superior Court justice erred in 
denying his motion to suppress evidence seized by police during a 
warrantless search of his home.”20 
 
 
 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 1236. 
12. Id. at 1235. “Significantly, when the Superior Court justice  
pointedly asked Patrolman Zambarano to state the factors that led him to 
conclude that Stephanie lived in the house, before he entered, he responded, 
‘Just assumption, I guess, your Honor.’” Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1236. 
18. Id. at 1237. The Superior Court justice stated, “‘[T]here were 
circumstances present in the case before me that certainly were exigent to 
the point where the cops had to find that gun, and knew there was a firearm.” 
Specifically, the justice pointed to the young child and the recent skirmish 
and gunfire. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 1234. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Because this case concerned an alleged violation of the 
Defendant’s constitutional rights, the Court conducted a de novo 
review.21 In doing so, the Court examined the “totality of the 
circumstances” to determine whether the firearm was seized from 
the Defendant’s home in violation of the Fourth Amendment.22 
The Court reaffirmed that warrantless entries by police into a 
home violate the Fourth Amendment, absent “one of the specific 
and carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant  
requirement.”23 Such exceptions are “‘narrowly defined and 
jealously guarded,’”24 and serve as the basis for the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment analysis.25 
The Court first examined the voluntary consent exception to 
the warrant requirement.26 The State argued Stephanie Kurwell 
had the “apparent authority” to voluntarily consent to police 
entering and searching the Defendant’s home.27 In apparent 
authority cases, “the [S]tate must demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence the factors that were actually relied 
upon by the police,” a demonstration that hinges on an officer’s 
reasonable belief.28 In affirming the Superior Court’s holding, the 
 
 
21. Id. at 1238. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 1239 (quoting State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 
1984)). 
25. Id. at 1238. “The starting point for analyzing whether the evidence 
seized during the warrantless search of defendant’s home is admissible under 
the Fourth Amendment must begin with a determination of whether the 
entry by the responding officers was justified as falling within an exception to 
the warrant requirement.” Id. 
26. Id. at 1239. “Voluntary consent by a person authorized to grant 
consent is one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. (citing State 
v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1125 (R.I. 2005)). 
27. Id. at 1238. Additionally, in apparent authority cases, “the state 
bears the burden of proving that the officer reasonably believed that the 
person who invited the officer into the dwelling, or permitted a search, was 
authorized to do so, and it is discovered later that the consenting party lacked 
the authority to consent.” Id. at 1239–40. 
28. Id. at 1240. “Crucial to an examination of apparent authority, “‘is 
whether, based on the information in the officers’ possession, they reasonably 
believed’ that the consenting individual had the authority to consent to a[n] 
[entry or] search.” Id. (citing State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 1000 (R.I. 
2008)) (emphasis added and emphasis omitted). 
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Court held that the State failed to meet this burden and that 
Stephanie did not possess the apparent authority to voluntarily 
consent to police entering and searching the Defendant’s home.29 
The Court noted that police did not rely on any factors to satisfy 
the conclusion that Stephanie lived in the house they sought to 
enter;30 rather, the Court reaffirmed police assumed Stephanie 
lived in the house and did not direct any questions to the parties 
involved to confirm their assumption.31 The Court found police’s 
assumption that Stephanie lived in the house, “in the absence of 
factors that would lead an experienced police officer to reach such 
a conclusion, [to be] woefully inadequate and [did] not lead to a 
reasonable judgment.”32 Because Stephanie did not have the 
apparent authority to authorize police to enter and search the 
Defendant’s home, the Court reaffirmed the Superior Court’s 
holding that the voluntary consent exception did not justify the 
failure to obtain a warrant in the Defendant’s case.33 
Next, the Court examined the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement, which applies when “there 
is such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will not 
brook the delay of obtaining a warrant.”34 “[T]he police [must] 
have an objective, reasonable belief that a crisis can only be 
avoided by swift and immediate action.”35 The Court illustrated 
 
29. Id. 
30. Id. “Although the state points out that Stephanie was the 
defendant’s fiancée and that she was familiar with defendant’s dogs as 
factors that support the officers’ conclusions, there was no evidence produced 
to suggest that the officers relied on these factors.” Id. 
31. Id. The Court again stated that both responding officers testified at 
the suppression hearing they assumed Stephanie lived in the house. Id. 
32. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that police should not be held to a 
standard of perfection. “This Court recognizes that, in the context of  
apparent authority, ‘room must be allowed for some mistakes on [the officer’s] 
part.’” Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 
However, the Court here found police’s mistakes unreasonable. “[T]he 
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability.” Id. (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176) 
(emphasis added). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1241 (citing State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1151 (R.I. 
2016)). 
35. Id. (citing Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1151). Additionally,  the  Court 
noted that its focus in analyzing the exigent circumstances exception is 
limited “to the facts known to the police at the time they enter the dwelling.” 
Id. 
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previous examples where it deemed such action overcame the 
warrant requirement, including: the need to render “emergency 
assistance,” “hot pursuit” scenarios, and preventing “the imminent 
destruction of evidence.”36 The Court also noted that an exigent 
circumstances analysis hinges on “whether the police reasonably 
believed, relying upon facts known by them at the time[,] that the 
warrantless intrusion was necessary to preserve life or avoid 
serious injury.”37 
Overturning the Superior Court’s finding, the Court held 
exigent circumstances were not sufficiently present so as to justify 
the warrantless entry into the Defendant’s home. In doing so, the 
Court first examined the responding officers’ testimonies provided 
at the suppression hearing.38 The Court found that “neither  
officer testified that he was concerned about the unsecured 
firearm or that he was faced with an emergency,” and neither 
officer testified they believed the “underlying dispute” for which 
police were initially summoned would “reignite.”39 Because the 
officers did not “‘point to some real immediate and serious 
consequences if [they] postponed action to get a warrant” through 
their testimony, the Court held exigent circumstances justifying 
the absence of a warrant did not exist.40 Additionally, the Court 
turned to the facts of the incident in finding exigent circumstances 
lacking. These included the fact that police secured the defendant 
in a cruiser during the search, and that there were “no other 
suspects, intruders, or victims on the premises.”41 The Court also 
dismissed the potential concern that the child Stephanie and 
Samantha cared for could have accessed and fired the weapon, 
noting that police only discovered the child running around the 
 
 
36. Id. at 1241. “Those circumstances include: ‘law enforcement’s need  
to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home, engage in “hot 
pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, enter a burning building to put out a fire and 
investigate its cause, [and] prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.’” 
Id. (citing Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1164). 
37. Id. at 1242. 
38. Id. “The testimony of the intruding officer provides the court with 
insight into the officer’s motivation for the entry and, therefore, provides the 
basis for the court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances support the 
intrusion.” Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
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house after they entered it.42 Moreover, that a firearm  was 
merely present in the Defendant’s house did not persuade the 
Court an emergency existed justifying warrantless entry by 
police.43 The Court emphasized the general circumstances at the 
time of the search and found that they presented no hazard that 
rightly afforded police the authority to conduct a warrantless 
entry.44 The Court stated, “When the area is secure and the 
danger is no longer present, the emergency is over, and the search 
must cease.”45 
Lastly, the Court briefly addressed the issue of harmless 
error.46 The inquiry under which harmless error is analyzed asks 
“whether it is reasonably possible that the error contributed to the 
conviction.”47 The State argued it was harmless error that the 
Superior Court Justice admitted the firearm seized from the 
Defendant’s home into evidence.48 The Court, noting that the 
Defendant’s charges “require the [S]tate to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [the] [D]efendant had control over a 
firearm,” disagreed, and further illustrated conflicting testimony 
as to the Defendant’s possession and use of a firearm during the 
incident that elicited police response.49 In considering this, the 
Court held that admitting the unlawfully seized gun was not 
harmless error.50 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court analyzed a fluid and 
 
 
42. Id. at 1243. The Court also noted police “paid scant attention to the 
child in any event. A passing observation that there may have been a child 
‘running around the house’ will not support a warrantless search based on an 
emergency.” Id. 
43. Id. “The fact that there may have been a firearm somewhere in the 
residence does not, by itself, rise to the level of exigency necessary to surpass 
the warrant requirement.” Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 1244. “Harmless error is recognized to be an error that ‘in the 
setting of a particular case [is] so unimportant and insignificant that [it] may, 
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring 
the automatic reversal of the conviction.’” Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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undoubtedly complex set of facts. It is clear that Stephanie lacked 
the apparent authority to consent to a search of the Defendant’s 
home because police admittedly relied on nothing more than 
assumption in determining to the contrary.51 However, it is less 
clear that exigent circumstances were absent. The dissent 
considered the circumstances to be sufficiently exigent so as to 
justify a warrantless entry into and search of the Defendant’s 
home,52 and emphasized that the actual circumstances should 
remain the exclusive basis for the Court’s inquiry in cases 
involving warrantless entry and the exigent circumstances 
exception. 
The dissent illustrated a scene that had yet to fully cool, 
stating the “[D]efendant’s arrest did very little to address the 
underlying domestic dispute that served as the catalyst to the 
fight and ultimate shooting.”53 Because the events were prone to 
being dangerously revived, the dissent noted the potential for 
harm to police or others, which was certainly exacerbated by the 
presence of an unsecured firearm; indeed, the dissent stated that 
“exigent circumstances are found when an officer anticipates that 
someone in the home, whether a child or an adult, will be harmed 
by a firearm.”54 Additionally, that the gun remained hidden and 
the shooting ceased is immaterial. The dissent stated that “[a]n 
officer is not required to wait until the anticipated danger— 
whether to himself or herself or to the public—comes to 
fruition.”55 
The dissent contested the majority’s reliance on “the 
testimony of the intruding officer [which] provides the [C]ourt 
with insight into the officer’s motivation for the entry and, 
therefore, provides the basis for the court’s conclusion that exigent 
circumstances support the intrusion.”56 The dissent stated that 
“[b]y shifting the focus to ‘the officer[s’] motivation for the entry,’ 
the majority has erroneously applied a subjective analysis to 
 
51. Id. at 1240. 
52. Id. at 1245. 
53. Id. at 1246. 
54. Id. “Here, the officers could reasonably have believed that it was 
necessary to secure the gun before either the heated domestic dispute 
reignited or, perhaps worse, the young child located the unsecured firearm.” 
Id. 
55. Id. at 1246. 
56. Id. at 1247. 
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determine whether an exigency existed.”57 Instead, the dissent 
retained focus on the “actual circumstances that confronted” 
police.58 Those circumstances involved “shots [that] had recently 
been fired; there had been a street fight between Samantha and 
her ex-boyfriend; someone had been pepper-sprayed; and the 
officers had been told that there was a firearm in the house where, 
as the majority noted, a young child ‘was running around.’”59 
Notwithstanding the officers’ testimonies that they were 
unconcerned for the loose gun,60 the dissent found the dangerous 
circumstances alone gave rise to exigency sufficient to overcome 
the warrant requirement.61 
The dissent is more persuasive because it addressed the 
danger police actually encountered, not what the officers may 
have believed. In determining whether the exigent circumstances 
exception applies, confining the analysis to the actual 
circumstances, viewed objectively, seems more appropriate than 
expanding the inquiry to consider an officer’s subjective 
motivation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that police violated the 
Fourth Amendment by entering and searching the Defendant’s 
home without first obtaining a warrant. The Court determined  
the entry and search to be unconstitutional because it satisfied 
neither the voluntary consent nor the exigent circumstances 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
 
Adam J. Fague 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 1248. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 1242. 
61. Id. at 1247. “When the circumstances are examined objectively, 
however, the officers’ entry was clearly justified under the exigent- 
circumstances exception.” Id. 
  
 
 
 
 
Employment Law. Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159 
(R.I. 2017). Rhode Island General Laws section 28-5-7(6), the 
Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), does not 
provide for individual liability of an employee of a defendant 
employer. Enforcing individual liability against an individual 
employee under FEPA would be against the intent of the statute 
and would have a chilling effect on management employees. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Sergeant Mark Mancini (Mancini) of the Providence Police 
Department brought suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Rhode Island, alleging unlawful employment and 
disability discrimination against his employer, the City of 
Providence, and the Chief of Police of the Providence Police 
Department, Hugh Clements, Jr. (Clements).1 Mancini alleged 
that he was illegally denied a promotional opportunity within the 
Providence Police Department.2 Additionally, Mancini alleged 
Clements was liable in his individual capacity for Mancini’s 
failure to be promoted.3 Section 28-5-7(6) of FEPA provides that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice [f]or any 
person, whether or not an employer, employment agency, 
labor organization, or employee, to aid, abet, incite, 
compel or coerce the doing of any act declared by this 
section to be an unlawful employment practice, or to 
obstruct or prevent any person from complying with the 
provisions of this chapter or any order pursuant to this 
chapter, or to attempt directly or indirectly to commit any 
act declared by this section to be an unlawful employment 
practice[.]4 
 
 
1. Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159, 161 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(6) (1956). 
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Mancini argued that Clements violated section 28-5-6-7(6) of 
FEPA when he failed to promote Mancini.5  Chief  Clements 
moved to dismiss the complaint against him, arguing section 28-5- 
6-7(6) does not provide for individual liability.6 The United States 
District Court for the District of Rhode Island posed a certified 
question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court requesting that the 
Court determine if individual liability exists under FEPA section 
28-5-6-7(6).7 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In answering the certified question posed by the district 
court,8 the Supreme Court sought to determine if FEPA could be 
reasonably interpreted to provide for individual liability of 
employees. Conducting a de novo review of the statutory  
language, the Court focused on the parties’ conflicting views on 
the language of the “aiding and abetting” statute.9 Mancini  
argued that the statutory language was unambiguous and urged 
the Court to follow the decisions of New York, Massachusetts, and 
Connecticut, which have held individual liability exists.10 
Clements urged the Court to read the FEPA as a whole and to 
follow the reasoning of Alaska, California, and Minnesota, which 
have held that individual liability does not exist under similar 
statutory schemes.11 
In interpreting the statutory language, the Court sought to 
“give effect to the General Assembly’s intent.”12 The Court stated 
that if the language of the statue was unambiguous it “must 
interpret the statute literally and give the words . . . their plain 
 
5. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 161. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 161–62. 
8. Id. at 161. The United States District Court for the District of Rhode 
Island asked the Rhode Island Supreme Court to answer the following 
certified question: “Does Section 28–5–7(6) of the Rhode Island Fair 
Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28–5–1 et seq. (‘FEPA’), provide 
for the individual liability of an employee of a defendant employer and, if so, 
under what circumstances?” Id. 
9. Id. at 161–62. 
10. Id. at 162. New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts all have 
similar statutory schemes for employment discrimination and have held 
multiple times that individual employees may be held liable. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
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. . . meanings.”13 However, because the language of the statute 
states liability should be attributed to “any person, whether or not 
an employee,” the Court determined that section 28-5-6-7(6) was 
ambiguous with regards to whether or not it imposed individual 
liability.14 In light of the ambiguous wording of the statute, the 
Court stated it must attempt to give effect to the legislative intent 
by evaluating the “entire statutory scheme.”15 The  Court 
reasoned that in order to impose individual liability it would have 
to determine that Sergeant Clements aided and abetted himself.16 
In order to impose liability on Clements, it would have to be 
determined that as an employee he was aiding in the unlawful 
employment practice.17 However, because Clements was both the 
employee and the sole individual responsible for the alleged 
unlawful employment practice, the Court determined that he 
could not aid and abet himself.18 The Court found that 
interpreting the statute in such a manner would be illogical and 
circular.19 
The Court noted that the General Assembly intended for 
FEPA to be construed liberally; however, a liberal interpretation 
of the statute should not go against logical reasoning.20 The 
section of FEPA at issue here was ambiguously worded, and the 
Court reasoned that if the General Assembly intended for 
individual liability, it would have expressly stated so in 
unequivocal language.21 Persuaded by precedent from Alaska, the 
Court held that the statute did not impose individual liability.22 
While the Court based its holding entirely on the principles of 
statutory interpretation, the Court also reasoned that holding 
 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 163; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(6). 
15. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 163. 
16. Id. at 164. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. The Court reasoned that holding Clements individually liable 
“would create a strange and confusing circularity where the person who has 
directly perpetrated the harassment only becomes liable through the 
employer whose liability in turn hinges on the conduct of the direct 
perpetrator.” Id. (quoting Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 
790 (Minn. 2013)). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 165. 
22. Id. at 165; see also Mills v. Hankla, 297 P.3d 158, 172 (Alaska 2013). 
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individuals liable would have a “chilling effect” on management 
decision making.23 If individual liability was imposed, the Court 
predicted that supervisors might make employment decisions 
based on fear of litigation instead of the best interest of the 
business.24 For public policy reasons, an individual should not 
have to be concerned with losing all of his possessions when 
deciding which employee to promote.25 Additionally, the remedies 
provided by FEPA, such as cease-and-desist orders, hiring 
reinstatements, and upgrading of employees, are traditionally 
statutory remedies imposed on employers.26 In line with the 
reasoning of the California Court, this Court stated that imposing 
individual liability may encourage individuals to make decisions 
based on what actions were least likely to result in litigation 
versus making the best decision for the furtherance of their 
employer’s business.27 
Finally, the Court briefly discussed the issue of deference to 
agency interpretation. The Rhode Island Commission for Human 
Rights stated in an amicus curiae brief that as the agency 
responsible for administering the FEPA, it has long held 
individual employees liable.28 The agency urged the Court to give 
deference to their interpretation of the statute.29 However, the 
Court reasoned that while it is often the practice to defer to 
reasonable agency interpretations of statutes, the Court is the 
final authority in statutory interpretation.30 Ultimately,  the 
Court determined that any deference due to the agency did not 
overcome the General Assembly’s intent to not impose individual 
liability.31 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly stays true to the 
 
23. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165–66. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 166. The Court also noted the potential difficulty of assigning 
liability when multiple individuals are part of the decision-making process. 
Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 166; see also Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1339 (Cal. 1998). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 168. 
31. Id. 
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spirit of section 28-5-7(6) by providing wronged employees an 
appropriate avenue to bring action against their employer for 
discrimination. In balancing the interests of the industry against 
those of wrongly discriminating employers, the Court ensured that 
employees who are wronged still have recourse against their 
employer and, further, that individual supervisors are free to 
make important business decisions without fear of legal 
repercussions. By ensuring that employees are still able to seek 
redress from their employer, the Court maintained the spirit of 
the statute, discouraged discrimination, and protected employees 
from wrongful discriminatory conduct by their employer. 
As such, by clarifying that individuals cannot be held liable 
under the FEPA, the Court broadened the decision-making 
capabilities of individual supervisors. In eliminating the risk of 
individual liability for discriminatory action, the Court gave 
supervisors and managers the confidence to make the right 
management decision for their organizations. In return,  
individual employees no longer need to fear losing their personal 
assets as a result of a lawsuit from an aggrieved employee. 
Finally, the Court protects the rights of injured employees 
seeking recourse for discriminatory acts. The Court maintained 
the overall purpose of the FEPA by ensuring that employees 
alleging discrimination still have effective means of redressability 
against their employer. In clarifying the ambiguous statutory 
language, the Court protected the interests of wronged employees 
while insulating individual employees from liability under section 
28-5-7(6) of the FEPA. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in answering a certified 
question from the United States District Court for the District of 
Rhode Island, held that under section 28-5-7(6) of the Rhode 
Island Fair Employment Practices Act individual employees are 
not liable for employment or disability discrimination.32 In the 
absence of clear language, the Court determined the General 
Assembly did not intend to hold individual employees liable under 
section 28-5-6-7(6) of the FEPA.33 
 
Kathrine M. Morin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32. Id. at 168; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(6). 
33. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 164. 
  
 
 
 
 
Injunctive Relief. Paolino v. Ferreira, 153 A.3d 505 (R.I. 2017). 
Despite mandatory injunctive relief for cases of continuing 
trespass, certain exceptional circumstances warrant a balancing of 
equities between parties before ordering injunctive relief. Upon a 
finding of exceptional circumstance warranting a balancing of 
equities, injunctive relief may still be ordered upon a finding of 
excessive activity corresponding to a de minimis encroachment. 
 
Evidence. Id. Expert testimony is admissible pursuant to Rule 
703 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence where an expert 
perceives facts or data prior to the testimony and relies upon those 
facts or data, which have been established as being reasonably 
and customarily relied upon by experts in the field. During 
testimony, upon an objection to the foundation of expert 
testimony, appeal is preserved upon a sufficient offer of proof.1 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In October 1983, Joseph Ferreira (Ferreira or Defendant) 
purchased approximately thirty acres of property, which included 
a stream and two large ponds, for use as an auto salvage yard.2 
Ferreira constructed two separate buildings on his property: the 
first was located two hundred feet away from the stream and used 
for dismantling cars, and the second was seven to ten feet from  
the border of an abutting property.3 There was no survey 
conducted before any construction, and when an addition to the 
second building was constructed, it exceeded the property line by 
 
 
1.   Attorney sanctions were also discussed in the opinion, but will not be 
a focus in this survey. 
2. Paolino v. Ferreira, 153 A.3d 505, 509–10 (R.I. 2017).  Upon  
ownership, Ferreira cleaned up the lot without any environmental inspection 
and began filling the wetlands, which caused a pond to rapidly fill. Id. This 
caused Ferreira to widen the stream, which led the Department of 
Environmental Management to require erosion controls to address the 
environmental violations. Id. 
3. Id. at 510. 
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eighty-six hundredths (0.86) of a foot.4 Ferreira also installed 
drainage controls to trap contaminants pursuant to an agreement 
with the Department of Environmental Management (DEM).5 
Ferreira testified that, in spite of the precautions taken to trap 
containments, he had noticed turbid water running off the site.6 
In December 1985, a company owned by Louis Paolino 
(Paolino or Plaintiff) purchased six acres abutting Ferreira’s lots.7 
In 1987, Paolino received a letter from DEM notifying him that his 
land was on the CERCLIS list because of the potential release of 
contaminants in the area.8 In response, Paolino had tests 
conducted on his land which subsequently cleared the property 
from the CERCLIS list.9 Through the 1990s, Paolino had no 
further problems with contamination on his property.10 
Contaminants were not again found until a potential buyer had 
the property evaluated.11 In response to the contamination, DEM 
sent a letter of responsibility, and then a letter of noncompliance, 
which indicated Paolino, as the owner of the property, was 
financially responsible for the investigation and remediation of the 
hazardous materials on site.12 
Subsequently, in November 2006, Paolino filed an action in 
the Rhode Island Superior Court alleging continuing trespass, 
public and private nuisance, as well as federal and state 
environmental violations on the basis that Ferreira caused the 
contaminants to flow onto his property.13 
 
4. Id. at 510, 513. 
5.  Id. at 510.   The storm water pollution prevention plan was installed 
by 2008. Id. 
6. Id. at 511. 
7. Id. LM Nursing Services Inc. Id. 
8. Id. CERCLIS (Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Information System) is a database maintained 
by the EPA as part of the Superfund program. Id. at 511 & n.3 (internal 
citation omitted). 
9. Id. at 511. Paolino hired Environmental Resource Associates, 
Incorporated (ERA) to conduct the test and, subsequently, clear the property 
from the CERCLIS list after the test revealed the contamination had 
subsided. Id. 
10. Id. The Division of Air and Hazardous Materials of DEM sent a 
letter confirming that the stream had been sampled twice and neither sample 
was found to be contaminated. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id.  at  511–12. Amended complaints added, in total, thirty-five 
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At trial, Paolino called Alvin Snyder (Snyder), a consulting 
environmental and chemical engineer, to testify as an expert 
witness concerning the contaminants and the properties at 
issue.14 In preparation for testimony, Snyder reviewed all 
available information including thousands of pages of documents 
that are customarily and reasonably relied upon by site 
assessment professionals when performing site assessments.15 
Snyder relied upon these documents to formulate his expert 
opinion.16 Snyder testified that storm water runs from Ferreira’s 
property and into the stream on Paolino’s property.17 Further, 
Snyder testified that the Environmental Resource Associates 
(ERA) conducted tests in 1987, which revealed no contamination 
on Paolino’s property, but “soil borings from Paolino’s property in 
2007 showed the presence of oil contamination.”18 Snyder then 
offered testimony of his visits to the property in which he 
determined the presence of turbidity in the stream water.19 
Snyder also took independent samples from the storm water 
running off of the property and testified that the oil from the 
storm water was “fingerprinted” and identified as lube oil or 
 
 
counts as well as two new defendants: Joseph Ferreira Trust and J.F. Realty, 
LLC. Id. 
14. Id. at 516. Snyder offered that he had a Bachelor of Science degree  
in chemical engineering from Clarkson College of Technology and that he was 
a registered engineer in four states. Id. 
15. Id. at 516–17. 
16. Id. at 517. An expert’s opinion may be based on a hypothetical 
question, facts or data perceived by the expert at or before the hearing, or 
facts or data in evidence of a type reasonably and customarily relied upon by 
experts in the particular field. In forming opinions upon the subject, the 
underlying facts or data shall be admissible without testimony from the 
primary source. R.I. R. Evid. 703. 
17. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 517. Snyder offered testimony on aerial 
photographs of the property which had been taken in 1981, 1988, 1996, and 
2005. The photographs revealed that Ferreira did not comply with a twenty- 
foot buffer zone requirement between activity and the stream. Id. 
18. Id. The soil borings found solvents, metals, lead, and light, non- 
aqueous phase liquids like oil or gasoline. Id. at 517 & n.7.  Snyder also  
noted an analysis done by the Pawtucket Water Supply Board that indicated 
a presence of other components of gasoline and testified to a hydrology report 
indicating oil sheen at the entry point of the storm water from Ferreira’s 
property to Paolino’s property. Id. at 517. 
19. Id. at 517–18. “Turbid” is defined by the American Heritage 
Dictionary as “having sediment or foreign particles stirred up or suspended.” 
Id. at 518 & n.9 (internal citation omitted). 
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compressor oils.20 
On direct examination, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Snyder if he 
had an opinion as to what caused the contamination on Paolino’s 
property, upon which Ferreira’s counsel objected based on lack of 
foundation.21 The trial justice sustained the objection providing 
that the Court was going to need more foundation, grounded in 
science, for the opinion testimony.22 Thereafter, Paolino’s counsel 
attempted to build a foundation for this opinion testimony which 
was repeatedly objected to by Defendant’s counsel and repeatedly 
sustained by the trial justice.23 
The sustained objections to this line of questioning continued 
until Paolino’s counsel asked: 
Based upon the reports you reviewed, your testing, and 
your personal observations at the site in 2009, did you 
have an opinion as to whether or not the water that was 
coming out of the storm water discharge system at the 
headwall was causing oil to come onto Mr. Paolino’s 
property?24 
Only then did the trial justice permit a limited opinion testimony 
that the storm water discharged from Ferreira’s salvage yard by 
the headwall was polluting Paolino’s property.25 Accordingly, the 
jury found that there was a continuing trespass and awarded 
Paolino nominal damages of $1,400.26 
Two years after this jury verdict, Paolino moved for an entry 
of final judgment, and, at the hearing, Paolino claimed he was 
 
 
20. Id. at 518. The storm water samples were carefully taken from 
Ferreira’s property to be sure the samples did not include any additional 
runoff from other properties. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 519. 
23. Id. Paolino’s counsel made numerous offers of proof to establish the 
foundation for which Snyder would testify through questions concerning the 
documents Snyder reviewed, the analysis Snyder performed, and the review 
of DEM and GZA tests and analysis. Id. at 518–20. 
24. Id. at 521. 
25. Id. However, testimony as to the discharge of oil from Ferreira’s 
property into the stream was precluded. Id. 
26. Id. at 512. The continuing trespasses identified were: a corner of 
Ferreira’s metal building, the headwall and riprap for Ferreira’s storm water 
remediation system, and the discharge flowing from Ferreira’s property onto 
Paolino’s property. Id. 
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entitled to injunctive relief to remove the continuing trespass.27  
At the hearing, the trial justice noted that the general remedy for 
continuing trespass is injunctive relief, but she stated that there 
are exceptions to mandatory injunctive relief where the impact to 
a defendant is disproportionate to the benefit of a plaintiff.28 The 
trial justice found that the Ferreira’s did not act recklessly or in 
bad faith and had no reason to know of the encroachment.29 
However, because encroachment of the metal building invites 
more human activity onto Paolino’s property, the injunctive relief 
was issued only in part to remove the portion of the metal 
building.30 
On appeal, Paolino challenged the trial justice’s preclusion of 
his expert witness’s opinion testimony, as well as the failure to 
order full injunctive relief on the issue of continuing trespass.31 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Preclusion of Expert Opinion Testimony 
On appeal, Paolino first argued that the trial justice erred 
when she precluded his expert witness from testifying as to the 
cause of the oil running onto Paolino’s property.32 Paolino argued 
that Snyder established a reasonable basis for the opinion 
testimony under Rule 703 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, 
contrary to the finding of the trial justice.33 It is clear that the 
determination of whether to qualify an expert witness to proffer 
an expert opinion is left to the discretion of the trial justice, and 
the Court will not disturb that determination absent clear error or 
abuse of discretion.34 Accordingly, a litigant must make an offer 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 513 (citing Santilli v. Morelli, 230 A.2d 860 (1967)). The court 
is entitled to balance the equities between parties unless the encroachment is 
intentional. Id. (citing Renaissance Development Corp. v. Universal 
Properties Group, Inc., 821 A.2d 233 (R.I. 2003)). 
29. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 513. 
30. Id. at 514. The trial justice reasoned that there would be an increase 
in human activity of Paolino’s property because people would be retrieving 
automobile parts that were stored in the structure. Id. 
31. Id. at 514, 521. 
32. Id. at 521. 
33. Id. at 521; see R.I. R. Evid. 703. 
34. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 521 (quoting Foley v. St. Joseph’s Health 
Services of Rhode Island, 899 A.2d 1271, 1280 (R.I. 2006)). 
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of proof after a sustained objection to preserve the issue for 
appeal.35 The Court determined, from the record of a sidebar 
exchange, that Paolino’s counsel made a sufficient offer of proof.36 
Because the issue had been preserved for appeal, the Court then 
sought to determine if, under Rule 705 of the Rhode Island Rules 
of Evidence, the testimony was permissible.37 Under Rule 705,  
“an expert’s opinion must be predicate upon facts legally sufficient 
to from a basis for his [or her] conclusion.”38 
In determining admissibility, the Court recognized that 
Snyder reviewed numerous documents pertaining to the property 
that were made available through governmental and professional 
agencies; the documents were typical of those customarily relied 
upon by site assessment professionals; and Snyder had taken 
visits to the property and independently analyzed various water 
samples.39 Subsequently, the trial justice only allowed testimony 
on the results of his independent tests and precluded opinion 
testimony as to the Ferreira property being the source of the 
contaminants.40 
As noted, the Court will not interfere with the trial justice’s 
decision unless a clear abuse of discretion is apparent.41  The 
Court elaborated that “if the expert has testified with ‘some  
degree of positiveness,’ his or her testimony is admissible[,] and 
issues relative to the weight of the evidence are left to the fact- 
finder.”42 Finding such, the Court determined that Snyder, as an 
expert witness, reviewed the reports of others and conducted his 
own analysis to render his expert opinion in a manner common to 
 
 
35. Id. at 521 (quoting Mead v. Papa Razzi, 899 A.2d 437, 445 (R.I. 
2006)). 
36. Id. at 522. The record of such exchange is quoted in full in the 
opinion. Id. 
37. Id. “Unless the court directs otherwise, before testifying in terms of 
opinion, an expert witness shall be first examined concerning the facts or 
data upon which the opinion is based.” Id. at 522; see R.I. R. Evid. 705. 
38. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 522 (quoting Gallucci v. Humbyrd, 709 A.2d 
1059, 1063 (R.I. 1998)); R.I. R. Evid. 705. 
39. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 523. None of the information discussed or relied 
upon was challenged by Defendant’s counsel. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. The standard is applicable to a trial  justice’s determinations  
with respect to both the relevancy of proffered evidence and the adequacy of 
the foundation laid for its admission. Id. (emphasis added). 
42. Id. (quoting Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472, 477 (R.I. 2002)). 
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expert witnesses.43 Subsequently, the Court found the exclusion of 
Snyder’s expert testimony an unsustainable exercise of discretion 
and awarded a new trial on the admissibility of the testimony.44 
B. Failure to Order Injunctive Relief 
Secondly, on appeal, Paolino argued that he was entitled to an 
order of full injunctive relief.45 Injunctive relief is discretionary in 
nature, and a decision will not be disturbed absent a showing of  
an abuse of discretion or error of law.46 The Court recognized a 
fundamental principle of property law that “land is not fungible; 
and, accordingly, equitable remedies are normally used when it 
comes to injuries and intrusions to it.”47 The trial justice, in 
opposition to the fundamental principle, may, in its discretion, 
decline to weigh the equities where enforcement will 
disproportionately harm the defendant with little benefit to the 
plaintiff.48 Paolino argued the trial justice should have found that 
Ferreira acted in bad faith and/or recklessly in encroaching upon 
Paolino’s property and, as such, it was inappropriate to balance 
the equities.49 
The Court addressed Paolino’s argument that the balancing of 
equities was not appropriate because the hardship to the 
Defendant was self-inflicted where he encroached on Paolino’s 
property knowingly or recklessly.50 However, the opinion makes 
clear the trial justice did not abuse her discretion because she 
found Ferreira did not knowingly and deliberately encroach upon 
 
 
43. Id. at 525. “An expert’s opinion may be based on a hypothetical 
question, facts or data perceived by the expert at or before the hearing, or 
facts or data in evidence. If of a type reasonably and customarily relied upon 
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions upon the subject, the 
underlying facts or data shall be admissible without testimony from the 
primary source.” R.I. R. Evid. 703. 
44. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 525. 
45. Id. at 514. 
46. Id. (citing North End Realty, LLC v. Mattos, 25 A.3d 527, 530 (R.I. 
2011)). 
47. Id. at 515. (quoting Rose Nulman Park Foundation ex rel. Nulman  
v. Four Twenty Corp., 93 A.3d 25, 29 (R.I. 2014)). 
48. Id. at 515. “[T]hese exceptional circumstances include, but are not 
limited to, acquiescence, laches, or a de minimis trespass.” Rose Nulman, 93 
A.3d at 29. 
49. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 515. 
50. Id. 
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Paolino’s property, but actually respected what he genuinely 
believed to be the property line.51 Thus, the Court opined that, 
where the encroachments do not substantially interfere with a 
plaintiff’s use of his or her land and it would cause such an 
inconvenience and pecuniary obligations to a defendant, the trial 
justice should use his or her discretion in denying the mandatory 
injunctive relief.52 Therefore, the Court affirmed the findings of 
the trial justice and made clear that the encroachment of the 
metal building was subjected to enforcement of injunctive relief 
because it invited continuous human activity where the building 
was used in connection with the business.53 However, the twelve- 
inch encroachment of the headwall and riprap in this case was de 
minimis and warranted a balancing of the equities which fell in 
favor of Ferreira.54 Thus, the Court found that the  trial  justice 
did not stray beyond her broad discretion in ordering injunctive 
relief in part.55 
COMMENTARY 
Upon review of Snyder’s expert opinion testimony, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court immediately noted the impressive 
credentials of Snyder’s schooling and career.56 It was further 
established that Snyder was more than prepared for his testimony 
after reviewing thousands of pages of documents and performing 
his own tests on the property.57  Concededly, under Rule 703 of  
the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, Snyder relied upon these 
documents and tests to formulate his expert testimony.58 In 
response to repeated objections for lack of foundation during 
testimony, Paolino’s counsel made an offer of proof as to how 
 
 
51. Id. The trial justice noted that the defendant’s testimony was 
believable where the survey did not reveal any encroachments and because it 
was easy to make a mistake as to the property boundaries. Id. 
52. Id. at 516. Because the cost to remove the riprap was $18,000 and 
the cost to redirect the discharge was $60,000, this case involves the 
exceptional circumstances warranting the balancing of equities. Id. at 514, 
516. 
53. Id. at 516. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. See id. 
57. Id. at 516–17. 
58. Id. at 517; see R.I. R. Evid. 703. 
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Snyder would testify.59 What the Court has failed to do, is 
recognize any rational basis for why the expert testimony was 
initially precluded. The Court expressly referred to the record of 
the trial justice during an interaction at sidebar.60 According to 
the record, the trial justice stated that “[Snyder] needs to give us 
the facts upon which he has concluded something. . . .[t]hat’s a 
little bit more than ‘I looked at a bunch of records.’”61 To the 
contrary, and under the express language of Rule 703 of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence, where the expert opinion is of a type 
reasonably and customarily relied upon by experts in a particular 
field, as established here, an expert’s opinion testimony may be 
based on facts or data perceived by the expert at or before the 
hearing.62 By expressly including the record from Snyder’s 
testimony, the Rhode Island Supreme Court implied that this was 
an obvious abuse of discretion in precluding expert testimony 
which was facially and procedurally sound practice under the 
Rules.63 It is sufficiently noted that the customary and suitable 
means for attacking credibility is through cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the 
burden of proof, and it is not for the trial justice to interfere with 
the jury’s role as the trier of fact.64 As evidenced here, a narrow 
application of the Rules of Evidence hinders the juries  
opportunity to hear relevant testimony and relieves the jury of its 
duty to weigh the credibility of an expert witness on direct 
examination and on cross-examination. 
The trial justice’s partial order of injunctive relief was a 
proper use of discretion upon weighing the equities of the 
parties.65 Here, the Court placed great weight on the balancing of 
equities and noted that there is a lack of a bright line rule in its 
application.66 The balancing act, as applied to the metal building, 
weighed both the physical intrusion as well as expected future 
intrusion. Accordingly, this Court, upon the findings of the trial 
 
59. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 518–19. 
60. Id. at 522. 
61. Id. at 519. 
62. R.I. R. Evid. 703. 
63. See id. 
64. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 525 (citing Owens v. Silva, 838 A.2d 881, 883 
(R.I. 2003)). 
65. Id. at 516. 
66. Id. 
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justice, identified the purpose of the encroaching metal building as 
being for business purposes.67 Therefore, the foreseeability of 
future, continuous human intrusion onto Paolino’s property for 
business purposes was a substantial factor in the ordering of 
injunctive relief.68 By allowing the equitable balancing act to 
include probable future intrusions and not rely strictly on the 
imminent, and readily ascertainable intrusion, the Supreme Court 
offers an additional tool to plaintiffs in search of injunctive relief 
who may be subjected to future continuing trespasses. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that expert testimony 
is admissible where the expert witness relies on documents 
reasonably and customarily relied upon by experts in the field 
where the facts and data are perceived by the expert prior to 
testimony. Further, the Court determined that, upon a balancing 
of equities, injunctive relief is to be ordered upon continuing 
trespass in the face of exceptional circumstances, such as price of 
removal, where the continuing trespass invites continuous, future 
business activity. 
 
Maxwell L. Beermann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
  
 
 
 
 
Insurance Law. Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc., 161 A.3d 
1150 (R.I. 2017). A passenger who is injured while rendering 
roadside assistance as a Good Samaritan is “occupying” the 
vehicle she just exited under the terms of an insurance policy and 
is entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits because: (1) 
there was a showing of some nexus between her injury and use of 
the insured vehicle; (2) she remained vehicle oriented as her 
departure from the insured vehicle was a temporary interruption 
in an unfinished excursion; and (3) in light of long-standing public 
policy to encourage rescue of others from perilous situations, at 
the time of injury she was engaged in a transaction essential to 
the use of the insured vehicle. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In February 2012, Amberleigh Hudson (Hudson or Plaintiff) 
was a passenger in a car driven by her then boyfriend, Gregory 
Hurst (Hurst).1 The car Hudson was traveling in was insured by 
GEICO Insurance Agency, Inc., d/b/a GEICO General Insurance 
Company (GEICO or Defendant), under which the named insured 
was Hurst.2 In the early morning hours the couple pulled into the 
Amazing Superstore parking lot on Allens Avenue with the 
intention to exit the vehicle and enter the store.3 While parked in 
the lot, but still in the car talking, they heard an automobile 
collision.4 The couple exited the vehicle, crossed two lanes of 
traffic, and reached the scene of the nearby collision.5 While 
Hudson was at the rear of the vehicles looking down to obtain the 
license plate numbers, someone yelled, “Car!”6 A third  vehicle 
then struck the disabled vehicles.7 Hudson was injured as a 
 
1. Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc., 161 A.3d 1150, 1152 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
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result of the impact.8 Hudson brought a claim against GEICO 
seeking relief as a passenger through the insurance policy Hurst 
maintained.9 GEICO denied Hudson’s claim, asserting that she 
was not “occupying” the insured vehicle at the time of her 
injuries.10 
In a bench trial upon a set of stipulated facts before the Rhode 
Island Superior Court, the trial justice analyzed the term 
“occupying” using the four prong Olivier test,11 and concluded that 
Hudson could not satisfy the first or third prongs of the Olivier 
criteria because no causal connection was established between 
Hurst’s insured vehicle and the Plaintiff’s injuries, nor was the 
Plaintiff vehicle oriented at the time of the injury.12 Thus, the  
trial justice held that Hudson “could not recover [underinsured 
motorist] (UM) benefits under the terms of the GEICO policy 
because she was not ‘occupying’ the insured vehicle at the time of 
the incident giving rise to her injuries.”13 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Justice Goldberg wrote the opinion for the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court.14 In a matter of first impression, the Court was 
called upon to address how, if at all, section 11-56-1 of the Rhode 
Island General Laws15 interacts with the term “occupying” in an 
insurance policy.16 Upon review of the Superior Court judgment, 
the Court sought to decide “[w]hether, in light of [section] 11-56-1, 
a Good Samaritan who was injured while rendering roadside aid 
may be considered to be ‘occupying’ an insured motor vehicle for 
 
 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. “The policy defined ‘occupying’ as ‘in, upon entering into or 
alighting from [the vehicle].’” Id. 
11. The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted four criteria under which 
a motorist would be considered “occupying” a vehicle within the meaning of 
an insurance policy in General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Olivier, 
574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990). See Hudson, 161 A.3d at 1153 n.1. 
12. Id. at 1153. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1152. 
15. Referred to by the Court as the “Good Samaritan Act.” Id. at 1154. 
But see id. at 1163 n.2 (Indeglia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
mischaracterizes the statute as a Good Samaritan Act, when it is really 
entitled “Duty to assist”). 
16. Id. at 1154 (majority opinion). 
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purposes of UM coverage under that vehicle’s insurance policy.”17 
Conducting a de novo review,18 the Court—using a broad and 
liberal view of the policy language19 and guided by the four prong 
Olivier criteria—analyzed whether Hudson was “occupying” the 
insured vehicle as defined in the GEICO policy.20 
A. First Prong 
The first prong of the Olivier criteria requires “a causal 
relation or connection between the injury and the use of the 
insured vehicle.”21 To satisfy this criteria there must be some 
nexus between the insured motor vehicle and the claimant’s 
injuries, which can fall short of amounting to proximate cause: the 
automobile does not have to be the instrumentality of the injury 
nor does the type of conduct that causes the injury need be 
foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle.22 The 
Court concluded that there was a sufficient nexus between the 
insured car and Hudson’s injuries because Hudson was occupying 
the insured motor vehicle when she heard and became aware of a 
collision.23 At that point, Hudson exited the vehicle because she 
was compelled to offer and render assistance at the nearby 
accident scene, which led to her injuries.24 
 
 
 
17. Id. at 1155. 
18. Because the trial court played no fact-finding role, questions of law 
and statutory interpretation, and the decision on motion for judgment as a 
matter of law were all reviewed de novo. Id. at 1153. 
19. Relying on Jackson v. Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the Court 
determined whether the interpretation was classified as inclusive (includes a 
person other than the named insured) or exclusive (excludes the named 
insured from the coverage). Id. at 1155 (citing Jackson, 159 A.3d at 610). 
Because Hudson was a passenger other than the named insured who sought 
to be included within the protection of Hurst’s GEICO policy, the Court read 
the terms of the GEICO policy broadly. Id. 
20. Id. at 1155–56. 
21. Id. at 1156 (quoting Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Olivier, 574 
A.2d 1240, 1241 (R.I. 1990)). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. The Court was quick to distinguish a scenario where Hudson had 
departed the car and did not become aware of the accident until she was 
already proceeding into the Amazing Store because a causal connection under 
those circumstances would be less certain. Id. at 1156–57. 
24. Id. at 1156. 
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B. Second Prong 
The second prong of the Olivier criteria requires that a 
plaintiff “be in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the 
insured vehicle.”25 The Court did not address this prong because 
the parties did not dispute the trial justice’s finding that this 
prong had been satisfied.26 
C. Third Prong 
The third prong of the Olivier criteria requires that a plaintiff 
“be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at 
the time [of the injury].”27 Looking to other courts who have 
considered the phrase “vehicle oriented,” the Court concluded that 
under Rhode Island law “where a departure from an insured 
vehicle is incident to a temporary interruption in an otherwise 
continuing excursion, and upon completion of the occasion causing 
the brief interruption the individual intends to continue on with 
his venture, he remains ‘vehicle oriented.’”28 In the case at bar, 
Hudson remained “vehicle oriented” because her exit of the 
insured motor vehicle was a temporary interruption in an 
unfinished excursion to the Amazing Superstore, and upon 
completion of the interruption (i.e., rendering aid at the accident 
site), Hudson intended to resume her journey.29 
D. Fourth Prong 
The fourth and final prong of the Olivier criteria is “that the 
individual be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the 
vehicle at the time of his or her injuries.”30 To satisfy this prong, 
the Court accepted Hudson’s argument “that, in light of [section] 
11-56-1, a willingness to render aid at the scene of a motor vehicle 
collision as a Good Samaritan, is inherently part of the use of the 
motor vehicle in this state.”31 Under Rhode Island law, a Good 
Samaritan is statutorily required to render reasonable assistance 
 
 
25. Id. at 1157 (quoting Olivier, 547 A.2d at 1241). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. (quoting Olivier, 547 A.2d at 1241). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1157–58. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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and thus cannot ignore the call of distress at the scene of an 
accident.32 Prior decisions of the Court and legislative  intent 
made it clear that Rhode Island public policy recognizes the value 
of encouraging the efforts of Good Samaritans and seeks to spur 
rescue.33 Thus, the Court answered the question of how section 11-
56-1 interacts with term “occupying” in an insurance policy by the 
following: “[A] motorist who exits his or her vehicle in order to 
provide reasonable assistance to victims at the scene of an 
accident is engaged in a transaction essential to the use of that 
vehicle.”34 
Armed with this holding, Hudson was able to satisfy the 
fourth and final criteria of Olivier, which led to the Court’s 
ultimate conclusion that she was “occupying” the insured vehicle 
and could recover under the GEICO policy.35 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly affirmed that 
“Olivier remains the governing standard for according a broad 
interpretation to the terms of an insurance policy” and should be 
used “in assessing whether an insured is ‘occupying’ a vehicle 
when an accident occurs.”36 While the Olivier criteria were 
affirmed in this case, their continued survival as good law seems 
uncertain, either in part or in whole. The Court declined to 
abandon the third prong of the Olivier test (vehicle oriented), but 
indicated that abandonment may be the road of the future.37 
Echoing the uncertainty of the Olivier criteria, Justice Flaherty, in 
his concurring opinion, advocated for abandonment of the criteria 
entirely.38 He described them as “unwieldy and difficult to 
understand,” and proposed a simpler approach wherein the 
 
32. Id. at 1159; see also 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 480 of the Jan. 2017 Sess.). 
33. Hudson, 161 A.3d at 1159; see also Ouelette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 
689–90 (R.I. 1992). 
34. Hudson, 161 A.3d at 1159. 
35. Id. at 1160. 
36. Id. at 1156. 
37. Id. at 1158. Washington is the only state that has abandoned the 
third prong, finding it unhelpful and creating internal inconsistency in the 
four-prong test. Id. at 1158 (citing Cherry v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 892 
P.2d 768, 772 (Wash. 1995)). 
38. Id. at 1160 (Flaherty, J., concurring). 
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guiding inquiry is: “under the totality of the circumstances, was 
the plaintiff sufficiently connected to the motor vehicle to be 
considered occupying it?”39 The concurring opinion recognizes one 
issue the dissenters also take issue with—that public policy, not 
the Olivier prongs—is actually what drives the analysis in cases 
such as these.40 
There are two issues of first impression in this case which 
should be accorded particular attention: first, what the phrase 
“vehicle oriented” means,41 and second, whether in light of section 
11-56-1, rendering aid at the scene of an accident is inherently 
part of the use of a motor vehicle in Rhode Island.42 The 
conclusions the Court reached on both of these issues are 
supported by case law and Rhode Island General Law, as they 
accurately reflect the legislative intent of the General Assembly. 
First, the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Jackson v. Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Co., makes it clear that 
when the Court is examining a policy provision seeking to include 
somebody other than the named insured within the protection of 
the policy, the Court must take a broad and liberal view of the 
extent of coverage.43 The dissent argues that the majority started 
with too broad of an interpretation, and as such the analysis of the 
subsequent Olivier criteria was flawed.44 However, the goal of the 
Olivier criteria is to determine whether, under the terms of an 
insurance policy, someone is “occupying” the vehicle and thus falls 
within the extent of coverage.45 Therefore, the Court  is 
attempting to deduce whether Hudson, the unnamed insured, is 
included within the protection of the policy by determining her 
occupancy status. Because of this, a broad and liberal view of the 
coverage afforded remains in line with the Court’s precedent. 
As to the second issue, the Court undertook determining 
whether rendering aid at the scene of an accident is inherently 
part of the use of a motor vehicle in Rhode Island.46 To do so, the 
 
39. Id. at 1160–61. 
40. Id. at 1160 (Flaherty, J., concurring); id. at 1161 (Suttell, C.J., 
dissenting); id. at 1162 (Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
41. Id. at 1157 (majority opinion). 
42. Id. at 1158. 
43. Id. at 1155 (citing Jackson, 159 A.3d at 614) (emphasis added). 
44. Id. at 1163 (Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. at 1153 n.1 (majority opinion). 
46. Id. at 1158. 
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majority looked to the Good Samaritan statute.47 Despite the 
dissent’s disagreement,48 this was an appropriate reliance  
because Good Samaritans cannot ignore the call of distress at the 
scene of an accident, and they are actually “statutorily required to 
render reasonable assistance.”49 In light of this, the majority 
rested their conclusion of this issue on the public policy goal of 
protecting Good Samaritans, which, in turn, will encourage public 
safety and honor the legislative intent of the General Assembly to 
spur rescues.50 From his dissent, it seems as though Chief Justice 
Suttell would not have held so broadly that rendering aid as a 
Good Samaritan is always inherently part of the use of a motor 
vehicle in Rhode Island, but rather whether the Good Samaritan 
“was required to interrupt his or her travel in order to render 
assistance at the scene of an emergency.”51 Had the majority 
applied this more restrictive test, it is unclear whether they would 
have found that Hudson was able to recover under the GEICO 
policy because they determined a passenger can remain vehicle 
oriented even where there is “a temporary interruption in an 
otherwise unfinished excursion.”52 Therefore, under Chief Justice 
Suttell’s test for the relationship between a Good Samaritan and 
the term “occupying” in an insurance policy, it is unclear whether 
the majority would have held that a temporary interruption 
amounts to the kind of interruption the Chief Justice was 
referencing. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in light of section 
11-56-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws, an essential 
transaction of the use of a motor vehicle is exiting the vehicle to 
 
47. Id. at 1159. 
48. In his dissent, Justice Indeglia disagreed that section 11-56-1 was a 
declaration of public policy to encourage the rescue of others from perilous 
situations. Rather, the statute is vague and fails to even mention motor 
vehicles. Id. at 1165 (Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. at 1159 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
50. See id. 
51. Id. at 1158. Because Hudson had reached her interim destination 
and was sitting in a parked car when she heard the accident, she would not 
satisfy this test and would not be able to recover. Id. at 1162 (Suttell, C.J., 
dissenting). 
52. Id. at 1157 (majority opinion). 
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provide reasonable assistance at the scene of an accident. As  
such, a passenger is entitled to recover underinsured motorist 
benefits under the policy of the car she was traveling in prior to 
exiting the vehicle to render roadside assistance at an accident 
scene. 
 
Mackenzie C. McBurney 
  
 
 
 
 
Insurance Law. Jackson v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 159 A.3d 
610 (R.I. 2017). The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews a grant 
of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Quincy Mutual Fire 
Insurance Company. The question as to whether summary 
judgment was proper hinges upon the interpretation of the term 
“occupying” a motorcycle in order to determine whether a plaintiff 
is barred from recovery under the exclusionary policy in their 
insurance policy. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On September 9, 2011, Anthony J. Esposito (Esposito) 
suffered a tragic fate. Esposito was riding his motorcycle down 
Route 6, a well-traveled and busy thoroughfare that winds its way 
through the heart of downtown Providence.1 As a truck 
approached Esposito in the opposite lane, a green trash barrel fell 
from the truck and skipped into Esposito’s lane.2 The barrel 
became wedged between the front tire and the frame of the 
motorcycle, causing Esposito to be launched from his vehicle and 
into the lane of oncoming automobiles.3 As Esposito struck the 
ground, he slid into a high-speed lane of traffic where he was 
struck by an automobile traveling in that lane.4 Esposito died at 
the scene.5 
Esposito’s motorcycle insurance policy did not have uninsured 
motorist coverage.6 However, Esposito did have an insurance 
policy through the Defendant, Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company (Quincy), for his automobile.7 This policy contained 
uninsured motorist coverage.8 The Quincy policy contained an 
 
1. Jackson v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 159 A.3d 610, 611 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. at 611. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 612. 
8. Id. 
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exception to uninsured motorist coverage, which states: 
We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for 
“bodily injury” sustained: By an “insured” while 
“occupying”, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned 
by that “insured” which is not insured for this coverage 
under this policy.9 
The Plaintiff, the Executrix of the Estate of Anthony J. 
Esposito, Jr., brought an action for declaratory judgment in 
Superior Court seeking recovery under the Quincy policy.10 
Subsequently, Quincy (the Defendant) filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that the exclusion clause precluded the 
Plaintiff from recovery.11 
A hearing for the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
was held on September 29, 2015.12 The Plaintiff  argued  that 
there existed an issue of material fact regarding which impact 
caused the decedent’s death (i.e. the impact with the trash barrel 
or the impact with the oncoming vehicle).13 The motion justice 
granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding 
that the “decedent was ‘occupying’ his owned-but-not-insured 
motorcycle at the time of the fatal injury.”14 The motion justice 
was not persuaded by the Plaintiff’s argument that stressed the 
importance of the temporal separation of the two impacts and the 
question of which impact caused Esposito’s death.15 After hearing 
the arguments, the motion justice concluded that Esposito was 
“occupying” his motorcycle at the time of his death and granted 
partial summary judgment on October 16, 2015.16 The Plaintiff 
filed a timely notice of appeal.17 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In its de novo review of the motion justice’s grant of summary 
 
 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (relying heavily on the Court’s holding in Gen. Accident Ins. Co. 
of Am. v. Olivier, 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990)). 
15. Id. at 612. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
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judgment, the Court was charged with determining whether the 
motion justice erred in disregarding the importance of the 
interpretation of the term “occupying” as it relates to the Quincy 
policy exclusion clause.18 The Plaintiff argued that there  were  
two distinct impacts leading up to the moment of Esposito’s death: 
the first being the impact with the trash barrel, and the second 
being the impact with the oncoming car.19 The Plaintiff argued 
that determining which impact caused Esposito’s death was an 
issue of fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The 
plaintiff contended that Esposito was lying in the opposing lane of 
traffic when he was fatally struck by the oncoming vehicle, and 
therefore should not be considered to have been occupying his 
motorcycle at the time of his death.20 
In response, Quincy argued that the two impacts were nearly 
instantaneous and that the motion justice properly applied the 
Olivier test.21 Quincy further argued that Esposito died as  a 
result of his impact with the ground rather than the subsequent 
impact with the oncoming vehicle and that he still “occupied” his 
motorcycle under the Quincy policy definition of the word.22 
Although the Court typically reviews insurance policies using the 
literal definition of the language, the Court had never before been 
called upon to define “occupying” as it relates to a multi-collision 
accident, nor had it examined an insurance policy clause designed 
to exclude the policyholder from the protections under his policy.23 
Therefore, the Court determined that a more concrete definition of 
 
18. Id. at 613. “Summary judgment is appropriate only when the 
‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as [a] 
matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Sola v. Leighton, 45 A.3d 502, 506 (R.I. 2012)  
and Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I. 2005)). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. The court in Olivier employed a four-pronged test to determine 
occupancy: there must be a causal connection between the injury and the use 
of the insured vehicle; the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably 
close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle; the person must be “vehicle 
oriented” rather than “highway or sidewalk oriented” at the time of injury; 
and the person must be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the 
vehicle at the time of injury. Id. (citing Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Contrisciane, 
473 A.2d 1005, 1009 (Pa. 1984)). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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“occupying” was required.24 
The Quincy policy defines “occupying” as “in, upon, getting in, 
on out or off.”25 In previous cases, the Court has held that the 
coverage afforded to someone occupying a vehicle hinges upon 
whether the clause is inclusionary or exclusionary.26 When a 
clause in a policy “relates to the inclusion of persons other than 
the named insured within the protection afforded, a broad and 
liberal view is taken of the coverage extended. But, if the clause  
in question is one of exclusion or exception, designed to limit the 
protection, a strict interpretation is applied.”27 The pivotal issue, 
therefore, was whether Esposito was “occupying” the motorcycle at 
the time of his death and therefore barred from recovery, or 
whether he was not “occupying” his motorcycle at the time of his 
death and therefore able to recover uninsured motorist insurance 
under the Quincy policy.28 
The Court looked for guidance in other jurisdictions’ 
definitions of occupancy in the context of two-impact collisions.29 
In Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, the Washington Supreme 
Court concluded that “when the second impact occurred, [the 
insured], who had been lying in the roadway. . . clearly was not  
‘in, on, getting into, or getting out of’ her motorcycle and therefore 
she was not ‘occupying’ it.”30 Likewise, the Court cited Miller v. 
Amica Mutual Insurance Co., where the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court held a decedent was not precluded from recovery under an 
exclusionary clause when “a reasonable person . . . would not view 
someone lying in the middle of the highway forty feet from his 
motorcycle for a period of time between thirty seconds [and] one 
half minutes as ‘in, upon, getting in, on, out or off’ that 
motorcycle.”31 
 
24. Id. 
25. Id. (quotations in original). 
26. Id. at 614 (relying on the “general principle favoring broad coverage” 
as the controlling standard) (quoting Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577 
A.2d 980, 983 (R.I. 1980)). 
27. Id. (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co of Winterhur, 
Switzerland, 170 A.2d 800, 804 (1961)). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 615. 
30. Id. (quoting Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, 905 P.2d 379, 381 
(1995)). 
31. Id. at 615–16 (quoting Miller v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 931 A.2d 1180 
(N.H. 2007)); see also Swarner v. Mut. Benefit Grp., 72 A.3d 641, 650–51 (Pa. 
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In its holding, the Court rejected Quincy’s argument that a 
lack of distance in space and time constitutes occupancy, and 
instead adopted the sister jurisdictions’ definitions and 
reasoning.32 In defining occupancy through the lens of other 
jurisdictions’ decisions, the Court found that it is entirely possible 
that Esposito could have died while he no longer occupied his 
motorcycle, thus rendering it possible for his estate to recover 
under the Quincy policy.33 The question of whether Esposito died 
as a result of the impact with the trash barrel or as a consequence 
of his impact with the oncoming vehicle, as well as the time or 
distance between them, are genuine issues of material fact for the 
jury to evaluate.34 Accordingly, the court sustained the plaintiff’s 
appeal and vacated the motion justice’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Quincy.35 
COMMENTARY 
This case is the first instance in which the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court was faced with interpreting an exclusionary clause 
in the context of a multi-impact motorcycle accident.36 Although 
certain previous cases define “occupying” in a more broad sense, 
the Court determined that, at least in terms of multi-impact 
accidents, there is no need to depart from the literal definition of 
terms in an exclusionary clause.37 With this newly-solidified 
interpretation, Rhode Island joins her sister states of Washington, 
New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania with respect to a plaintiff’s 
ability to survive summary judgment in this context.38 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in this case considered 
whether a jury could conclude that the decedent no longer 
occupied his motorcycle when he sustained bodily injury. While it 
is evident that the Court sought to narrow its definition of key 
words in the exclusionary clause by consulting other jurisdictions, 
 
Super. Ct. 2013) (holding that decedent was not “occupying” motorcycle when 
she was struck by a passing truck). 
32. Jackson, 159 A.3d at 616. 
33. Id. at 617. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 613. 
37. Contra Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington v. Clure, 702 P.2d 1247 
(1985). 
38. Jackson, 159 A.3d at 614–16. 
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much weight was given to the hypothetical interpretation that the 
decedent was “occupying” his motorcycle as he was launched into 
an opposing lane of traffic. In Justice Robinson’s partial dissent, 
he contends that the issue of whether or not the decedent occupied 
his motorcycle at the time of death should not be in dispute, as the 
decedent could not have occupied his motorcycle as a matter of 
common English.39 “If I stand up from the chair in my office in 
order to go to lunch, one can rightly describe me as ‘getting off’ 
that chair.”40 A man lying in an opposing lane of traffic cannot be 
described as to having any sort of occupancy of his motorcycle. 
Although the Court may have approached the genuine issue in a 
semi-circuitous manner, it ultimately came to a conclusion that is 
both fair to the plaintiff and instructive to drafters of exclusionary 
clauses. 
CONCLUSION 
In this matter of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court held that the motorcyclist no longer occupied his motorcycle 
when he sustained his injury and issues of fact exist as to when 
the cause of his death occurred, and therefore does not fall into the 
exclusionary clause of an insurance policy. Because a jury could 
determine that the motorcyclist’s injury could have occurred 
during an accident when he did not occupy his motorcycle, 
summary judgment for the insurance company was improper. 
 
Brody Karn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. Id. at 618. 
40. Id. 
  
 
 
 
 
Labor and Employment Law. Beagan v. R.I. Dept. of Labor & 
Training, Bd. of Review, 162 A.3d 619 (R.I. 2017). Under Rhode 
Island General Laws section 28-44-18(a) of the Rhode Island 
Employment Security Act, only an employee’s misconduct that is 
connected to the employee’s work, such that it creates a workplace 
nexus, can be considered misconduct that can disqualify an 
employee from receiving unemployment benefits. An employee 
“baiting” his employer to visit his Facebook page, which contained 
derogatory comments towards his employer, is not enough to 
establish the requisite connection without more legally competent 
evidence. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Michael Beagan (Beagan) was formerly employed by 
Kemperle, Incorporated (Kemperle) as a full-time delivery driver 
until his termination on March 7, 2013.1 Prior to Beagan’s 
termination, Kemperle issued new Standard Operations & 
Procedures policies that its employees needed to sign.2 According 
to Beagan’s manager, Henry Morancey (Morancey), Beagan made 
a “ruckus” over the new policies and initially refused to sign 
them.3 On March 6, 2013, Beagan spoke with Morancey and 
agreed to sign the policy, but complained he was being underpaid 
overtime.4 Following his meeting with Beagan, Morancey emailed 
Ronald Kemper (Kemper), the owner of Kemperle, and relayed 
Beagan’s complaints and issues he caused.5 
 
1. Beagan v. R.I. DOL & Training, Bd. of Review, 162 A.3d 619, 621 
(R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. Kemperle’s new policy was called the “accident policy.” Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. Beagan complained that he was not being paid two and a half 
hours for overtime each week. Id. 
5. Id. at 621–22. The letter stated that Beagan complained about the 
unfairness of the policies and that his wife, who was a Workers’ 
Compensation attorney, thought Beagan should be paid for the overtime 
every week and should not have to comply with the standard operation 
procedures. Id. Additionally, Morancey wrote that Beagan initially refused 
 
707 
 708 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:707 
 
On March 7, 2013, Morancey intended to fire Beagan for 
personal, derogatory comments Beagan made to Morancey the day 
prior and because “[he] felt it was in everyone’s best interest.”6 
Morancey instead took pity on Beagan, and Beagan apologized, 
signed the written notice and the email Morancey sent to Kemper 
regarding his comments, and acknowledged his insubordinate 
behavior.7 Morancey told Beagan that his next violation would 
result in termination.8 Before the end of the meeting, Beagan 
commented that “[Morancey] couldn’t see what [Beagan] writes on 
his Facebook because he has [Morancey] blocked.”9  This 
statement peaked Morancey’s curiosity, and, after the meeting, 
Morancey sent Beagan on his deliveries and asked a third-party to 
log onto Facebook and look at Beagan’s post.10 Morancey found 
that Beagan’s post criticized Beagan’s boss, who was left 
unnamed.11 When Beagan returned from his deliveries, Morancey 
fired him.12 
On March 18, 2013, Beagan filed an unemployment benefits 
claim with Department of Labor and Training (DLT).13 The DLT 
form Kemperle completed stated the reason for Beagan’s 
termination was “misconduct” and did not mention the Facebook 
post.14 On April 22, 2013, the DLT director denied Beagan’s 
application because it found that Beagan was discharged due to 
 
to sign and had complained to drivers in both Rhode Island and Connecticut, 
which created a lot of “ill-will.” Id. at 621–22. 
6. Id. at 622. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. Moracey noted that Beagan said this in a “smug manner.” Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. Beagan’s post read: “It’s a good thing my boss doesn’t  take 
things personal and wanna [sic], like, know if I wrote shit about him. I 
sometimes forget that despite that [sic] fact he walks and talk [sic] like a real 
person, he isn’t a real boy, Geppeto [sic].” Id. 
12. Id. at 623. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. Kemperle also gave an “employer statement” that described the 
cause of Beagan’s termination and did not mention the Facebook post. Id. In 
addition to including the language of the written warning, the statement 
“described that Beagan was angry about the new policy and that, after 
signing the written policy, ‘[Beagan] went out of the office ranting and raging 
to other employees about management and the new policy. He wanted 
overtime. He was given [two] 15 minute breaks and 1/2 hour lunch[es]. [H]e 
was saying he wanted overtime and causing a commotion with other 
employees.’” Id. 
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“unprofessional behavior in the workplace,” and Beagan could not 
receive benefits because his actions went against Kemperle’s best 
interests pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 28-44-
18.15 Beagan appealed, and on May 29,  2013,  Morancey and 
Beagan testified at a hearing before the appeal tribunal.16 
Morancey testified that the Facebook post was ultimately the 
reason why he fired Beagan.17 Additionally, Morancey stated that 
according to the time of Beagan’s Facebook post, Beagan used his 
phone while driving, which was prohibited by company policy, and 
was an additional reason for his termination.18 At the close of the 
hearing, the appeal tribunal referee affirmed the director’s denial 
of Beagan’s unemployment benefits, concluding that Beagan’s 
actions were not in the employer’s best interests, and Beagan was 
discharged for disqualifying reasons under section 28-44-18.19 
Among the disqualifying reasons, the referee mentioned the 
derogatory comments Beagan posted on Facebook.20 
Beagan appealed to the full board of review (Board), and on 
August 2, 2013, the Board affirmed the referee’s decisions.21 
Beagan appealed the Board’s decision to the Rhode Island District 
Court.22 On June 4, 2014, the District Court affirmed the Board’s 
finding of ineligibility based on qualifying misconduct and held 
that Beagan “baited” Morancey to search his Facebook page, and 
Beagan’s Facebook post constituted misconduct or insubordination 
and the connection of the post to Beagan’s work was sufficiently 
established, although “barely so.”23 Thereafter, Beagan filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme 
 
 
15. Id.; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a) (1956) (stating that an 
employee discharged for misconduct connected to his work is ineligible for 
unemployment benefits). 
16. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 623; 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-43 (1956) 
(stating that a claimant may appeal the judgment of the director to the 
referee). 
17. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 623. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 624; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a). 
20. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 624. 
21. Id.; 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-47 (1956) (stating that a claimant 
may appeal the judgement of the appeal tribunal to the board of review). 
22. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 624; 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-52 (1956) 
(stating that a claimant may appeal the judgement of the board of review to 
the District Court). 
23. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 624–25. 
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Court.24 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the District Court order, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court initially sought to determine whether there was 
legally competent evidence in the record to support the finding 
that Beagan was discharged for disqualifying reasons.25 Based on 
the language in section 28-44-18(a), the Court found that two 
things must be considered to determine whether an employee is 
ineligible for benefits based on disqualifying reasons: “(1) whether 
there was an act of proven misconduct; and (2) whether the 
misconduct was connected to the employee’s work.”26 The Court 
assumed Beagan’s actions in posting the Facebook message 
constituted misconduct and instead focused on whether there was 
legally competent evidence that Beagan’s misconduct was 
connected to his work because the District Court’s judgment 
rested on this fact.27 The Court noted, pursuant to section 28-44- 
18(a), that misconduct must be connected to an employee’s work to 
be considered disqualifying misconduct.28 The Court looked  at 
case law for precedent but found the connection between an 
employee’s alleged misconduct and the workplace as it related to 
social media and online activity had not yet been considered.29 
Although the District Court found that the requisite 
connection was established when Beagan “baited” Morancey into 
searching for his Facebook page, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
disagreed.30 The Court instead held that Beagan’s alleged 
misconduct lacked the connection to the workplace required by 
section 22-44-18 and reasoned that Beagan’s statement to 
Morancey alone did not support a finding that the Facebook post 
was connected to Beagan’s work.31 The Court supported their 
 
24. Id. at 625. 
25. Id. at 626. 
26. Id. at 627; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a) (stating that an 
employee discharged for misconduct connected to his work is ineligible for 
unemployment benefits). 
27. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 627. 
28. Id.; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a). 
29. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 627 (citing Bunch v. Bd. of Review, Rhode 
Island Dep’t of Emp’t and Training, 690 A.2d 335 (R.I. 1997)). 
30. Id. at 628. 
31. Id.; 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a). 
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reasoning by pointing out that Morancey was blocked from 
Beagan’s Facebook page; that there was no evidence the post 
related to Beagan’s job performance or that it was authored on 
any employer’s device; that the employer did not have a social 
media policy in evidence; and that Beagan specifically denied 
making the post on the road.32 
Lastly, the Court noted its task was to search the record for 
any legally competent evidence they could use to determine 
whether Beagan was ineligible for unemployment.33 The Court  
did this in light of legislative intent that recognized the 
Employment Security Act’s declared purpose is to lighten the 
burden on the unemployed worker and his family.34 In doing so, 
the Court declined to extend the exclusionary effect of restrictions 
on unemployment eligibility under the pretext of interpreting the 
Employment Security Act.35 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
legislative purpose of the Employment Security Act was to lighten 
the burden of unemployment on the employee and his family.36 In 
doing so, the Court narrowly focused on the issue of whether there 
was any legally competent evidence that could support the District 
Court’s finding that the employee’s misconduct was sufficiently 
connected to his work.37 To establish the sufficient connection 
between the misconduct and the employee’s work, the Court 
specifically focused on Beagan’s Facebook post. Through their 
focus, the Court failed to give weight to a multitude of legally 
competent evidence that highlighted Beagan’s other actions that 
Morancey considered in Beagan’s termination, most of which 
arguably constituted misconduct that established a connection to 
the workplace. 
The Court looked to section 28-44-18, which details that 
misconduct must be connected to the employee’s work to be 
 
 
32. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 628. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 626. 
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considered disqualifying misconduct.38 On March 6, 2013, when 
Morancey first asked his employees to sign Kemperle’s new 
Standard Operations & Procedures, Beagan willfully refused, 
stating that his wife said he should not have to comply with the 
new procedures.39 Additionally, Beagan later acknowledged that 
he had exhibited insubordinate behavior.40 Morancey initially 
found that this was cause for Beagan’s termination but gave him 
another chance out of pity.41 The referee and the Board took this 
into consideration in establishing the requisite connection but 
here, the Court mistakenly treated Beagan’s Facebook post as the 
main thrust of Morancey’s reasoning for terminating him and did 
not look at the other factors. In reviewing the legally competent 
evidence available to the District Court, the Supreme Court had 
evidence of both the referee’s and the Board’s findings.42 In 
addition to finding evidence of Beagan’s Facebook post, the referee 
found that Beagan violated the company policy on insubordination 
and acted inappropriately when he voiced his opinions to 
coworkers in both the Rhode Island and Connecticut office which 
created ill-will towards the new policies.43 Based on  these 
findings alone, the Court could have considered Beagan’s 
misconduct to establish a connection to the workplace. It is clear 
Morancey terminated Beagan based on his prior insubordinate 
behavior, and Beagan’s Facebook post merely confirmed 
Morancey’s initial concerns, which led to the warning. 
Similarly, although the Court ultimately found that there was 
no legally competent evidence to establish that the employee’s 
conduct was related to his work, the dissent points out that the 
majority exceeded their scope of review in re-evaluating and 
weighing the evidence and drawing inferences in doing so.44 
Although the District Court cautiously determined that the 
connection was sufficiently established by Beagan “baiting” 
Morancey, the District Court concluded that a jury could find that 
“posting of such materials was utterly corrosive of the supervisor- 
 
 
38. Id.; see 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a). 
39. Beagan, 162 A.3d at 621–22. 
40. Id. at 622. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 628. 
43. Id. at 623–24. 
44. Id. at 629. 
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employee relationship.”45 In considering what Beagan’s post 
related to and how much weight to give the fact of Beagan 
“baiting” Morancey, the majority effectively substituted their 
judgement by re-evaluating and weighing the evidence from the 
District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, pursuant to 
section 22-44-18(a), misconduct must be connected to the 
employee’s work to be considered misconduct that disqualifies an 
employee from receiving unemployment benefits. An employee 
who “baited” the employer to access his Facebook page that 
contained comments regarding the employer’s manager creates no 
workplace nexus without more legally competent evidence. The 
Court determined this in light of the Employment Security Act’s 
legislative purpose to lessen the burden of unemployment on the 
worker and his family. 
John Souza 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45. Id. at 625. 
  
 
 
 
 
Legal Malpractice. DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell, 
Ltd.,152 A.3d 413 (R.I. 2017). The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
held that a Rhode Island Superior Court justice did not commit 
error of law by allowing the Plaintiff to obtain, through discovery, 
antenuptial and postnuptial agreements that his former attorney 
drafted for other clients to show that the attorney took subsequent 
remedial measures. The Court rejected the Defendants’ argument 
that the agreements were protected by the attorney-client 
privilege because the Defendants lacked standing to assert the 
privilege, and concluded that the agreements did not qualify for 
protection under the marital privilege or work product doctrine. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In the year 2000, Sergio A. DeCurtis (Plaintiff) hired Visconti, 
Boren & Campbell, LTD., and one of its attorneys (collectively, 
Defendants) to draft an antenuptial agreement that would protect 
his income in the event his ensuing marriage dissolved.1 Soon 
thereafter, the Plaintiff and his fiancée executed the agreement 
and married on March 28, 2000.2 In 2005, the marriage faltered, 
and the Plaintiff’s wife filed for divorce.3 In a turn of events, the 
divorce petition was dismissed, the couple participated in a court- 
mandated settlement, and entered into a postnuptial agreement.4 
Unfortunately, harmony in the marriage was short-lived and in 
June 2010, the Plaintiff’s wife again filed for divorce.5 On June  
21, 2011, the Family Court justice determined, after reviewing the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act,6 that the antenuptial and 
postnuptial agreements drafted by the Plaintiff’s attorney “did not 
 
1. DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell, LTD., 152 A.3d 413, 418 
(R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. The Defendants drafted the postnuptial agreement on the 
Plaintiff’s behalf. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. See 15 R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6 (2017). 
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exclude any income or appreciation of assets derived by [the 
Plaintiff] during the marriage from the marital estate.”7 The 
Plaintiff’s pecuniary exposure was not insignificant; the marital 
estate was valued at “several million” and the vast majority of its 
assets were accumulated during the period of coverture.8 The 
Plaintiff, after learning his financial fate, entered into a property 
settlement agreement with his former wife.9 Pursuant to the 
agreement, the Plaintiff’s former wife would receive $2,750,000 
based   on   equitable   distribution   of   the   marital   assets   and 
$1,500,000 in spousal support over the course of fifteen years.10 
On August 8, 2012, the Plaintiff brought an action for legal 
malpractice against the Defendants, alleging that the antenuptial 
and postnuptial agreements were negligently drafted, and that  
the Defendants failed to advise him against commingling his 
premarital and marital assets.11 During discovery, the Plaintiff 
propounded document requests upon the Defendants, requesting, 
inter alia, antenuptial and postnuptial agreements that the 
Defendants drafted for other clients from the year 1999 through 
the date of the requests.12 The Defendants objected to the  
requests and asserted the attorney-client privilege, marital 
privilege, and work product doctrine to protect the agreements 
from disclosure.13 The Defendants further maintained that, 
because the agreements were privileged, the requests were beyond 
the scope of Rule 26 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of 
Civil Procedure.14 The Plaintiff countered the Defendants’ 
objections and argued that the agreements were relevant and 
constituted subsequent remedial measures in accordance with 
Rule 407 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.15 Moreover, the 
 
7. Id. The Plaintiff explained to the Family Court that according to his 
understanding of the antenuptial and postnuptial agreements the 
instruments would, “allow[] [the Plaintiff] to take [his] income, and whatever 
portion of it was going to be kept separate could be kept in a separate account 
so that it was protected.” DeCurtis, 152 A.3d at 419. 
8. Id. at 418. 
9. Id. at 419. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. “When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken 
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the 
 716 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:714 
 
Plaintiff argued that the agreements would demonstrate that the 
Defendants took remedial measures after they learned that the 
language used in the Plaintiff’s antenuptial and postnuptial 
agreements failed to protect his interests.16 
Ultimately, the Superior Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion 
to compel, but limited the scope of discovery to the years 2010 
through 2012.17 The Superior Court determined that the Plaintiff 
was entitled to agreements that the attorney drafted for his other 
clients after the June 2011 Family Court hearing because at that 
time he learned about the ineffective language used in the 
agreements, and therefore the hearing was the “triggering event” 
for subsequent remedial measure purposes.18 Subsequently, the 
Defendants filed a writ of certiorari petitioning the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court for interlocutory review of the discovery order.19 
The Supreme Court granted the Defendant’s writ on June 15, 
2015,20 and, following review, it quashed the writ, affirmed the 
Superior Court justice’s discovery order, and advised the lower 
court to permit disclosure, so long as the agreements were subject 
to a protective order and reviewed in camera prior to production.21 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior 
Court justice’s discovery order and held that it was without error. 
First, the Court considered the scope of Rule 26 and concluded 
that disclosing the agreements would advance the Rule’s policy 
favoring broad discovery.22 Next, the Court analyzed  the 
Plaintiff’s request for the agreements under Rule 407 of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence—which permits evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures to prove negligence—and held that the 
Plaintiff was entitled to those agreements that the Defendants 
 
subsequent measures is admissible.” R.I. R. EV. 407. 
16. DeCurtis, 152 A.3d at 419. 
17. Id. 
18. See id. 
19. Id. at 420. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 429. 
22. See id. at 421. “The philosophy underlying modern discovery is that 
prior to trial, all data relevant to the pending controversy should be disclosed 
unless the data is privileged.” Id. (quoting Cabral v. Arruda, 556 A.2d 47, 48 
(R.I. 1989)). 
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drafted for other clients after the year 2005.23 Lastly, the Court 
held that the agreements, although laden with confidential client 
information, were not protected by the attorney-client privilege, 
marital privilege, or work product doctrine because the 
Defendants lacked standing to assert those privileges, and the 
Plaintiffs presented a substantial need for the agreements.24 
Although the Defendants did not object to the entirety of the 
Plaintiff’s requests, they argued that disclosure should be limited 
to those agreements that were drafted after the June 2011 Family 
Court hearing.25 The Court rejected the Defendants’ argument 
and reasoned that the “triggering event” for purposes of 
subsequent remedial measures is the “liability causing conduct,” 
not the “eventual litigation,” because concluding otherwise would 
render Rule 407 superfluous in most cases.26 Therefore, the 
liability causing event that triggered the subsequent remedial 
measures analysis was the attorney’s drafting of the 2005 
postnuptial agreement, not the June 2011 Family Court  
hearing.27 Moreover, the Court highlighted that the “triggering 
event” for Rule 407 purposes is not predicated on the tortfeasor’s 
knowledge of the injury.28 
The Defendants further argued that the agreements were not 
subject to disclosure because they were protected by the attorney- 
client privilege, marital privilege, and work product doctrine.29 
First, the Court held that the Defendants could not protect the 
agreements from disclosure by turning to the attorney-client 
privilege because they lacked standing—the clients, not the 
Defendants—were the “true privilege holders.”30 Next, the Court 
rejected Defendants’ argument that the agreements were 
protected by the marital privilege.31 The Court reasoned that the 
martial privilege exists only to protect spouses from having to 
testify against one another regarding communications exchanged 
during the marriage, and in the instant case, the agreements were 
 
23. Id. at 422. 
24. Id. at 429. 
25. Id. at 421. 
26. Id. at 421–22. 
27. Id. at 422. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 420. 
30. Id. at 424. 
31. Id. at 427. 
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not testimonial and the parties to the antenuptial agreements 
were not married at the time they were executed.32 Lastly, the 
Court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the agreements 
were factual work products and therefore protected by the work 
product doctrine.33 The Defendants posited that the agreements 
were prepared “in anticipation of litigation,” e.g. divorce 
proceedings, and that the Plaintiff did not have a “substantial 
need” for the agreements to prove the merits of his case.34 On the 
contrary, the Court held that the agreements were prepared to 
“avoid” litigation, rather than “in anticipation of litigation,” and 
the Plaintiff would not have access to the agreements through 
alternative channels.35 The Court concluded that precautionary 
steps, such as redacting confidential information and producing 
the agreements under a protective order, would allay the 
Defendants’ confidentiality concerns.36 
COMMENTARY 
This decision is a clear victory for plaintiffs pursuing 
malpractice actions because it dismantles evidentiary barriers. 
The Court reiterated its position that parties should be given wide 
latitude during discovery and that evidence should not be 
excluded, unless a narrow privilege fits the facts of the case, 
because excluding evidence “limits the full disclosure of the 
truth.”37 In addition, this decision keeps Rhode Island within the 
minority of jurisdictions that permit parties to use evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence.38 Moreover, 
the Court’s conclusion that knowledge of the injury causing event 
is not a precondition to the admissibility of subsequent remedial 
measures evidence negates the policy argument that evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures would deter individuals from 
 
32. Id. at 428. 
33. Id. at 427; see Henderson v. Newport County Regional Young Men’s 
Christian Ass’n, 966 A.2d 1242, 1246 (R.I. 2009) (“[M]aterials obtained or 
prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation are not . . . discoverable 
unless production of those materials [is] necessary for the preparation of  
one’s own case.”). 
34. Id. at 428. 
35. Id. at 422. 
36. Id. at 429. 
37. Id. at 423. 
38. Id. at 422. 
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rectifying injury causing events to avoid prejudicial evidence.39 
This decision  was  a conduit for the Court to communicate its 
professional standards to members of the bar. The  Court 
indirectly urges attorneys to cautiously draft agreements that will 
protect clients’ interests because the lessons an attorney learns 
from misrepresenting a client may be used in a legal malpractice 
action against her. Attorneys, now more than ever, are more  
likely to closely evaluate stock language before incorporating such 
language into an agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a Superior Court 
justice in a legal malpractice action properly granted the 
Plaintiff’s motion to compel production of marital agreements that 
his attorney drafted for other clients to show evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures. The Court was guided by  its 
policy in support of broad discovery, and narrowly interpreted the 
attorney-client privilege, marital privilege, and work product 
doctrine to permit disclosure. 
 
Krystal L. Medeiros 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. See id. 
  
 
 
 
 
Property Law. Kilmartin v. Barbuto, 158 A.3d 735 (R.I. 2017). 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that merely labeling an 
area “Beach” on a Plat and Indenture is insufficient to constitute a 
public dedication. The requisite manifest intent necessary to rule 
an action a public dedication is not met solely by labeling an area 
on a Plat and Indenture. Rather, a landowner’s intent to dedicate 
must be expressed to the public, and the public must accept the 
dedication. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In July of 1909, owners of beachfront property in 
Misquamicut filed a plat map (the 1909 Plat) that divided the 
property amongst the owners.1 The 1909 Plat showed the lots 
separated easterly and westerly by dashed lines and bounded by 
Atlantic Avenue to the north.2 These boundaries were all 
undisputed by the parties in this case; however, the disputed 
southern border of the lots led to this litigation. The 1909 Plat 
shows an undulating line south of the lots labeled as the “line of 
foot of bank.”3 Beyond the line of foot of bank is an area labeled 
“Beach,”4 which was at the heart of this case. 
The State alleged that the landowners, by the 1909 Plat, 
dedicated the area labeled “Beach” to the public because the 
dashed lines marking the easterly and westerly boundaries of the 
lots did not extend through the line of foot of bank and therefore 
did not extend to the Beach area.5 The 1909 Plat also contained 
nine rights of way that extended from Atlantic Avenue down to 
the Beach area.6 In addition to the 1909 Plat, the Plattors also 
recorded an Indenture, which described the lots as being located 
between “Atlantic Avenue on the North and the ocean on the 
 
1. Kilmartin v. Barbuto, 158 A.3d 735, 737 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 737–38. 
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South.”7 The Indenture also described each of the nine rights of 
way as “a public walk or right of way,” that was to be “dedicated 
as a public walk and right of way from said highway to the 
Beach.”8 
In October of 2012, the Attorney General brought suit  
alleging that the 1909 landowners dedicated the beach to the 
public through the 1909 Plat and sought to enjoin the current 
landowners from preventing public access to the beach.9 The 
Defendants moved pursuant to Rule 19 of the Superior Court 
Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for “failure to 
join persons needed for a just adjudication” or, in the alternative, 
to require joinder of said persons.10 In response, the trial justice 
required the State to notify all landowners in the area at issue, 
and then allowed those landowners to intervene.11 
The Defendants answered the State’s complaint, claiming  
that they were the true owners of the Beach area at issue, brought 
a counterclaim against the State for slander of title, and further, 
claimed that the State’s conduct constituted a temporary taking of 
their property.12 The State, the Defendants, and the Intervenors 
all filed motions for summary judgment and the trial justice 
denied all of the motions, determining that there was “a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to whether the Plattors’ 
intended a public dedication.”13 
The two issues at trial were: whether the Plattors intended a 
public dedication of the Beach, and, if they did, whether the public 
accepted the offer of dedication.14 The State called  seven 
witnesses at trial, ranging from professional land surveyors, to 
attorneys who primarily practiced real estate conveyances, to 
history professors.15 Their collective testimony ultimately 
interpreted the 1909 Plat to show the manifest intent necessary 
 
7. Id. at 738. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. The Attorney General’s complaint alleged “public nuisance, 
purpresture, private nuisance, trespass, and unreasonable use of easement.” 
Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 739. 
15. Id. at 739–40. 
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for a public dedication.16 The expert witnesses focused on the fact 
that the easterly and westerly dashed line borders ended at the 
line of foot of bank and did not extend to the beach, and argued 
that was evidence of the line of foot of bank existing as the 
southerly border.17 They also pointed to the fact that the 
Indenture described the rights of way as running “to the Beach” 
and argued that language created “public rights in the rights of 
way and on the beach.”18 
The Defense called three witnesses: an attorney and two 
professional land surveyors. Their collective testimony was that 
the line of foot of bank was not intended as a boundary line 
because of its “‘fairly significant’ break[s]” and that if it were 
intended as a boundary line, it would have been drawn as one 
continuous line.19 One witness also testified that the “great 
majority” of the conveyances of the lots shown on the 1909 Plat 
described the lots as being bordered southerly by the ocean.20 
Another witness testified to the rights of way granted to the public 
and opined that they granted the public “the right to pass to the 
beach and to walk back and forth across it.”21 However, this 
referred to the historic meaning of the word “beach” as the “land 
below the mean high tide line and above the mean low water [line] 
where you can walk” and not the dry sand portion of the beach at 
issue here.22 
The trial court justice held that the Plattors did not have the 
power to dedicate the Beach to the public because they each  
owned a part of the aggregate whole, and not all of the owners 
signed the 1909 Plat and Indenture.23 The trial court justice then 
ruled on the issue of whether the 1909 Plat and Indenture 
demonstrated the Plattors’ “manifest intent for a public dedication 
of the Beach area.”24 The trial court justice held that the 1909  
Plat and Indenture did not reveal the requisite manifest intent to 
 
 
16. Id. at 739–42. 
17. Id. at 740, 742. 
18. Id. at 739. 
19. Id. at 742. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 743. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 744. 
24. Id. 
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dedicate the Beach to the public.25 Comparing the boundary lines 
of Atlantic Avenue to the undulating line marked the line of foot of 
bank, the trial court justice concluded that the 1909 Plat did not 
clearly and unambiguously manifest intent to dedicate the Beach 
to the public.26 Furthermore, the trial court justice deemed 
inapplicable the common law principle of “presumption of intent to 
dedicate” when a road is shown on a Plat because the Plattors did 
not consider the Beach a road.27 Lastly, the trial court justice 
found the 1909 Plat and Indenture unambiguous and therefore 
concluded that extrinsic evidence could not be used to determine 
the question of dedicatory intent.28 However, the trial  court 
justice offered his alternative analysis on the extrinsic evidence 
and concluded that it did not demonstrate the requisite manifest 
intent either.29 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the State argued that the trial court justice erred 
because the 1909 Plat and Indenture clearly and unambiguously 
demonstrated the Plattors’ intent to dedicate the Beach to the 
public, and even if the 1909 Plat was ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence revealed the Plattors’ intent.30 The Court noted that a 
trial justice sitting without a jury will not be overturned on factual 
findings unless the “findings clearly are wrong or the trial justice 
overlooked or misconceived material evidence.”31 The Court also 
noted that the State had the burden to prove on appeal that the 
Plattors’ had a “manifest intent” to dedicate the beach area to the 
public.32 
The State argued that the 1909 Plat and Indenture clearly 
and unambiguously demonstrated the Plattors’ intent to dedicate 
the Beach to the public and the trial justice made three legal 
errors when interpreting the 1909 Plat and Indenture: first, he 
“misread the lines and markings on the [1909] Plat”; second, he 
 
 
25. Id. at 746. 
26. Id. at 745. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 746. 
31. Id. at 746–47. 
32. Id. at 747. 
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“erroneously concluded that the rights of way did not grant any 
rights in the Beach area”; and third, he “improperly narrowed the 
doctrine of incipient dedication to roadways.”33 
The Court reviewed the trial justice’s analysis of the lines and 
markings on the 1909 Plat and Indenture and found that he 
compared the lines used for the Atlantic Avenue northern 
boundaries, which were “thick, straight, uninterrupted lines,”  
with the line of foot of bank, which was an “undulating line that 
breaks in six places.”34 The Court reasoned that the Indenture 
supported the trial court justice’s finding that the Plattors did not 
intend a public dedication.35 The Plattors knew how to 
successfully dedicate property to the public as evidenced by the 
nine rights of way that they did dedicate to the public.36  
Therefore, if the Plattors intended to dedicate the Beach to the 
public, they would have done so in a proper manner.37 
The State also argued that the trial court justice “ignored key 
parts” of the 1909 Plat and Indenture in coming to his decision.38 
The State pointed specifically to the fact that the trial court justice 
“disregarded the dimensions that show that the lots end before the 
mean high tide line.”39 The Court rejected the State’s argument  
by finding that the trial court justice did carefully analyze the 
1909 Plat’s lines and markings and added that trial court justices 
do not need to categorically consider and “accept or reject” each 
piece of evidence that is offered at trial.40 
The State further alleged that the trial court justice 
committed an error of law by deciding that the line of foot of bank 
was not the southerly border of the lots.41 The Court noted that 
the trial justice did not in fact make any determination as to the 
southerly border of the lots, nor was he tasked with doing so.42 
The Court continued on to say that any findings the trial court 
justice made related to the line of foot of bank were made with the 
 
33. Id. at 748. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 749. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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sole purpose of assisting him in determining the Plattors’ intent.43 
The State also argued that the trial justice erred by not finding 
that the Indenture’s language “to the Beach” granted the public 
implied easement rights to use the Beach.44 The State relied on 
case law from surrounding jurisdictions such as Massachusetts 
and Connecticut, but the Court rejected the State’s arguments 
and noted that “the determination of manifest intent is a   fact-
intensive  inquiry”   and   concluded   that  the   intent was 
lacking in this case.45 
The Court also rejected the State’s argument that the trial 
justice “restricted the doctrine of incipient dedication to 
roadways.”46 The Court clarified that the trial court justice did  
not rule that the doctrine of incipient dedication only applies to 
roadways.47 Rather, the trial justice found that the  Plattors’ 
intent could “not be easily presumed from their recordation of the 
1909 Plat” with the word “Beach” on it.48 The Plattors needed to 
do more than simply label the area beach.49 This contrasts with 
the “presumption of incipient dedication of roadways”; however, it 
does not narrow the doctrine to only roadways.50 
The Court continued further and addressed the State’s 
arguments regarding extrinsic evidence, even though its 
determination that the trial justice did not err in deciding that the 
1909 Plat and Indenture did not demonstrate manifest intent to 
dedicate the Beach to the public effectively ended the inquiry on 
appeal. The trial justice determined that the most important 
extrinsic evidence were the deeds out of the 1909 Plat, the 
documents created leading up to the 1909 Plat’s recording, and the 
expert testimony regarding the 1909 Plat’s lines and markings.51 
The trial justice concluded that any ambiguity in the 1909 Plat 
and Indenture only supported the finding that they did  not 
“intend to dedicate an easement to the public over the Beach 
 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 749–50. 
45. Id. at 750. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 751. 
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area.”52 The State faulted the trial justice for placing too much 
weight on specific exhibits of extrinsic evidence that post-date the 
1909 Plat and Indenture and list the ocean as the southerly border 
of the plats.53 The Court rejected the State’s argument and noted 
that “the majority of the deeds” after the 1909 Plat listed the 
ocean as the southerly border of the lots.54 Furthermore,  the 
Court noted that trial justices need to draw inferences at times 
and that a trial justice’s findings will stand “even though another 
equally reasonable set of inferences might be drawn from the 
evidence.”55 
COMMENTARY 
Although it did not prove to be a dispositive issue at trial or 
on appeal, the State had a strong argument that the 1909 Plat  
and Indenture were ambiguous. The State argued that the 
southerly border of the lots on the 1909 Plat should be read to be 
where the dashed lines demarcating the easterly and westerly 
boundaries of the plots end (which was before the beach area).56 
The reasonable inference to be drawn from the dashed lines is  
that the lots only extend as far south as their easterly and 
westerly boundary lines. Although this inference would not be 
strong enough evidence of the requisite manifest intent to dedicate 
the beach to the public, it certainly was strong enough evidence to 
convince the trial justice that the 1909 Plat and Indenture was 
ambiguous. 
Ultimately, the trial justice considered the extrinsic evidence 
and offered his “alternative analysis” regarding the extrinsic 
evidence as he would have had he found the 1909 Plat and 
Indenture ambiguous in the first place.57 The Supreme Court 
reviewed his analysis of the extrinsic evidence and found no error. 
This case, and in particular the 1909 Plat and Indenture, had 
the potential to force current landowners in the Misquamicut area 
of Westerly, Rhode Island to allow the public onto what they 
formerly believed to be the land they owned for many years. The 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 752 (citations omitted). 
56. Id. at 748. 
57. Id. at 745. 
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implications on not only the persons involved in this case, but also 
on future litigants, would have been truly significant. Rhode 
Island is a state situated along the coastline with many beaches.  
If the Court held that the manifest intent necessary for a public 
dedication was met here, then many other similar claims could 
arise dealing with private property along other parts of Rhode 
Island’s coastline. 
The Supreme Court correctly held that the landowners did  
not meet the requisite level of intent for a public dedication. The 
trial justice noted that “dedication can be presumed in most 
roadway dedications” but in the case of a beach, dedication cannot 
be presumed.58 There is a clear difference between landowners 
dedicating a roadway to the public and dedicating beachfront 
property to the public. Beachfront property is not nearly as 
common as public roadways, and it is less likely that owners of 
beachfront property would be willing to dedicate that property to 
the public without expressly conveying their intention through 
more than a mere label on a Plat. 
Furthermore, the Court was correct in ruling that the 
presumption did not apply to the Beach in this case because the 
landowners showed proof that they understood how to dedicate 
property to the public through the dedication of the rights of way 
that contained the express language stating, “the spaces indicated 
on said plan . . . are dedicated as a public walk and right of  
way.”59 In light of these facts, it becomes clear that the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court decided this case correctly, and in doing so, 
likely allowed many beachfront property owners in Rhode Island 
to relax their fears of future litigation involving potential “public 
dedications” from century-old documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58. Id. at 749. 
59. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the 1909 Plat and 
Indenture did not exhibit the requisite manifest intent to dedicate 
the beach area to the public. The Court reasoned that a public 
dedication of beach area requires more than simply labeling an 
area on the 1909 Plat “Beach” and that the extrinsic evidence here 
further supported the Defendants’ contention that intent was 
lacking. 
 
Alexander L. Ried 
  
 
 
 
 
Tort Law. Bates-Bridgmon v. Heong’s Mkt., Inc., 152 A.3d 1137 
(R.I. 2017). A trial justice’s decision to deny a motion for a new 
trial in a slip and fall case will not be disturbed if nothing 
indicates that “the trial justice overlooked or misconceived 
material and relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong” in 
denying the motion. When a party does not properly request a  
jury instruction or fails to object to the absence of such an 
instruction at the trial level, the party will be precluded from 
raising that issue on appeal under the Court’s long-standing raise- 
or-waive rule. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In March 2009, Deborah Bates-Bridgmon (Deborah) went to 
Roch’s Market, a grocery store, and slipped on what she described 
as “cucumber and oil debris” from a nearby salad bar.1 On 
January 9, 2012, Deborah and her husband, Jackie Bridgmon 
(Jackie) (collectively, Plaintiffs), filed a complaint against Roch’s 
for injuries sustained from her fall.2 The complaint alleged that 
Roch’s Market negligently maintained the market’s premises, 
breached its contractual duty to Deborah, a business invitee, by 
failing to maintain the premises in a safe and reasonable manner, 
and, as a result, Jackie suffered loss of consortium and Deborah 
suffered damages.3 Plaintiffs subsequently amended their 
complaint to include an additional count based on the “mode of 
operation” theory.4 Essentially, this theory provides that when an 
 
1. Bates-Bridgmon v. Heong’s Mkt., Inc., 152 A.3d 1137, 1139 (R.I. 
2017). 
2. Id. at 1138. Plaintiffs will be referenced by their first names, as the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court did in its Opinion, in order to avoid confusion. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. Plaintiffs described the theory of mode of operation to the court  
as allowing for the burden of proof to shift onto the party who was in the best 
position to identify the cause of an injury sustained by an invitee. Here, 
Defendant/owner of Roch’s Market was in the best position to identify the 
debris near the salad bar. Id. at n.2. Plaintiffs cited to a Massachusetts case, 
Sheehan v. Roche Brothers Supermarkets, Inc., where “the court explained 
 
729 
 730 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:729 
 
owner’s chosen mode of operation, particularly in the context of 
self-service retail establishments, makes dangerous conditions 
reasonably foreseeable, the owner assumes responsibility for such 
negligence and foreseeable conditions on the premises.5 A trial 
occurred from February 24, 2015 through February 26, 2015.6 
Deborah testified first and explained the circumstances 
surrounding her fall.7 She testified that there were no warning 
signs near the salad bar or available employees in the area to 
assist her once she had fallen.8 She subsequently found a nearby 
railing, lifted herself up, and an employee eventually offered 
assistance and wiped the floor.9 Deborah further testified that 
after she got up from the fall, a manager told her no one was 
available at that time to complete an incident report.10 Although 
Deborah experienced pain “immediately after the fall,” she did not 
go to the emergency room until the next morning, when she 
received x-rays and an MRI that revealed a bulging and 
degenerative disk along with multiple tears in her meniscus.11 
Deborah distinguished the pain she felt from the fall from 
preexisting injuries for which she was collecting disability benefits 
from the State.12 
The remainder of the trial included testimony from Jackie, 
the owner of Roch’s Market, and the general manager.13 Jackie 
testified that he often required his wife’s assistance due to his own 
health issues, and that the fall had negatively impacted their day- 
to-day life.14 He also recounted calling Roch’s Market after the 
 
the theory as follows: ‘a store owner could be held liable for injuries to an 
invitee if the plaintiff proves that the store owner failed to take all reasonable 
precautions necessary to protect invitees from these foreseeable dangerous 
conditions.’” Id. (quoting 863 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Mass. 2007)). 
5. Id. at 1139. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1139–40. 
10. Id. at 1140. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. Deborah collected benefits for fibromyalgia, anxiety, depression, 
and circulatory issues. Id. She described the pain from her fall  as  “a 
constant pain . . . like an ache or throb[,]” as opposed to “that sharp twitchy 
electrical current pain” she felt from the fibromyalgia. Id. 
13. Id. at 1140–41. 
14. Id. at 1140. Regarding the loss of consortium claim, Jackie stated 
that Deborah’s new injuries had impacted their life to such a point that 
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fall, and a manager told him to call an attorney.15 Next,  the 
owner of Roch’s Market testified.16 She explained that  the  
general manager had informed her of the fall, but he did not have 
Deborah’s information or an incident report.17 Moreover, she was 
questioned on whether changing the salad bar into a station for 
wrapped sandwiches in 2011 was influenced by Deborah’s fall, but 
stated that change was purely because the salad bar was not 
generating enough business.18 Finally, the general manager 
testified.19 He stated that he was aware of the fall, the existence  
of injuries, and confirmed that something was, indeed, on the 
floor.20 He also explained that no particular employee was 
assigned to monitor the salad bar, and no protective mats or 
warning signs were around the premises.21 
Both parties rested and moved for judgment as a matter of 
law.22 After hearing each party on their respective motions, the 
trial justice denied Plaintiffs’ motion and reserved deciding 
Defendant’s motion.23 
 
“[their] life’s just done. [They] do nothing.” Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. The owner was not in the store on the day in question. Id. The 
general manager told her of the fall, but she was not informed about an 
injury or the husband’s subsequent phone call. Id. The owner was also 
doubtful that an employee told Jackie to call an attorney. Id. It is company 
policy to complete an injury report so that they have the customer’s name, 
information, and a description of what happened on file. Id. 
18. Id. at 1140–41. 
19. Id. at 1141. The general manager was working on the  day  in  
question, but was unable to testify that day. Id. at n.2. Plaintiffs’ attorney 
read the transcript into the record. Id. 
20. Id. at 1141. 
21. Id. The manager stated that the deli employees could view the salad 
station and would periodically check to ensure it was stocked. Id. 
22. Id.; see R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 50. On its motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, Defendant argued that, although it is undisputed that Deborah 
fell on oil and cucumber, there was no evidence of actual notice concerning 
the substance of the floor. Bates-Bridgmon, 152 A.3d at 1141. Further, 
Defendant asserted that there was no evidence of constructive notice to give 
Defendant a reasonable opportunity to clean the spill before Deborah fell. Id. 
On the issue of notice, Plaintiffs argued that the salad bar is a “constant 
danger” and Roch’s Market lacked policies to maintain safety. Id. Plaintiffs 
asserted, even without mode of operation or breach of contract theories, 
Defendant still breached its due care obligation under the concept of 
negligence. Id. 
23. Id. at 1141. 
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The trial justice instructed the jury in accordance with the 
issue of duty.24 In a subsequent sidebar, Plaintiffs’ attorney 
requested instructions on the collateral-source rule and 
subsequent remedial measures pursuant to Rule 407 of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence, both of which the trial justice denied.25 
Plaintiffs also requested the jury be instructed on aggravation of 
preexisting injuries, which the trial justice granted.26 While still 
in sidebar, the trial justice stated that these issues were  not 
raised in Plaintiffs’ papers, and that Plaintiffs’ counsel did not 
provide him with written jury instructions.27 Plaintiffs’ attorney 
maintained that he did provide those instructions, and that they 
contained a request for jury instructions on the mode of operation 
count and breach of contract claims; yet, the aforementioned 
documents did not appear within the record.28 
The jury deliberated, and on February 26, 2015, it found that 
Plaintiffs did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant was negligent or that the alleged negligence was the 
proximate cause of any injury sustained.29 
Within the next week, Plaintiffs moved for a new trial and 
additur, and a hearing was held on that motion in April 2015.30 
Defendant objected to this motion.31 The trial justice summarized 
 
24. Id. at 1142. The instructions provided that Defendant owed a duty  
to Plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the premises in a 
reasonably safe condition for grocery shopping, keeping in mind the nature of 
the operations being conducted on the premises at the time. Id. 
25. Id. The trial justice determined that, since there was no mention of 
insurance, there was no need for an instruction on the collateral-source rule. 
Id. Additionally, the trial justice held that the evidence did not warrant an 
instruction on subsequent remedial measures. Id. 
26. Id. This instruction provided that the defendant in a personal injury 
case takes his plaintiff as he finds the plaintiff and cannot defend the 
accident based on merely aggravating preexisting conditions. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. On appeal, Plaintiffs provided the Supreme Court with a 
document entitled “Jury Instructions,” but there was no indication that the 
Superior Court received this document because it was not time-stamped as 
received by the court or signed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Id. at n.6. 
29. Id. at 1142. 
30. Id.; see R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 59. Plaintiffs argued that, because 
the salad bar had the potential to spill onto the floor, Deborah’s fall was 
foreseeable, that Roch’s Market removing the salad bar was a subsequent 
remedial measure, and that the owner was on notice after the incident. Bates-
Bridgmon, 152 A.3d at 1142–43. 
31. Id. at 1143. Defendants asserted that the verdict was consistent 
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the evidence adduced at trial and agreed with the jury’s 
conclusion; he was not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ presentation on the 
issue of negligence and proximate cause.32 Accordingly, he denied 
Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.33 
On April 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an appeal that contended 
the trial justice improperly denied their motion for a new trial and 
erred by failing to charge the jury on the mode of operation 
theory.34 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the Superior Court judgment, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court sought to determine whether the trial 
justice erred by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and 
failing to charge the jury on the “mode of operation” theory.35 
Additionally, Plaintiffs requested the Court adopt the 
aforementioned theory as a standard by which Rhode Island 
analyzes slip and fall cases.36 
The Court first reviewed Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.37 
Plaintiffs disputed various findings that the trial justice made in 
deciding the motion.38 The Court concluded that it was satisfied 
 
with Rhode Island law, and that the theory of mode of operation is 
inapplicable in this state. Id. 
32. Id. The trial justice reasoned that the issue of whether Defendant 
was aware of Deborah’s fall after it occurred was a “red herring” because the 
relevant inquiry was whether Defendant was on notice of the condition that 
caused the fall. Id. He also noted that he had difficulty distinguishing the 
numerous preexisting health issues that Deborah suffered from the newly 
incurred injuries. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1143. Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal before judgment 
was entered, but the Court routinely treats such an appeal as timely filed. Id. 
at n.7. 
35. Id. at 1143. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 1144. With regard to a motion for a new trial, the standard of 
review is deferential to the trial justice’s decision. Id. at 1143. The trial 
justice must uphold the jury verdict if he or she determines the evidence is 
evenly balanced or that reasonable people could come to different conclusions 
in considering the same evidence. Id. The Court will not find that the trial 
justice erred in his ruling on a motion for a new trial unless the moving party 
demonstrates that “the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material and 
relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.” Id. at 1144 (quoting Yi  
Gu v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 38 A.3d 1093, 1099 (R.I. 2012)). 
38. Id. at 1144. Plaintiffs argued the trial justice ignored the fact that 
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with the trial justice’s new-trial analysis because he summarized 
the evidence adduced at trial and determined he would not have 
reached a different result from that of the jury.39 With respect to 
the issue of Deborah’s fall, the trial justice found the evidence was 
lacking details pertaining to the specifics of how the fall 
occurred.40 Regarding the issue of notice, the trial justice noted 
there was no evidence about how long the spill was on the ground. 
Further, despite Plaintiffs’ recurring argument that Defendant 
knew of the fall after-the-fact, the relevant inquiry was what 
notice Defendant had of the condition prior to the fall.41 Finally, 
on the causation issue, the trial justice found the evidence 
distinguishing between the preexisting health problems and those 
sustained by the fall was “murky at best.”42 The Court concluded 
there was nothing in the record to “indicate that ‘the trial justice 
overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence or was 
otherwise clearly wrong.’”43 Thus, the decision was affirmed.44 
Conducting a de novo review of the jury instructions, the 
Court considered whether the trial justice erred in declining to 
instruct the jury on the theory of mode of operation.45  Pursuant  
to Rule 51(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 
unless a party objects with some specificity to the giving or failure 
to give an instruction before the jury retires to determine the 
verdict, the instructions will not be in error.46 Moreover, under 
 
Defendant was aware of the fall, the trial justice contradicted himself 
regarding the sufficiency of Deborah’s testimony about the fall, and the trial 
justice attempted to “make light of” Plaintiffs’ damages by implying her 
testimony did not reflect injuries related to the incident. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. The standard of review for jury instructions is as follows: 
[The Court] examine[s] “jury instructions ‘in their entirety to 
ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinarily intelligent lay 
people would have understood them . . . . Even if an instruction is 
erroneous, reversal is warranted only if it can be shown that the jury 
could have been misled to the resultant prejudice if the complaining 
party. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) 
46. Id. at 1145. When a party objects to jury instructions, it must state 
distinctly the matter to which they object and the grounds of the objection. 
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Rhode Island’s well-established “raise-or-waive” rule, the Court is 
precluded from reviewing issues at the appellate level that were 
not properly raised at trial.47 Here, Plaintiffs’ attorney did not 
properly request a jury instruction on mode of operation, nor did 
he object when the trial justice instructed the jury.48 Although 
Plaintiffs’ counsel loosely touched upon the topic during a sidebar, 
there was no formal request for that specific instruction, and when 
given the opportunity to raise concerns with respect to the jury 
instructions, counsel answered in the negative.49 Thus, the Court 
concluded that Plaintiffs waived their right to review on this 
issue.50 
Finally, the Court addressed Plaintiffs’ alternative request for 
Rhode Island’s adoption of the “mode of operation” theory for slip 
and fall cases.51 Recognizing that this request was affiliated with 
Plaintiffs’ request for review of the lower court’s jury instruction, 
the Supreme Court reiterated counsel’s failure to request a jury 
instruction on the mode of operation or object to the absence of the 
instruction.52 Without the benefit of the lower court’s analysis  
and decision making on the matter, the Court refused to consider 
the merits of adopting a new rule that may affect a large number 
of cases.53 
COMMENTARY 
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court properly 
affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling with regard to the jury 
instructions and “mode of operation” theory. As most  Rhode 
Island practitioners know, Rhode Island state courts strictly 
adhere to the long-standing “raise-or-waive” rule.54 This rule 
precludes the Court from hearing or considering issues at the 
appellate level that were not properly presented at the lower court 
 
See R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 51(b). The objection must be specific enough to 
alert the trial justice as to the nature of his or her error. Bates-Bridgmon,  
152 A.3d at 1145 (internal citation omitted). 
47. Id. (quoting Botelho v. Caster’s, Inc., 970 A.2d 541, 547 (R.I. 2009)). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 1145. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. See id. 
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level.55 While Plaintiffs maintained that the record included an 
“extensive memorandum prior to the trial on the mode of 
operation,” at no point during the trial did counsel formally 
request an instruction on the mode of operation theory.56 
Additionally, when the trial justice gave the opportunity to raise 
any requests concerning the jury instructions, Plaintiffs’ attorney 
expressly stated, “No, your Honor.”57 
As Justice Indeglia noted, the Court is especially rigorous in 
applying the raise-or-waive rule when reviewing jury 
instructions.58 In order to protect the integrity of the trial process 
and the jury’s deliberated findings, the Court applied basic rules 
of jurisprudence and appropriately precluded review of the issue. 
Furthermore, the Court’s unwillingness to consider the 
adoption of the mode of operation theory is understandable, 
particularly in light of its interrelatedness with the previously 
challenged jury instructions.59 When creating a new rule that 
would affect a large number of cases, the Court is reluctant to 
adopt the rule without input from other intelligible sources.60 The 
Court cited to a Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision 
holding “where an owner’s chosen mode of operation makes it 
reasonably foreseeable that a dangerous condition will occur, a 
store owner could be held liable for injuries to an invitee if the 
plaintiff proves that the store owner failed to take all reasonable 
precautions necessary.”61 Thus, the adoption of mode of operation 
in slip-and-fall cases would result in a presumption of negligence 
that certain store owners can rebut if they demonstrate that they 
exercised reasonable care.62 
Because Plaintiffs did not properly raise the issue of “mode of 
operation” at trial, the trial justice never addressed the issue, and 
the Court was “without the benefit of the lower court’s analysis 
and decision-making on the matter.”63 Notably, the Court did not 
 
55. See id. (citing Botelho v. Caster’s, Inc., 970 A.2d 541, 547 (R.I. 2009)). 
56. Id. at 1145. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. (quoting Botelho, 970 A.2d at 548). 
59. See id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1139 & n.2 (quoting Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, 
Inc., 863 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Mass. 2007)). 
62. See Sheehan, 863 N.E.2d at 1283. 
63. Bates-Bridgmon, 152 A.3d at 1145. 
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provide much commentary regarding this theory and, thereby, 
inferred it may be willing to grapple with the idea under proper 
circumstances.64 
With regard to the motion for a new trial, Plaintiffs in this 
case repeatedly and “vigorously” drew the trial justice’s attention 
to Defendant’s knowledge and notice of the fall after it occurred.65 
To introduce evidence of this nature was in no way beneficial to 
Plaintiffs’ case.66 The trial justice categorized this point as a “red 
herring,” and concluded that the proper inquiry was what notice 
Defendant had of the defect or condition that caused the fall.67 
This conclusion, in addition to Deborah’s unpersuasive and vague 
explanation of how she fell and how injuries sustained from that 
fall differed from her preexisting injuries, was a reasonable basis 
for a jury to find that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof 
for negligence and causation.68 Saying that such a “red herring” 
issue and “murky” testimony would be sufficient grounds to 
warrant the granting of a new trial would be a great stretch.  
Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court properly followed 
precedent by giving great deference to the trial justice’s discretion 
because nothing suggested that the trial justice overlooked or 
misconceived material and relevant evidence or was otherwise 
clearly wrong.69 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s conclusion on the issues 
raised by Plaintiffs was sound and in accordance with well- 
established Rhode Island law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs failed to 
preserve for appellate review their claim that the trial court 
should have instructed the jury on the “mode of operation” theory 
in a slip-and-fall action because Plaintiffs’ attorney neither 
requested an instruction on mode of operation nor objected when 
the trial justice did not instruct the jury on it. Pursuant to Rhode 
 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1143. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See id. at 1144. 
69. Id. (quoting Yi Gu v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 38 A.3d 1093, 1099 
(R.I. 2012)). 
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Island’s well-established “raise-or-wave rule,” the Court is 
precluded from considering issues at the appellate level that were 
not properly presented before the trial court. 
 
Camille Caron Capraro 
  
 
 
 
 
Tort Law. O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422 (R.I. 2017). The 
Wrongful Death Act’s minimum-damage provision is subject to 
joint and severable liability, meaning that the minimum-damage 
provision of $250,000 applies on a per-claim rather than per- 
defendant basis. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On March 9, 2003, Jason Goffe (Goffe) and Michael Petrarca 
(Petrarca) participated in a high-speed race on the New London 
Turnpike heading in a westerly direction.1 Brendan O’Connell 
Roberti (Roberti) was a passenger in Goffe’s car.2 William 
Walmsley (Walmsley or Defendant), was driving in an eastbound 
lane.3 Goffe lost control of his vehicle, swerved into the eastbound 
lane, and was struck by Walmsley.4 Goffe and Roberti died as a 
result of this incident.5 
Roberti’s parents, as co-administrators of Roberti’s estate, 
brought suit against Walmsley and other Defendants.6 All of the 
other Defendants, including those joined by Walmsley in a third- 
party complaint for indemnification and contributory negligence,7 
settled with the Plaintiffs who released them from any future 
claims arising out of the incident.8 These releases resulted in a 
 
1. O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 424 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. “The [P]laintiffs also sued Donald Goffe, Goffe’s father, who 
owned the vehicle [Goffe] drove, and Geico General Insurance Company 
(GEICO), which insured the same vehicle.” Id. 
7. Id. Walmsley brought a third-party complaint against Petrarca and 
Tapco. Inc., which owned the truck driven by Petrarca, for indemnification 
and contributory negligence in regard to Roberti’s death. Id. 
8. Id. Prior to trial, the Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement 
with Goffe and Geico for $145,000 (Goffe Release) and a separate settlement 
agreement with Petrarca and Tapco, Inc. for $250,000 (Petrarca Release). 
Both settlements released the parties from future claims arising out of the 
incident. Id. The Goffe Release stated, “that all potentially recoverable 
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total of $395,000 in recovery for the Plaintiffs.9 Thus, Walmsley 
was the only Defendant who advanced to trial.10 Walmsley moved 
for judgment as a matter of law, but prior to ruling, the trial 
justice permitted the case go before a jury and Walmsley was 
found negligent and liable for $10,000.11 
Walmsley’s renewed motion for summary judgment was 
granted and the Plaintiffs then moved for a new trial and an 
additur, arguing that the statutory minimum for a wrongful death 
suit in which the defendant is found liable is $250,000.12 On 
September 22, 2010, judgment was entered for Walmsley and the 
Plaintiffs appealed, with the sole issue being the trial justice’s 
grant of Walmsley’s motion for judgement as a matter of law.13 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated that judgment and 
remanded the case for additional proceedings.14 
The case was then brought before a hearing justice where the 
Plaintiff sought $250,000 against Walmsley in accordance with 
the additur.15 Walmsley moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that he was not required to pay the full sum to the Plaintiffs.16 
Walmsley argued that based on the contractual language of the 
Goffe and Petrarca Releases, his payment obligation was reduced 
 
 
claims were ‘hereby reduced by the statutory pro rata share of negligence of 
Goffe under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act of the 
State of Rhode Island, or the sum of $145,000 whichever is the greater 
reduction.’” Id. “In the Petrarca Release, [P]laintiffs also promised to reduce 
any damage recoverable by [P]laintiffs against all other persons jointly or 
severally liable to [P]laintiffs by the pro rata share of liability of [Petrarca 
and Tapco, Inc.] or in the amount of the consideration paid under the 
agreement, whichever amount is greater.” Id. (internal quotations to the 
Petrarca Release omitted). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. The jury “deemed his negligence a proximate cause of Roberti’s 
death.” Id. 
12. Id. at 424–25 (citing in relevant part 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 
(1956) concerning minimum recovery in wrongful death actions). “The trial 
justice ruled conditionally that, if defendant’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law was overturned on appeal, he would grant [the] [P]laintiffs’ 
motion for an additur. Alternatively, the trial justice ruled that, if [the] 
[P]laintiffs did not accept the additur, he would grant their motion for a new 
trial with respect to both damages and liability.” Id. at 425. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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as “an ‘other tortfeasor,’”17 and further, that the Plaintiff had 
already received over $250,000 regarding the wrongful death 
action and thus, his reduced liability was proper.18 In essence, 
Walmsley argued that joint tortfeasors were severally liable for 
the $250,000.19 In contrast, the Plaintiffs asserted that  the 
statute required a minimum of $250,000 from each Defendant 
found liable, regardless of their percentage of fault or what the 
Plaintiffs have recovered in the aggregate from all tortfeasors.20 
On May 6, 2015, the hearing justice found in favor of 
Walmsley because the Goffe and Petrarca Releases fully satisfied 
the judgment against him.21 The hearing justice explained that 
the legislative intent of the minimum-damage requirement was to 
compensate wrongful-death plaintiffs, and thus, the Plaintiffs 
were satisfied because they had already received more than the 
statutory minimum under the releases.22 The hearing justice 
further reasoned that if reading a statute literally produces an 
absurd result, as it would here by requiring a minimum of 
$250,000 from each Defendant, the statite should not be read in 
that way.23 He stated that “joint tortfeasors are jointly and 
severally liable for the $250,000 minimum reflected in [Rhode 
Island General Laws section] 10–7–2”24 and further, that “state 
law clearly provided that release of one joint tortfeasor  reduces 
the claim against other joint tortfeasors.”25 For those reasons, the 
hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendant and the Plaintiffs appealed.26 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to 
 
17. Id. (alteration omitted). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. (citing Petro v. Town of W. Warwick ex. rel. Moore, 889  
F.Supp.2d 292 (D.R.I. 2012) (discussing the statutory interpretation of 10 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1956))). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 426. 
25. Id. The hearing justice noted that based on 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 10-7-2 and the two releases, the Plaintiffs’ recovery against Walmsley must 
be reduced by $395,000, which was the joint sum of the settlements. Id. 
26. Id. 
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determine whether the hearing justice was correct in granting a 
motion for summary judgment.27 The issues presented were (1) 
whether the Wrongful Death Act’s minimum-damages provision28 
should be a “rigid and technical plain-reading,” as the Plaintiffs 
asserted29 and; (2) whether the minimum-damage provision could 
be reconciled under joint and several liability.30 The primary 
intent of the Wrongful Death Act was to provide compensatory 
damages to remedy the loss of the estate.31 The Court explained 
that the Wrongful Death Act is contrary to common law and thus 
requires the Court to “strictly construe its language,”32 unless a 
strict reading of the statute results in “absurdities or would defeat 
the underlying purpose of the enactment.”33 
The relevant language of section 10-7-2 of the Rhode Island 
General Laws states that “[w]henever any person or corporation is 
found liable under §§ 10-7-1–10-7-4 he or she or it shall be liable 
in damages in the sum of not less than two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars ($250,000).”34 The Court found that a strict reading of the 
statute  here  might require  each  tortfeasor to  pay a minimum of 
$250,000, which they determine is an absurd result and one not 
intended by the General Assembly.35 In viewing the full statutory 
scheme, the Court reasoned that the legislative intent was for the 
minimum-damages requirement to apply on a per-claim basis 
rather than a per-defendant basis.36 The statute focuses on the  
act which caused the death, and the compensation of the family, 
not on the number of actors involved.37 Thus, the number of 
tortfeasors  involved  in  the  wrongful  death  is  irrelevant  to the 
 
 
27. Id. “We will affirm a [trial] court’s decision only if, after reviewing 
the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Boucher v. Sweet, 147 A.3d 
71, 73 (R.I. 2016). 
28. 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1956). 
29. Walmsley, 156 A.3d at 426–27. 
30. Id. at 427. 
31. Id. (citing Simeone v. Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 446–47 (R.I. 2000)). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 428 (citing Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, 727 
A.2d 676, 681 (R.I. 1999)). 
34. 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1956). 
35. Walmsley, 156 A.3d at 428. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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amount of loss endured by the estate.38 Whether it was one actor 
or ten, the minimum recovery, as a whole, is $250,000.39 
Thus, the Court found that the hearing justice was correct in 
declining to hold Walmsley individually liable for $250,000 
because the Goffe and Petrarca Releases reduced the claim 
against him as a joint tortfeasor.40 The Court concluded that 
statutory minimum of the Wrongful Death Act is subject to joint 
and several liability principles.41 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly articulated the 
relationship between release of joint tortfeasors and the Wrongful 
Death Act regarding minimum damages.42 The Court explained 
that it “must ‘consider the entire statute as a whole; individual 
sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory 
scheme, not as if each section were independent of all the other 
sections.’”43 Within this framework, the Court concluded that 
section 10-7-2, the minimum-damage provision of the Wrongful 
Death Act, could be reconciled with section 10-6-7, the release of 
joint tortfeasors, because not doing so would produce an absurd 
result.44 
As such, the Rhode Island Supreme Court clarifies the 
statutory scheme of the Wrongful Death Act in accordance with 
multiple tortfeasors when some of those tortfeasors are released 
prior to trial. On its face, the language of the Wrongful Death 
Act’s minimum recovery is not clear in identifying that joint and 
several liability applies; however, the Court’s interpretation now 
gives light to the fact that the statute should be read that all of 
the tortfeasors together owe a minimum of $250,000 to the 
plaintiff. It seems to be that this reasoning would apply whether 
the joint tortfeasors were released or not, meaning that if multiple 
parties continued on to trial, in the aggregate, the result would be 
the same. By reading the statute in this light, the Court clarifies 
 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 429. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 426 (quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)). 
44. Id. at 428. 
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the rule that when there are multiple tortfeasors in a wrongful 
death action, their recovery is an overall minimum of $250,000 
whether there are ten defendants or two. 
The holding and reasoning of the Court in this case is sound 
because “individual sections must be considered in the context of 
the entire statutory scheme.”45 Therefore, the minimum damage 
provision of the Wrongful Death Act should be read in conjunction 
with the section on release of joint tortfeasors when the facts lend 
themselves to this analysis. Reading the minimum damage 
provision as applying to each tortfeasor separately would produce 
an absurd result. The purpose of this provision is to make a 
plaintiff whole again and to set a minimum in remedying them for 
their loss. It would be unfair if each plaintiff had a different 
statutory minimum depending on the number of defendants 
involved. Reading the Wrongful Death Act’s minimum recovery as 
a per-claim basis garners a just and fair result for all plaintiffs to 
whom it applies. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that under the 
Wrongful Death Act, a plaintiff’s minimum recovery is subject to 
joint and severable liability.  The Court determined that allowing 
a plaintiff to separately recover a minimum of $250,000 from each 
defendant would yield absurd results and thus was contrary to the 
intent of the legislature. 
 
Jillian Nobis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45. State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013). 
  
 
 
 
 
Tort Law. Roach v. State, 157 A.3d 1042 (R.I.  2017).  The  
general statutory tort cap applicable in tort cases asserted against 
the State does not apply when the State engages in a “proprietary 
function in commission of the tort.” An entity may be capable of 
fulfilling both governmental and proprietary functions. However, 
the only relevant functions in the tort cap analysis are those that 
give rise to the tort claim. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On November 10, 2008, the Plaintiff, Ms. Victoria Roach (the 
Plaintiff), slipped and fell on a moist area of a bathroom floor 
during her shift as a nurse at the Rhode Island Veterans Home 
(Veterans Home).1 The Veterans Home is a nursing home for 
Rhode Island veterans, housing veterans predominately between 
seventy and eighty years old with varying degrees of self- 
sufficiency.2 The veterans reside in rooms and are assigned 
particular units. Each unit includes two wings and the wings 
contain thirty or forty residents on each side.3 
The Plaintiff’s accident occurred in a bedroom within Unit N-
7, which was comprised of residents that “required heightened 
care” and “palliative (end of life) residents.”4 In order to 
accommodate the needs of these residents, the Veterans Home 
customarily staffed a charge nurse, a staff nurse, and several 
Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) for each  shift.5  On 
November 10, 2008, the Plaintiff reported to work for her 4 p.m. to 
 
 
1. Roach v. State, 157 A.3d 1042, 1044 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. The Veterans Home is “statutorily organized and governed under 
Rhode Island’s Department of Human Services.” Id. In order to reside at the 
home, the individual must be a Rhode Island resident veteran who served 
during a time of war. Id. Residents range from “totally independent to 
bedridden.” Id. at 1045. 
3. Id. at 1045. The two wings are referred to as “sides A and B.” Id. 
4. Id. Many of these residents “needed help getting out of bed and 
ambulating, using the bathroom, eating and bathing.” Id. 
5. Id. 
 
745 
 746 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:745 
 
12 a.m. shift at the Veterans Home.6 In order to obtain 
information about the Veterans Home’s procedures and orient 
herself with her new work environment, the Plaintiff arrived to 
work early and met with the Unit’s charge nurse, Ms. Cheryl 
Kelley (Kelley).7 
After Kelley’s introduction, the Plaintiff began her first task 
of administering medication to the Unit N-7 residents.8 After 
visiting a few rooms, she arrived at Room B-7, which was the 
home of two resident-patients.9 The Plaintiff administered one of 
the resident-patient’s medications in pill form, which she served in 
a Dixie cup.10 The resident received his pill with a 90-cubic- 
centimeter Dixie cup filled about halfway with water.11 After the 
resident-patient ingested the pill, the Plaintiff discarded the 
medication cup into the trash and approached the bathroom in 
order to dispose of the remaining water in the Dixie cup.12 
However, upon her entrance into the bathroom, she slipped and 
fell on the bathroom floor.13 The Plaintiff stated that the smell of 
the liquid on the floor indicated to her that it was “cleaning 
solution or soapy water[,]” which is typically used to bathe the 
residents.14 The liquid dampened her back and the side of her 
pants, and as a result of her fall, she suffered a torn anterior 
cruciate ligament (ACL) and a torn meniscus.15 
The Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against the State of Rhode 
Island and Gary Alexander in his official capacity as Director of 
the Rhode Island Department of Human Services (collectively, the 
Defendants), and a trial by jury commenced on March 12, 2014.16 
 
6. Id. The plaintiff was a contract nurse and worked on a per diem 
basis for MAS Medical Staffing. Id. 
7. Id. Kelley showed her “the treatment cart, medical cart, bathroom 
and kitchen.” Id. The plaintiff also reviewed the list of unit residents’ 
medications, which she would be administering during her shift. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. Resident 1 was a double amputee, who often remained in a wheel 
chair and needed assistance accessing the toilet, which required the use of a 
lift. Id. Resident 2 suffered from end-stage Parkinson’s disease and also 
needed assistance moving from his bed to his wheelchair. Id. at 1046. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 1046, 1048. 
16. Id. at 1044. 
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Upon the close of the Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the Defendants 
moved for judgment as a matter of law as permitted by Rule 50 of 
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.17 Ultimately, on 
March 19, 2017, the jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000.18 
Shortly thereafter, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Superior 
Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendants filed a motion for a 
new trial and a motion to amend judgment and sought a 
remittitur.19 On April 17, 2014, the trial justice issued a bench 
decision denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter 
of law and motion for a new trial, but granting the remittitur, 
which reduced the Plaintiff’s award to $382,000.20 However, 
prejudgment interest increased the judgment to  $631,373.66.21 
On April 30, 2014, the Defendants appealed the judgment and 
presented the following arguments: “(1) the public-duty doctrine 
shields the state from liability; (2) the statutory cap in Rhode 
Island General Laws section 9-31-2 limits damages to $100,000; 
(3) the prejudgment interest award was improper; (4) the trial 
justice erred in denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a 
matter of law; and (5) the trial justice erred in failing to instruct 
the jury on comparative negligence.”22 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial justice’s bench decision, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court addressed the Defendants’ appellate 
arguments in turn, starting with a de novo review of the 
applicability of the public-duty doctrine.23 The public-duty 
doctrine serves to “shield the state from liability in limited 
circumstances.”24 The Court sought to determine whether the 
function that gave rise to the Plaintiff’s injuries was a 
 
17. Id. The Defendants later renewed their motion for judgment as a 
matter of law at the close of evidence. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 1048. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1049. 
24.  Id. at 1050.  “[T]he public duty doctrine immunizes the state from  
‘tort liability arising out of discretionary governmental actions that by their 
nature are not ordinarily performed by private persons.’” Id. (quoting  
Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d 721, 730 (R.I. 2006)). 
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discretionary governmental activity protected under the public- 
duty doctrine or an act capable of performance by private 
citizens.25 The Defendants’ argument on this issue was quickly 
disposed of by the Court. The Defendants attempted to frame the 
activity at issue as “the Veteran Home’s maintenance[,]” which it 
argued cannot be replicated by a private person because the 
Veterans Home is statutorily created with its management vested 
in the Director of Human Services.26 
The Court agreed with the trial justice when it rejected this 
argument because the public-duty doctrine test narrowly 
examines the underlying activity that gave rise to the tort.27  
Here, the function the Court examined was “care for nursing home 
resident-patients.”28 With the function properly framed in this 
manner, it was clear to the Court that the Veterans Home 
performs similar tasks as private nursing homes. Particularly,  
the Court noted that both entities “house[] and care for patients, 
which includes care from agency-employed nurses.”29 Moreover, 
the trial justice noted, and the Court reinforced, that “daily 
nursing care and nursing care facilities are not unique to state 
entities.”30 Thus, because the Defendants engaged in a function 
capable of being performed by a private citizen or entity, the 
public-duty doctrine did not apply. 
The Court’s next issue to review was whether or not the 
statutory damage limitation applied to the case at bar. The Court 
acknowledged that “Rhode Island operates under a general 
statutory-damage limitation applicable in tort cases asserted 
against the state.”31 While the Court acknowledged the existence 
 
25. Id. at 1051. 
26. Id. 
27. See id. at 1052. “[T]he administration, operation, or maintenance (in 
a broad sense) of the Veterans Home is not at issue. Rather the pertinent 
government function is resident-patient care.” Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1051. The Plaintiff was in fact an agency employed nurse. Id. 
at 1045. 
30. Id. at 1051. 
31. Id. at 1052. The Court referred to the following provision: 
In any tort action against the State of Rhode Island or any political 
subdivision thereof, any damages recovered therein shall not exceed 
the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); provided, 
however, that in all instances in which the state was engaged in a 
proprietary function in the commission of the tort, or in any 
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of the cap, it quickly shifted to the proprietary function exception 
stated within section 9-31-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws.32 
In determining whether or not the activity within this case is a 
proprietary function, the Court provided the following two 
definitions of the term: (1) “actions normally performed by private 
individuals,” and (2) “one which is not ‘so intertwined with 
governing that the government is obligated to perform it only by 
its own agents or employees.’”33 In reconciling these definitions, 
the Court articulated the similarities between them: specifically, 
the fact that both definitions “pinpoint the function at issue” and 
“examine whether it is so significantly tied to governing that 
private persons or entities could not justifiably fulfill it.”34 
The Defendants argued that the damages cap applies because 
“Veterans Home maintenance is a governmental function.”35 
Moreover, it asserted that the trial justice applied the improper 
test in analyzing the cap.36 According to its analysis, the proper 
question was whether the Defendants “engaged in a proprietary 
function in the commission of the tort.”37 In response, the Court 
stated that although the public-duty doctrine and statutory tort 
cap standards tend to be very similar, the trial justice “properly 
framed the issue before her.”38 The Defendants’ argument was 
unpersuasive principally because the inquiry into whether private 
individuals regularly engage in a function is tantamount to 
“asking whether the Veterans Home, in commission of the tort, 
acted in a proprietary manner.”39 
 
situation whereby the state has agreed to indemnify the federal 
government or agency thereof for any tort liability, the limitation on 
damages set forth in this section shall not apply. 
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-2 (1984). Id. 
32. See id. “[The] Court recognizes that damages above $100,000 are 
permitted when the tort action stems from the state’s ‘proprietary function.’” 
Id. 
33. Id. at 1052 (quoting Lepore v. Rhode Island Public  Transit 
Authority, 524 A.2d 574, 575 (R.I. 1987)). The Court “recognizes the 
somewhat murky nature of deciphering when the state executes a proprietary 
versus a governmental function.” Id. at 1053. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. The Defendants argue the trial justice “improperly applied the 
public-duty doctrine standard.” Id. at 1053. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 1054. 
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Similarly, the Court was unmoved by the Defendants’ 
argument that the Veterans Home “is a creature of statute and 
therefore is protected by the tort cap.”40 The Court stated that 
whether an entity is statutorily created is not relevant to this 
particular issue. Instead, the proper analysis considers the 
function that gave rise to the tort. In fact, the Court concluded 
that if it accepted the Defendants’ argument, then it would be 
difficult to envision the Veterans Home, or any other statutorily 
organized state entity, ever being fully liable in tort.41 
Finally, on the issue of statutory tort cap damages, the Court 
made a concerted effort to indicate its awareness that entities are 
capable of performing both governmental functions and 
proprietary functions.42 Insofar as the Veterans Home is capable 
of fulfilling both functions, the Court made clear that the activity 
giving rise to the State’s liability in this case involved purely 
proprietary functions.43 However, the Court stated that Veterans 
Home certainly would also be capable of performing a 
governmental function.44 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that 
the test is “fact-intensive,” which requires an examination of the 
“underlying activity or function at issue rather than the entity 
itself.”45 Accordingly, the proper conclusion in this case warranted 
the trial justice’s rejection of the tort cap’s application. 
In reviewing its third issue, the Court shifted its inquiry to 
prejudgment interest.46 The Defendants argued that the Court 
erred in awarding prejudgment interest.47 Furthermore, the 
Defendants argued that the Plaintiff’s failure to request 
prejudgment interest precluded recovery.48 The Court analyzed 
 
 
40. Id. at 1053. 
41. Id. at 1054. “To accept the [Defendants’] assertions would morph 
current jurisprudence into a cursory analysis whereby statutory organization 
alone is sufficient to limit the state’s liability.” Id. at 1054. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. These activities include functions related to resident-care 
functions of CNAs and contracted housekeepers. Id. 
44. Id. at 1054–55. The Court uses the example of a scenario where the 
management and operation of the Veterans Home might involve 
“discretionary government decision making, such as negligence flowing from 
the director’s decision to admit or not admit a resident-patient.” Id. at 1055. 
45. Id. 
46. See id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
 2018] SURVEY SECTION 751 
 
these arguments one at a time beginning with the Defendants’ 
argument that prejudgment interest was improper.49 In doing so, 
the Court highlighted an exception to the general rule that 
prejudgment interest is not awarded against the State.50  As is  
the common theme throughout this case, the exception “turn[ed] 
on the proprietary versus governmental function distinction.”51 
Thus, because the Defendants “acted in a proprietary, rather than 
governmental, manner,” the Defendants were subject to 
prejudgment interest.52 
Additionally, in addressing the Defendants’ second argument 
that the Plaintiff’s failure to request prejudgment interest 
precluded recovery, the Court disagreed for two reasons. First,  
the statute itself makes no indication that the Plaintiff was 
required to request prejudgment interest.53 
Second, the Court relied on precedent indicating that the 
Plaintiff did not have to request prejudgment interest in order to 
receive it.54 As a result, the Plaintiff’s award of prejudgment 
interest was not improper. 
In reconciling the Defendants’ argument that the trial justice 
erred in denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, the Court highlighted the significant amount of findings 
that the trial justice articulated. The Defendants argued that “the 
[P]laintiff’s case relie[d] on impermissible inference building in 
that [the] [P]laintiff did not eliminate other possible causes of the 
 
 
 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1056. The relevant interest statute stated the following: 
In any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision made 
for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the clerk of court to 
the amount of damages interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) 
per annum thereon from the date the cause of action accrued, which 
shall be included in the judgment entered therein. 
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10. 
54. Id. at 1056; see Cardi Corp. v. State, 561 A.2d 384, 387 (R.I. 1989) 
(“Whether [the plaintiff] specifically requested the interest by motion [is] not 
relevant to the awarding of prejudgment interest pursuant to 9 R.I. Gen. 
Laws Ann. § 21-10 (West 2017). This Court has long held that the awarding 
of such interest is a ministerial act for the clerk of the court, not an issue to 
be decided by the court.”). 
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spill.”55 In response, the Court concluded that the evidence 
provided was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to reach a 
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.56 
Finally, the Court addressed the State’s argument that the 
trial justice erroneously refused to instruct the jury on 
comparative negligence. The Court agreed with the trial justice’s 
finding that the Defendants had not presented a  clear 
comparative negligence theory.57 In addition, the Court refused to 
review a new comparative negligence theory for the first time on 
appeal and considered it waived under the “raise-or-waive rule.”58 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court further established that the 
statutory cap in tort actions against the State is subject to an 
impactful and divisive “proprietary function” exception.59 
Acknowledging “the somewhat murky nature of deciphering when 
the state executes a proprietary versus a governmental function,” 
the Court elected to follow a line of cases that focused on the 
nature of the activity at issue in order to determine whether the 
Defendants’ actions constituted a proprietary function.60 This 
analysis included identifying the function giving rise to liability 
and examining “whether it [was] so significantly tied to governing 
that private persons or entities could not possibly fulfill it.”61 
Thus, according to the majority, a proprietary function is 
undoubtedly a function or activity that is capable of being 
 
 
55. Id. The Defendants further contend that “because a third party  
with Room B-7 access may have caused the spill, a reasonable jury should not 
have been allowed to find that a CNA or housekeeper caused it, or that the 
liquid was present long enough to alert a CAN to its existence.” Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. The Defendants argued a comparative negligence  instruction 
was appropriate because the “[P]laintiff (1) failed to supervise CNAs and (2) 
failed to notify the CNAs; and alternatively (3) did not properly enter Room 
B-7 to administer medications. Id. at 1057. 
58. “It is well settled [under our raise-or-waive rule] that a litigant 
cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not 
raised before the trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828– 
29 (R.I. 2008)). 
59. Id. at 1053. The statutory cap does not apply when “the state was 
engaged in a proprietary function in the commission of the tort.” Id. 
60. Id. at 1052. 
61. Id. at 1053. 
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routinely performed by a private person or entity.62 
While the majority was comfortable with its method for 
determining a proprietary function, Justice Robinson proceeded 
down a different analytical path in his dissenting opinion. Based 
on his analysis, Justice Robinson reached the conclusion that the 
statutory cap should apply in this case.63 The difference rests in 
the manner by which he defined proprietary function. Justice 
Robinson treated the issue of defining “proprietary function” as 
one of statutory interpretation and therefore sought to glean the 
Legislature’s intent in drafting the statute.64 He believed that the 
intent was “to limit the amount of damage awards in the 
governmental tort context save only for the genuinely exceptional 
case where government engages in a ‘proprietary function.’”65 
Thus, in adhering to the purpose of the statutory tort cap,66 
Justice Robinson followed a different line of cases in defining 
proprietary function.67 
Justice Robinson devoted his attention to cases that focus on 
“whether or not the alleged tort was somehow related to the 
maintenance of a public building” rather than those that focus on 
the nature of the activity at issue.68 Utilizing this test, which 
guarantees that fewer functions will be deemed proprietary, he 
concluded that because the Plaintiff “was injured as a result of 
activities that related to the maintenance of the Veterans Home 
(incontestably a government building),” her case should not be 
exempted from the statutory tort cap.69 
There are stark implications for how “proprietary function” is 
defined within the text of the statutory cap statute. The approach 
adopted by Justice Robinson certainly has the effect of shrinking 
 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 1058. 
64. Id. at 1059. 
65. Id. at 1058. 
66. See Barrat v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219,  1225  (R.I. 1985) (noting 
that the purpose of the statutory tort cap is to “protect the state’s treasury 
against excessive claims”). 
67. Roach, 157 A.3d at 1058. 
68. Id. at 1058. In abandoning the majority’s approach to defining 
proprietary function, Justice Robinson remarked that “such a focus is not 
rooted in the statutory language and constitutes an ‘Open Sesame’ for 
enormous damage awards . . . .” Id. at 1061. 
69. Id. at 1062. 
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the number of plaintiffs that would enjoy exemption from the 
statutory cap in tort actions against the State, which he believes 
properly aligns with the purpose of the statute.70 However, 
without clarification by the General Assembly as to the scope of 
the “proprietary function” exception to the statutory cap, the true 
intent of the General Assembly on this issue will remain unclear. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that statutory cap 
under Rhode Island General Laws section 9-31-2 did not apply to 
the case at bar because the Veterans Home’s resident care 
activities of CNAs and contracted housekeepers constituted 
proprietary functions. The Court reached this conclusion by 
determining that these underlying functions were routinely 
performed by private individuals. 
 
Koye Idowu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70. See id. at 1063. “The obvious goal of the  General  Assembly  in 
enacting the Tort Claims Act was to allow some measure of relief to plaintiffs 
seeking relief for alleged governmental torts while also protecting taxpayers 
from having to be responsible for very large awards of damages.” Id. 
  
 
 
 
 
Workers’ Compensation. Ajax Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 
154 A.3d 913 (R.I. 2017). The Rhode Island Workers’ 
Compensation Act does not require coverage from a single policy 
or insurer; an employer can satisfy the Act’s requirements with 
multiple policies or multiple insurers. Where there is overlapping 
coverage, liability is not determined by the forum in which the 
injured employee decides to file a claim. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On October 26, 2004, Mark Furia, an iron worker for Ajax 
Construction Company (Ajax), was injured on a job site in Milton, 
Massachusetts.1 Furia filed a claim against Ajax in Rhode Island 
Workers’ Compensation Court, and shortly thereafter, Ajax 
petitioned the same court to determine which of its insurers would 
be responsible for making payments to Furia.2 Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company (Liberty) was Ajax’s workers’ compensation 
insurer in Massachusetts; Beacon Mutual Insurance Company 
(Beacon) insured Ajax in Rhode Island.3 
Ajax is based in Harrisville, Rhode Island, but does work in 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and 
Rhode Island.4 It carries workers’ compensation insurance in 
every state where it does business.5 Premiums were calculated by 
the wages earned by employees in each state—the premium on the 
Liberty policy (Massachusetts) was $282,707, while the premium 
on the Beacon policy (Rhode Island) was just $69,000.6 Furia, like 
other iron workers, did not have one single place of employment, 
but rather moved around to different job sites.7 He stated in his 
deposition that he was hired at Ajax’s headquarters in Rhode 
 
1. Ajax Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 154 A.3d 913, 916 (R.I. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 917. 
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16. Id. 
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Island and had worked in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island during his twelve to fifteen years with the company.8 He 
estimated he spent about seventy percent of his time working in 
Massachusetts and thirty percent of his time working in Rhode 
Island.9 Ajax’s president, Donald Morel, testified that  the 
company could not predict where it would do most of its work in 
any given year, but that historically, eighty percent of its work 
had been done in Massachusetts.10 He stated that  during  the 
year of Furia’s injury, 2004, Ajax did more work in Massachusetts 
than in Rhode Island and it withheld Massachusetts income taxes 
and paid Massachusetts employment taxes for its employees who 
did work in that state.11 
The Workers’ Compensation Court trial judge entered a 
pretrial order on December 22, 2004 that held that Furia had 
sustained a work-related injury; later that day, the trial judge 
entered an interlocutory order requiring Beacon to pay benefits to 
Furia.12 If, after trial, Beacon was found liable, it would receive a 
credit for the payments it had already made to Furia; if Liberty 
was found liable, it would be required to reimburse Beacon for all 
the payments it had already made to Furia.13 
The trial judge issued a bench decision on May 11, 2006, 
finding Ajax liable to Furia under the Rhode Island Workers’ 
Compensation Act (the Act) because it had hired him in Rhode 
Island.14 Beacon, in turn, was liable because Furia brought his 
claim in Rhode Island and because Beacon had issued Ajax’s  
policy pursuant to the Act.15 The trial judge found that Furia had 
a right to payments from a single entity and designated Beacon to 
make the payments; however, he also found that Ajax had 
overlapping coverage in this case and that Liberty needed to 
contribute to Furia’s benefits.16 Although the trial judge found 
that the Act did not provide a particular remedy for this situation, 
he believed that ordering the two insurers to each cover fifty 
 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 916. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 918. 
15. Id. 
27. Id. 
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percent of Furia’s benefits would be equitable and in line with the 
equitable nature of workers’ compensation law.17 Beacon would 
still pay Furia directly, but would receive a credit for the benefits 
it had already paid; Liberty would indemnify Beacon for fifty 
percent of the benefits paid to Furia.18 
All three parties—Ajax, Beacon, and Liberty—appealed to the 
Workers’ Compensation Appellate Division.19 Ajax argued that 
Liberty should be responsible for 100 percent of Furia’s benefits 
because Ajax was paying a premium of more than $280,000 per 
year to cover its employees who worked in and were injured in 
Massachusetts.20 Beacon made the argument, among others, that 
the Liberty policy covered Furia and that the Act, specifically 
Rhode Island General Laws section 28-36-5, did not provide for 
Liberty to avoid paying benefits to Furia directly.21 Liberty  
argued that the same section of the statute required Beacon to 
cover Ajax’s entire liability, and that the Liberty policy only 
covered Massachusetts employees, while Furia was a Rhode 
Island employee.22 
On November 7, 2013, Beacon moved for a decision from the 
Appellate Division; there was no explanation for the seven-year 
delay, which the Rhode  Island  Supreme  Court  found 
troubling.23 The Appellate Division vacated the trial judge’s order 
and held Beacon fully liable.24 It found that Furia was covered 
under the Act, which states that policies apply to “any and all 
employees . . . who are injured or hired in the state of Rhode 
Island”25 and that “every policy shall cover the entire liability of 
the employer . . . .”26 Beacon issued a policy to Ajax  under  the 
Act; Furia brought his claim in Rhode Island, pursuant to the Act; 
and the court awarded him benefits pursuant to the Act.27 The 
Appellate Division found irrelevant the issue of which insurer had 
 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 919. 
23. Id. & n.4. 
24. Id. at 919. 
25. Id. (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–29–1.3). 
26. Id. (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–36–5). 
36. Id. at 920–21. 
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included the worker’s wages in determining the premium.28  It 
also agreed with the trial judge that there was concurrent 
jurisdiction because the Rhode Island Act covers employees hired 
in Rhode Island, and the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation 
Act covers employees injured in Massachusetts; therefore, if Furia 
had filed his claim in Massachusetts, Liberty would have been 
fully responsible.29 
The Appellate Division examined the section in Liberty’s 
policy regarding payment of benefits awarded in another state, 
which stated that Liberty would pay “only if the claim for such 
benefits involves  work  performed  by  a  Massachusetts  
employee . . . .”30 Given that the term “Massachusetts employee” 
was not defined, the court turned to a bulletin issued by the 
Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Rating and Inspection 
Bureau (WCRIB).31 It defined “Massachusetts employee” as an 
individual hired in Massachusetts to work primarily in 
Massachusetts.32 Based on that definition, the Appellate Division 
found that Furia was not a Massachusetts employee and therefore 
Liberty was not responsible for paying benefits awarded to him in 
Rhode Island.33 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the Ajax and 
Beacon petitions for certiorari.34 Ajax argued the Appellate 
Division erred in finding Beacon liable in full and in concluding 
that Liberty’s policy did not cover the benefits awarded to Furia in 
Rhode Island.35 Beacon made the argument, among others, that 
the Appellate Division erred by allowing the forum in which Furia 
filed his claim to dictate Liberty’s liability and by not interpreting 
Liberty’s policy in the light most favorable to the insured—  
Ajax.36 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court focused on two issues in its 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 920. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
44. Id. at 922–23. 
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review: whether the Appellate Division’s interpretation of 
“Massachusetts employee” was correct, and whether its 
interpretation of section 28-36-5 of the Rhode Island General  
Laws was correct, specifically the phrase “entire liability of the 
employer.”37 The Court reviewed both the contract interpretation 
issue and the statutory construction issue de novo. 
Ajax argued that the term “Massachusetts employee” in the 
Liberty policy was unambiguous and that the only reasonable 
interpretation of that term was “an employee who works primarily 
in Massachusetts.”38 It further argued that the Appellate 
Division’s finding that Furia was not a Massachusetts employee 
was “unreasonable and contrary to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the term” because Furia worked primarily in 
Massachusetts.39 Ajax also argued in the alternative that by 
turning to the WCRIB bulletin for a definition of “Massachusetts 
employee,” the Appellate Division determined it was an 
ambiguous term; therefore, the term should have been construed 
against Liberty.40 Beacon argued, similarly, that the Appellate 
Division should not have turned to the WCRIB bulletin because it 
was not included with the Liberty policy or otherwise presented to 
Ajax.41 
Following “the rules of construction that govern contracts,” 
the Court looked to give the term “Massachusetts employee” its 
“plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.”42 The Court held that the 
term was not ambiguous; in fact, any ordinary reader or purchaser 
of the policy would have interpreted it the way Ajax did: a 
Massachusetts employee is an individual who works primarily in 
Massachusetts.43 The Court further held that the Appellate 
Division should not have looked to the WCRIB bulletin because 
the term was not ambiguous, and ambiguity was required for the 
Appellate Division to turn to extrinsic evidence.44 Furthermore, 
the Appellate Division never expressly found the term to be 
 
 
37. Id. at 921–22. 
38. Id. at 921. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 921–22. 
41. Id. at 922. 
42. Id. (citations omitted). 
43. Id. 
52. Id. 
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ambiguous, and, if it had, it would have been obligated to construe 
the policy in favor of Ajax, the insured, and against Liberty, the 
insurer.45 Given that Furia fit the definition of a Massachusetts 
employee, the Court found Liberty liable for his workers’ 
compensation benefits, but had to determine whether Beacon was 
also liable.46 
Regarding the language in section 28-36-5 of the Rhode Island 
General Laws—“entire liability of the employer”—Ajax argued the 
Appellate Division “erroneously broadened the scope” of the 
statute and “failed to further” the legislative intent behind it.47 
Ajax argued that nothing in the statute indicated that coverage 
had to come from one policy and that the Appellate Division’s 
interpretation would lead to “absurd, unintended and 
unreasonable results.”48 Beacon argued that the phrase “entire 
liability of the employer” was ambiguous and that the Appellate 
Division’s interpretation would require employers to obtain 
coverage from the same insurer in every jurisdiction.49 Beacon 
argued that the phrase should be interpreted to mean that  a 
policy cannot exclude benefits required by the statute, but that the 
benefits do not need to come from one policy.50 
The Court agreed that the phrase was ambiguous and,  
looking to the legislative intent, concluded the statute was 
intended to ensure that employers obtained coverage for all their 
employees, regardless of how many policies or insurers were used 
to accomplish that.51 The Court found that the Appellate 
Division’s interpretation held Beacon liable for coverage that was 
not accounted for in its premiums while letting Liberty off the 
hook for coverage that was accounted for in its much higher 
premiums.52 
The Court looked to a Connecticut Supreme Court case for 
guidance, which held that “[f]ull coverage of the entire liability of 
an employer at a given place or places, on specified work, fully 
meets the intent of the statute in this respect,” otherwise, “it 
 
45. Id. at 923. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 923–24. 
51. Id. at 924. 
56. Id. 
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would be necessary for an employer in all cases to obtain a single 
policy covering all his liability in every place, and would prevent 
his taking out several policies in different companies . . . .”53 
Accordingly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that 
employers should not be required to take out all of their policies 
from the same insurer, especially if they can find savings through 
different insurers.54 The Court also found the forum in which the 
claim is filed to be irrelevant to liability in cases of overlapping 
coverage, citing case law from other jurisdictions for support.55 
Rejecting the Appellate Division’s findings on both issues— 
the contract interpretation of “Massachusetts employee” and the 
statutory construction of “entire liability of the employer”—the 
Court found Liberty liable in full, and required Liberty to 
reimburse Beacon for all payments made to Furia.56 
COMMENTARY 
The Court rightly found Liberty liable in this case. It would  
be illogical for Beacon to be entirely liable for Furia’s benefits 
simply because he chose to file his claim in Rhode Island. Injured 
employees likely do not consider which of their employer’s 
insurance companies will be liable when filing their workers’ 
compensation claims. Furthermore, Beacon makes a persuasive 
argument that the term “Massachusetts employee” in the Liberty 
policy is ambiguous and therefore should be construed in favor of 
the insured, Ajax. Despite taking a different approach to this 
issue, the Court arrived at the same result by finding the term 
unambiguous and adopting Ajax’s interpretation. Lastly, the 
Court’s interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language— 
“entire liability of the employer”—appears to accomplish the 
legislative intent. While it does not seem necessary in all 
situations for only one insurer to be liable when there is 
overlapping coverage, in this case, the circumstances pointed to 
Liberty to pay in full. Ajax was paying premiums to Liberty to 
cover exactly this sort of situation—an injury that took place in 
 
 
53. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 155 A. 
709, 713 (1931)). 
54. Ajax, 154 A.3d at 924–25. 
55. Id. at 925. 
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Massachusetts to a worker who spent a majority of his time 
working in Massachusetts—and therefore Liberty should be 
responsible for paying the benefits in full. The Court’s analysis 
produced a commonsense and equitable result. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the idea that the 
forum in which an injured employee files a workers’ compensation 
claim should dictate which of an employer’s insurers should be 
liable. The Court also clarified the meaning of the ambiguous 
phrase in section 28-36-5 of the Rhode Island Workers’ 
Compensation Act—“entire liability of the employer.”  An 
employer can meet the statutory requirements through multiple 
policies and multiple insurers; in fact, it would lead to absurd 
results if employers were required to have only one policy or 
insurer. The Court came to this conclusion by analyzing the 
legislative intent of the statute and by looking to other 
jurisdictions for guidance. 
 
Jessie M. Reniere 
  
 
 
 
 
Zoning.  Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Ass’n v. Pres. Soc’y  
of Newport Cty., 151 A.3d 1223 (R.I. 2017). Under the Zoning 
Enabling Act, a local zoning board has the authority to interpret 
zoning ordinances in determining whether to grant special use 
permits and in considering challenges to the issuance of such 
permits. Interpreting zoning ordinances does not require a zoning 
board to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the pre-existing 
use of property. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The Preservation Society of Newport County (Society) has 
operated the Breakers, a prominent mansion in Newport, Rhode 
Island, as a museum since 1948.1 Until 1977, the  Society  
operated the Breakers as a museum “by right pursuant to the 
zoning ordinance.”2 In that year, Newport amended the ordinance 
to allow for museums in the zone where the Breakers is located, 
but only by issuance of a “special use permit” by the City of 
Newport Zoning Board of Review (Zoning Board or Board).3 In 
1997, the Society applied for a special use permit to build a shed  
to house a vending machine for visitors waiting to enter the 
Breakers, and the Zoning Board granted the permit.4 
In May 2013, the Society applied to the Newport Historic 
District Commission (HDC) for a certificate of appropriateness for 
a Welcome Center near the entrance to the Breakers.5 As 
proposed, the Welcome Center would be approximately 3,650 
square feet and would serve as a location for ticket sales, 
 
 
1. Bellevue-Ochre Neighborhood Ass’n v. Pres. Soc’y of Newport Cty., 
151 A.3d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 2017). The Breakers was originally a summer 
residence for the Vanderbilt family. Gladys Vanderbilt first opened it to the 
public in 1948, and her heirs sold it to the Society in 1972. Id. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1225–26, 1225 n.2 (explaining the process for applying to the 
HDC). 
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concessions, and restrooms.6 The HDC denied the  application, 
and the Society appealed to the Zoning Board.7 The Zoning Board 
granted the Society’s application on March 1, 2014, reversing the 
HDC’s ruling.8 
On March 7, 2014, the Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood 
Association (BOPNA), a corporation of property owners in the 
neighborhood surrounding the Breakers, filed an action for 
declaratory judgment in Rhode Island Superior Court.9 The 
Society moved to dismiss the action, arguing in part that BOPNA 
had improperly bypassed the Zoning Board and that “judicial 
intervention in zoning matters should be reserved until the local 
zoning process is finished.”10 The hearing justice granted the 
Society’s motion to dismiss on July 18, 2014, determining that the 
Zoning Board had the authority to address BOPNA’s claims.11 
BOPNA appealed this ruling on September 9, 2014.12 
After BOPNA filed its appeal, the Society applied for a 
modification of the special use permit it had received in 1997.13    
In a written decision, the Zoning Board granted the application 
and “also addressed—and rejected—many of the arguments raised 
in BOPNA’s complaint.”14 The Zoning Board asserted that, 
contrary to BOPNA’s contention, the Breakers was not a 
nonconforming use because it had received a special use permit in 
1997.15 It also rejected BOPNA’s contention that the zoning 
ordinance prohibited restaurants in the Breakers’ district by 
stating that neither the Breakers nor the proposed Welcome 
 
 
6. Id. at 1225. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1226. BOPNA’s claim asked for declarations that “the 
Breakers is a lawful nonconforming use, and the Welcome Center’s 
construction would be a prohibited movement or change in the land’s 
nonconforming use; the Welcome Center will house a restaurant, and the 
zoning ordinance prohibits restaurant operation on museum property; and, 
lastly, the Welcome Center is an unpermitted accessory use on the Breakers 
property.” Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. The hearing justice also noted that BOPNA had failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies. Id. 
12. Id. at 1227. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
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Center operated primarily to sell food.16 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first sought to determine 
the proper standard of review.17 While BOPNA insisted that the 
Court review the case using the standard of Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the Society contended 
that the Court should conduct a de novo review because the 
hearing justice considered “substantial materials outside of the 
complaint’s four corners,” which “converted the motion to dismiss 
to a summary judgment motion.”18 The Court found that the 
hearing justice had considered several items outside the 
complaint, including Newport’s 1977 and 1994 zoning ordinances 
and all of the materials related to the 1997 special use permit.19 
After determining that the hearing justice’s use of these materials 
converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment, the Court proceeded with a de novo review.20 
The Court then examined BOPNA’s complaint, ascertaining 
at the outset of its analysis that “the crux of the issue before the 
hearing justice was whether the [Z]oning [B]oard had the 
authority to decide the issues raised in BOPNA’s complaint.”21 
Although BOPNA asserted that its complaint presented issues of 
law that only a court had the power to decide, the Court found no 
basis for this argument.22 The Court found that the cases invoked 
by BOPNA had held that a zoning board did not have authority to 
issue declaratory judgments “regarding the pre-existing use of 
property,” a matter entirely separate from interpreting zoning 
ordinances.23 Looking instead to the Newport Zoning Code, the 
Court found that the Zoning Board had the authority to interpret 
 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1228. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 1228–29. The present version of the zoning ordinance was 
adopted in 1994. Id. at 1229. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1229–30. While BOPNA cited two cases in support of this 
argument, the Court found that neither stood for the proposition that a 
zoning board lacked the authority to interpret zoning ordinances.  Id.  at 
1230. 
23. Id. 
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its zoning ordinances.24 The Court noted that the Zoning Board 
would not have had to make a declaratory judgment on the 
Breakers’ pre-existing use if BOPNA had undertaken the proper 
administrative procedures.25 Instead, the Court explained, “the 
[Z]oning [B]oard would have to (and eventually did) interpret the 
zoning ordinance’s provisions, review the society’s application, and 
ultimately determine whether to grant a special use permit.”26 
The Court also addressed the hearing justice’s application of 
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.27 BOPNA 
argued that its complaint fell within an exception to the doctrine 
because it claimed that the Zoning Board lacked jurisdiction to 
address the relevant issues.28 The Court, however, agreed  with 
the hearing justice that the Zoning Board had the power to hear 
BOPNA’s complaint, and determined that the exception did not 
apply.29 It similarly rejected BOPNA’s argument that an 
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile, noting that 
the Zoning Board had authority to hear BOPNA’s complaint and 
had yet to issue a ruling on the proposed Welcome Center at the 
time of the hearing justice’s ruling.30 The Court concluded, 
therefore, that “BOPNA had a mechanism, through the [Z]oning 
[B]oard, to pursue the issues asserted in its complaint.”31 BOPNA 
also asked the Court to interpret the zoning ordinance itself.32  
The Court refused to do so, however, in light of its determination 
that the Zoning Board had the authority to decide the issues 
 
24. Id. at 1229 (quoting Newport Zoning Ordinance § 17.112.010(A): “It 
is the intent of this zoning code that all matters arising in connection with the 
enforcement or interpretation of this zoning code, . . . shall be first presented 
to the zoning officer; and . . . shall be presented to the zoning board of review 
only on appeal . . . .”); see also 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-57(1)(i) (Supp. 
2016) (granting zoning boards of review the power to hear and decide appeals 
regarding any action “by an administrative officer or agency in the 
enforcement or interpretation of this chapter, or of any ordinance adopted 
pursuant hereto”). 
25. Bellevue-Ochre, 151 A.3d at 1230. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1231. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. The Court also agreed with the hearing justice that court 
consideration of BOPNA’s complaint would run counter to the exhaustion of 
remedies doctrine’s four purposes. Id. 
30. Id. at 1232. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
 2018] SURVEY SECTION 767 
raised in the complaint.33 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly established that 
local zoning boards have the authority to interpret zoning 
ordinances in hearing complaints.34 The Court also  confirmed 
that zoning boards do not have the authority to issue declaratory 
judgments, and, thus, determined that such authority is separate 
and distinct from the power to interpret zoning ordinances.35 The 
Newport Zoning Board issued a declaratory judgment as part of  
its decision to grant the modification to the Society’s special use 
permit; however, this declaration did not affect the Zoning Board’s 
ability to determine the meaning of the ordinance. Rather, 
BOPNA’s preemptive filing in court prompted the Zoning Board to 
address BOPNA’s concerns in its decision. Had BOPNA first 
presented its challenge to the Zoning Board, the Board would not 
have needed to issue a declaratory judgment.36 
In this case, the Court sought to make clear that courts 
should only be called upon to interpret a zoning ordinance after 
the local zoning board has done so. The facts of this case revealed 
that BOPNA likely expected that a review of its concerns by the 
Zoning Board would be unfavorable in light of the Board’s decision 
overruling the HDC. Thus, the Court’s decision foreclosed the 
possibility of a party challenging the interpretation of a zoning 
ordinance directly in court in the hope of a favorable ruling and 
eliminated a form of forum shopping in zoning cases. 
The Court also pointed out that compelling plaintiffs to seek 
review by a zoning board before bringing an action in court 
ensures a fairer and more developed case that promotes judicial 
efficiency.37 Adjudication by a zoning board allows a more 
complete version of the facts to take form before the case even 
reaches the court, and allowing a zoning board to develop these 
facts may prevent a court from expending the time to conduct its 
own factfinding process.38 Proceeding in this manner also 
 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1229. 
35. Id. at 1230. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 1231. 
38. Id. (quoting Doe ex rel. His Parents and Natural Guardians v. East 
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presents the possibility that the case will be resolved before it 
reaches a court, thus eliminating the need for any intervention by 
the judiciary.39 By applying the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in this situation, the Court established 
local zoning boards as vehicles of judicial economy in zoning cases; 
by doing so, the Court looks to ensure that fewer of these cases 
require judicial involvement, and that the ones that reach the 
court are sufficiently well developed for judicial review. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a local zoning 
board is vested with the power to interpret local zoning ordinances 
when reaching decisions on whether to grant special use permits 
and when faced with challenges to grants of such permits. The 
Court found that Rhode Island’s Zoning Enabling Act explicitly 
confers this power upon the boards, and that a zoning board’s 
exercise of this power properly serves the interests of allowing the 
board to apply its expertise and facilitating judicial economy. 
 
Patrick Burns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greenwich Sch. Dep’t, 899 A.2d 1258, 1266 (R.I. 2006)). 
39. Id. (quoting Doe, 899 A.2d at 1266). 
  
 
 
 
 
2017 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 51, 60. An Act Relating to Criminal 
Procedure—Identification and Apprehension of Criminals. This 
Act requires all persons eighteen years or older who volunteer or 
work for a religious organization to undergo a national criminal 
background check if the religious organization requests it. The 
Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) will conduct the 
background check and notify the religious organization within 
fourteen days of any disqualifying information.   Any offenses of 
§§23-17-37,  11-37-1   to  11-37-8.4,  and   §§11-9-1   to   11-9-5.3  is 
considered disqualifying information. The applicant is responsible 
for the costs of the criminal records check. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 110, 174. An Act Relating to 
Criminal Procedure—Criminal Injuries Compensation. This Act 
allows criminal injury compensation for a child who suffers 
emotional injury as a direct result of witnessing a homicide or 
instance of domestic violence. The child, their guardian, a child 
advocate, or legal representative may apply on behalf of the child 
for compensation. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 132, 150. An Act Relating to 
Insurance—Coverage for Infertility. This Act requires any health 
insurance contract, plan, or policy that includes pregnancy-related 
benefits to provide coverage for fertility preservation services when 
medically necessary medical treatment may cause iatrogenic 
infertility to a covered person. This Act also applies to nonprofit 
hospital service, nonprofit medical service, and health maintenance 
organization service contracts, plans, or policies. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 133, 146. An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses—Fraud and False Dealing. This Act 
criminalizes a person who, with the intent to defraud, knowingly 
omits a material fact or makes a written misrepresentation during 
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the mortgage lending process with the intention that a mortgage 
lender, borrower, or other person will rely on that 
misrepresentation or omission. This Act also includes the knowing 
use or facilitation of an omission or misrepresentation of a material 
fact during the mortgage lending process with the intention that a 
mortgage lender, borrower, or other person will rely on that 
misrepresentation or omission. Solicitation or conspiracy are also 
prohibited by this Act. Violators of the Act shall be subject to 
imprisonment of not more than ten years, a fine not more than 
$10,000, or both. Furthermore, the violator will be forced to 
disgorge any profits and pay restitution to any victims. The 
penalties may be increased if the offender knew the victim was 
vulnerable due to age, disability, infirmity, reduced physical or 
mental capacity, or national origin. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 167. An Act Relating to Motor and 
Other Vehicles—Mobile Telephone Use. This Act prohibits 
operators of motor vehicles from using a hand-held personal 
wireless communication device to make calls while the vehicle is in 
motion. The Act presumes that a hand-held personal wireless 
communication device in the immediate proximity of the operator’s 
ear while the vehicle is in motion to be making a call. Listening or 
talking on such a device is considered “engaging in a call,” but 
activating or deactivating a function of the phone is not. This Act 
does not apply to communicating with an emergency response 
officer, hospital, doctor’s office, fire department, ambulance 
company, police department, or public utility. Further, this Act 
does not apply to peace officers, firefighters, operators of an 
emergency vehicle, taxi-cab drivers, tow-truck operators, or 
employees or agents of a public utility. Finally, this Act does not 
apply to a hands-free device. Violation of this Act will result in a 
$100 fine, except for first-time offenders who purchase a hands-free 
device prior to imposition of the fine. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 186, 328. An Act Relating to Health 
and Safety—Department of Health. This Act prohibits any licensed 
medical, mental health, or human services professional from 
advertising or engaging in conversion therapy for patients under 
eighteen years old. Conversion therapy means any practice that 
seeks to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender 
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identity. Conversion therapy does not include counseling that 
provides assistance to those undergoing gender transition or 
provides support for identity exploration. Conversion therapy 
provided by a licensed professional shall be considered 
unprofessional conduct and subject them to discipline by the 
department including suspension and revocation of the 
practitioner’s license. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 207, 250. An Act Relating to Food 
and Drugs—Uniform Controlled Substances Act. This Act requires 
any health care professional authorized to issue prescriptions, prior 
to an initial prescription of an opioid drug, to discuss the risk of 
developing dependence or addiction and potential overdose with the 
patient. The health care professional must also discuss the adverse 
risk of concurrent alcohol or other psychoactive medication use and 
discuss other alternative treatments, if appropriate. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 435. An Act Relating to Motor and 
Other Vehicles—Motor Vehicle Offenses. This Act creates penalties 
for a second violation within a five year period with respect to 
refusal of a blood test. The penalties are a fine of $600 to $1,000; 
60 to 100 hours of community service; and suspension of the 
offender’s driver’s license for two years. For a third violation, 
penalties are a fine of $800 to $1,000; not less than 100 hours of 
community service; and suspension of the offender’s driver’s license 
for between 2 and 5 years. Additionally, the sentencing judicial 
officer shall require alcohol and/or drug treatment for that person 
and prohibit them from operating a motor vehicle not equipped with 
an ignition interlock system. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 222, 334. An Act Relating to 
Domestic Relations—Visitation Rights. This Act specifies a list of 
factors for the family court to consider on a case-by-case basis in 
determining whether grandparents get visitation rights. In 
considering whether it is in the child’s best interest, courts now 
consider: 
(A) The nature of the relationship between the child and 
the grandparent seeking visitation; 
(B) The amount of time the grandparent and child spent 
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together; 
(C) The potential detriments and benefits to the child from 
granting visitation; 
(D) The potential effect of granting visitation on the 
parent-child relationship; 
(E) The preferences of the grandchild who is of sufficient 
intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a 
preference; and 
(F) The reasons that the parent(s) believe that it is not in 
their child’s best interests to have visitation with the 
grandparent(s). 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 229, 318. An Act Relating to 
Education—Student Journalists’ Freedom of Expression Act. This 
Act extends the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press 
in school-sponsored media to student journalists regardless of 
financial support by the school. This Act does not authorize or 
protect expression that is libelous or slanderous, constitutes an 
invasion of privacy, violates a federal or state law, or incites 
students into creating a clear and present danger of an unlawful 
act, violation of school district policy, or a material and substantial 
disruption of the orderly operation of the school. A student 
journalist may not be disciplined for acting in accordance with this 
Act. A student media advisor may not be dismissed, suspended, 
disciplined, reassigned, transferred, or retaliated against for 
protecting a student journalist, or refusing to infringe on conduct 
protected by this Act. 
 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 232, 260. An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses—Uniform Act on the Prevention of and 
Remedies For Human Trafficking. This Act repealed and replaced 
the law titled “Trafficking of Persons and Involuntary Servitude.” 
Any person that knowingly recruits, transports, transfers, harbors, 
receives, provides, obtains, isolates, maintains, or entices an 
individual to further forced labor or sexual servitude commits 
human trafficking. The Act defines “forced labor” as knowingly 
using coercion to compel another to provide labor or services, except 
when otherwise permissible. “Sexual servitude” occurs when one 
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knowingly either: (1) maintains or makes available a minor for the 
purpose of engaging the minor in commercial sexual activity; or (2) 
uses coercion or deception to compel an adult to engage in 
commercial sexual activity. The Act also criminalizes individuals 
who knowingly patronize a victim of sexual servitude and business 
entities who engage in human trafficking. In addition, the Act 
includes aggravating factors for recruiting the victim from shelters 
that serve victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, or foster 
children and kidnapping or holding an individual against his or her 
will. The identity or images of the alleged victim will be kept 
confidential unless they are necessary for investigation or 
prosecution, and the past sexual behavior of the victim is generally 
not admissible. The Act also provides immunity for minor victims 
of this crime and presumes them abused and/or neglected, while 
also providing an affirmative defense to prostitution and 
solicitation charges for victims. The Act creates a civil action 
victims can bring against traffickers for compensatory damages, 
punitive damages, injunctive relief, and any other appropriate 
relief. The court will award attorneys’ fees and costs if the action is 
successful. The statute of limitations for that action is ten years 
after an individual was last a victim of trafficking, or turned 
eighteen years old, whichever is later. The Act also creates a 
council, appointed by the governor, to develop plans to provide 
victims with services, author an annual report to the governor, 
promote awareness of the topic, coordinate prevention services for 
employees who come into recurring contact with victims, and any 
other appropriate activities. Further, the Act requires any public 
or quasi-public transportation service to display an awareness sign. 
Certain employers, like strip-clubs or job recruitment centers, must 
also display the public awareness sign. The Act requires law 
enforcement to give an I-914B or I-918B form provided by the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to someone 
reasonably believed to be a victim. 
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 344, 354. An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses—General Provisions. This Act revises the 
previous definition of “bodily injury,” and broadens felony assault 
to include assaults that does not result in injury. “Bodily injury” 
now includes physical injury that causes physical pain, illness, or 
any impairment of physical condition. 
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2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 386, 424. An Act Relating to Human 
Services—Abused and Neglected Children. This Act requires 
physicians or registered nurse practitioners or other health care 
providers involved in the delivery or care of infants born with or 
affected by substance abuse resulting from prenatal drug exposure 
or fetal alcohol spectrum disorder to report the incident to the 
Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) or a law 
enforcement agency. 
